act by which he conferred the Electorate upon Maximilian. The Archduke Charles, the Emperor's brother, was despatched to Dresden, to gain over John George. Hyacintho himself was to go to Madrid, to wring, if possible, an assent from the King of Spain.1

Whatever Englishmen might think about the matter, it was from Spain that the most strenuous opposition was to be expected. If the Spanish Government continued to take August. Objections part in the war at all, it was only because Frederick's of Spain. folly made it impossible for them to withdraw with honour. In June the Council of State at Madrid was looking forward with hope to a general pacification. Then had come the news of Mansfeld's excesses in Würzburg and Leuchtenberg, and it was necessary to take the change of circumstances into consideration. Zuñiga was consulted, and his advice was embodied in a despatch written by Philip to his ambassador at Vienna. "By all means,” such was the substance of the letter, "take care to oppose the pretensions of the Duke of Bavaria to the Electorate. Induce the Emperor, if possible, to satisfy him by the cession of the district of Burgau, or of some other Austrian territory. Every day increases the necessity for obtaining a settlement to which the Palatine will agree. Probably the best solution is that which has been indicated by a councillor of the Elector of Saxony. If Frederick would abdicate the Electorate, his son might at once be accepted as his successor, and educated at the Emperor's Court." 2 A few days later Philip wrote again, approving the supSept. 1. port which Oñate had given to Digby. It was necessary, he said, that the troops in the Lower Palatinate should come to the assistance of the Bavarians, but he hoped that the negotiations for a general pacification would not be postponed.3

The plan thus put forward by the Spanish Government is the more noteworthy because it continued to be the object of its

1 Hurter, Gesch. Ferdinands II. ix. 158.

2 Consulta by Zuñiga, Aug. (?), Simancas MSS. 2506, fol. 4. Philip IV. to Oñate, Aug. Brussels MSS.

20

30'

1621

dation of

Frederick's

THE SPANISH PLAN.

221

desires till the course of events made the position which it now took up altogether untenable. It sprang from a proRecommen- found conviction that with Frederick no peace was abdication. possible. It had the advantage of offering a middle ground upon which both parties might agree. It had the disadvantage with which all the schemes proceeding from the Catholic side were attended. It dealt only with the wrongs of the princes, and forgot the wrongs of the people. That education at the Emperor's Court involved a change of religion it was impossible to doubt; and as matters stood in Germany, the voluntary conversion of a prince carried with it the forcible conversion of his subjects. Perhaps if some neutral Protestant Court had been substituted for Vienna as the place of education, the plan might ultimately have been found to promise the most satisfactory solution; but it was evidently premature to expect that it would as yet be acceptable to anyone.

If better terms were to be obtained, it was indispensable that Frederick should be brought to his senses. Ac

Mission of Villiers to the Hague.

cordingly James, finding that his son-in-law paid no attention whatever to his letters, despatched Sir Edward Villiers to Holland, with orders to insist upon his return from the Dutch camp. Frederick saw the necessity of obeying, and whilst Sir Edward was journeying towards him by one road to the camp, he hurried back to the Hague, like a truant schoolboy, by another. It was more difficult to extract from him a promise that he would make the required submission to the Emperor. He placed in Villiers' hands a lengthy argument by which he proved, to his own satisfaction, that such a step would be ruinous to his country and dishonourable to himself. At last, however, he yielded, and protested that he would do as he was bidden.2

Nor did James stand alone in urging upon Frederick the necessity of submitting. In a letter written to him about this time by the Princes of Lower Saxony, the blame of all that had occurred is distinctly ascribed to his own restlessness; and his

1 Brieve déduction des Causes, &c., Sept. 29, S. P. Germany.

2 Frederick to the King, Oct. 3, S. P. Germany. Carleton to Trum, bull, Oct. 4; Villiers to Carleton, Oct. 10, S. P. Holland.

1

obstinacy is characterised as the chief impediment to the peace of Germany. Even Frederick's own subjects in the Palatinate were of the same opinion. Men openly said that if he had but written a few lines to the Emperor, all would have been well.2

Experience was not very favourable to the hope that Frederick would take these admonitions to heart. Yet, consiDigby at dering the interests that were at stake, Digby was no Heidelberg. doubt right in refusing to throw up the game. He had been summoned in haste to Heidelberg to assist in providing for the defence of the Lower Palatinate. He found the troops in a pitiable condition. The Spaniards were masters of the open country on both sides of the Rhine. Vere's little

force of three or four thousand men was fully employed in garrisoning Heidelberg, Mannheim, and Frankenthal. The troops at Frankenthal, which was soon actually besieged by Cordova, were under the command of Sir John Burroughs, a brave and skilful veteran. He was supported by the ardour of the townspeople, who mainly consisted of Protestant emigrants from the Spanish Netherlands. Yet it was evident that, unless succour came, he could not hold out long. Nor was this the worst. There were symptoms that the same causes which had produced the defection of the inhabitants of the Upper Palatinate, were operating in the Lower. "The gentry of the country were using means to be preserved in their estates and goods." The people were groaning under their hardships, and were seeking an accommodation with the enemy. Vere's men were almost in open mutiny for want of pay, and food to satisfy them was not to be had.

