man, and the opinion of his opponents, is as great as between any two, the most contradictory, notions that can be named. Does the Dr. really think that mankind have no further idea of power or liberty, than that which he supposes, when they reflect on crimes which they have committed?

Has not every man, who feels remorse for

any evil he hath done, an idea that he had it in his power not to have done it? If so, which cannot surely be called in question even by the Dr. himself, will not this undeniably prove that the generality of mankind have a very different opinion of the power or liberty which belongs to them from that which the Dr. allows? They not only believe that they poffefs the power or liberty of doing what they please; but also that the will or pleasure, which is the spring of action, is itself under their direction, or subject to their own voluntary determination, and not to that phyfical neceffity, arifing from the unalterable influence of particular motives, which the Dr. contends for.

This

This feems evidently to have been the fentiment of Mr. Wollafton, and is clearly expreffed in the paffage quoted by the Dr.-In the fixth edition in quarto, the paffages referred to are in pages 64 and 184. In the former he fays-" Sure it is in a man's power to keep his hand from his mouth; "if it is, it is alfo in his power to forbear ex"cefs in eating and drinking. If he has the "command of his own feet, fo as to go either "this way or that, or no whither, as fure " he has, it is in his power to abstain from "ill company and vicious places." And in p. 184.-" I can move my hand upwards " or downward or horizontally, faster or "flower, or not at all, or ftop it when it " is in motion, juft as I will, &c. If then "I have (as I am fenfible I have) a power "of moving my hand in a manner, which "it would not move in by those laws, that "mere bodies already in motion, or under "the force of gravitation, would observe, "this motion depends folely upon my will, "and begins there."

No words can, I think, more clearly convey the idea of liberty as opposed to the doctrine

doctrine of philofophical neceffity than the above. Mr. Wollafton's whole argument, in the first of these paffages, is defigned to fhew, that man has the power of forbearing excess and refraining from bad company, and of confequence, of refraining from all other vicious indulgences and evil practices; and in the latter, he exprefsly afferts that motion" depends folely on the will and begins there." Whether Mr. Wollaston's, or the Dr.'s opinion, concerning human liberty be just, is not the point here to be determined; but it will not surely admit of a doubt, that Mr. Wollafton meant to maintain not merely a freedom of action but also of will in man, including the entire power of abstaining from vice. Whether this be not claiming more liberty or power than is granted by the Dr. is fubmitted to the judgment of thofe, who will carefully compare their fentiments.

Mr. Locke, the other advocate for liberty referred to by the Dr. in fome parts of his chapter on power, has indeed expreffed himself in fuch a manner, as, in the opinion of some of his most judicious readers,

is

is lefs eafy to be understood. It however feems clear, upon a careful attention to the whole of what he fays, (fo differently do we judge of authors) that the liberty he contends for is fo far from being perfectly "confiftent with the doctrine of philofo

6%

phical neceffity," that it cannot be reconciled with it. The Dr. fays, (p. 5.) "The will, he (Mr. Locke) acknowledges, "is always determined by the most preffing uneafiness, or defire;" for which the Dr. refers to p. 204. The edition of Mr. Locke's Works before me is the eighth and last, in quarto, printed anno 1777. Upon examination, I cannot find such an acknowledgement, in the extent in which the Dr. understood him. But in the chapter on power, fect. 47. he fays, "There being in us a

66

great many uneafineffes always foliciting, " and ready to determine the will, it is "natural, as I have faid, that the greatest " and most preffing fhould determine the "will to the next action; and fo it does

for the most part, but not always. For "the mind having in most cafes, as is "evident in experience, a power to fufpend

"the

"the execution and fatisfaction of any of "its defires, and fo all, one after another, " is at liberty to confider the objects of them, "examine them on all fides and weigh them " with others." Here Mr