He supplies the Council with money.

Such was the position of affairs when Digby arrived. He was not the man to shrink from responsibility. Though without orders, he would supply what was needed to carry on the defence of the country. He borrowed money on his own credit from the Nuremberg bankers. He sent his plate to the melting-pot. In this way he got together 1 The Princes and States of Lower Saxony to Frederick, Oct. 20, S. P. Germany:

8, 18 2 Camerarius to Solms, Sept. Söltl, Religionskreig, iii. 133, 135. 18, 28' The Council of Heidelberg to Digby, Sept. 21, Sherborne MSS.

1621

DIGBY'S ACTIVITY.

223

a sum of 10,000l., which he at once placed in the hands of the Heidelberg Council. "If this sum," he wrote to his own Government, "could be made up to 20,000l., the garrisons might still hold out. If not, everything would run a hazard." 20,000l., supplied now, would do more than 100,000l. afterwards.1 Digby, satisfied that he had done his duty, passed on to Brussels. Strange news awaited him there. After all, Mansfeld had come to the conclusion that Frederick's service was better than the Emperor's, and had made up his mind to continue steadfast to what he was pleased to call his principles. Deceit and trickery cost him nothing. On September 30, he disarmed the suspicion of his enemies by signing the engagement to disband his army. Before the next sun rose, he slipped away with his whole force, and marched with all speed for Heidelberg,3

Mansfeld in the Lower Palatinate.

2

Digby had no confidence in Mansfeld. He knew that the Bavarians would soon be at the heels of the force which had eluded them, and that even if the adventurer remained master of the field, it was not likely that he would consult any interests but his own. It was

October. Digby at Brussels.

4

useless to appeal to the Infanta. Personally in favour of a general suspension of arms, she had been charged by the Emperor to take no steps without the consent of Maximilian, and that consent had not been accorded to her. Nor was Digby in a very dissimilar position. He had no authority to speak in Frederick's name. He contented himself, therefore, with using strong language on his own. account. "I know not," he wrote to Calvert, "what I may be held in England, but I am sure here I shall hardly ever be

1 Digby to the Commissioners for German Affairs, Oct. 2, S. P. Germany. An unguarded expression of Lingard has induced many Continental writers to suppose that this money was given to Mansfeld, and Hurter even grounds upon this supposition a thoroughly baseless charge against Digby of connivance in Mansfeld's treachery.

2 The agreement in the Vienna Archives is cited by Hurter, Gesch. Ferdinands II. ix. 59.

The Council of Heidelberg to Digby, Oct. 8, Harl. MSS. 1581, fol. 172.

ΙΟ

4 The Duke of Bavaria to the Infanta Isabella, Sept.

The Infanta

20

Isabella to Philip IV., Sept.

14 Oct.

Brussels MSS.

24

14'

His return

held Spanish hereafter; for I assure you I have dealt very plainly with them.” 1 It was in Spain, as he well knew, that, so far as it was possible to do anything whilst Frederick and Mansfeld were masters of the position, his work was to England. to be done. He accordingly hastened back to England, to impart to James the knowledge which he had acquired, hoping to start again for Madrid as soon as possible. Before he left the Continent, he heard that Mansfeld had arrived in the Lower Palatinate, and that Cordova had been forced to raise the siege of Frankenthal.

A short breathing-time was gained. It was just possible that it might yet be used to force reasonable terms on Frederick and Maximilian alike. Perhaps, if Digby had been King of England, this might have been done, for no man knew better than he how little words could effect in such a case. The firmness of will and the promptness of action which had saved the Council of Heidelberg from ruin, might perhaps, if they had been allowed free play, have saved Europe from war.

Everything depended on the impression of resolution which James would be able to make upon the Court of Madrid. Philip's ministers, after all, did not desire peace because they had no wish to encroach in Germany, but because they were afraid of the consequences. Unfortunately, during Digby's absence, James had, as usual, been acting in the way most calculated to remove any fear that he would ever take up an independent position in opposition to Spain.

Mansell at

On November 27 in the preceding year, Mansell cast anchor with his fleet of twenty ships in the roads of Algiers. He sent 1620. a formal demand to the Dey for the restitution of all November. English vessels and English subjects in his possesAlgiers. sion, and for the execution or surrender of the pirates by whom they had been captured. He might have saved himself the trouble. The Algerines pretended extreme eagerness to comply with his wishes, and released some four-and-twenty captives. Mansell was well aware that such a handful of men formed but a small instalment of the crews of the hundred and

1 Digby to Calvert, Oct. 22, S. P. Flanders.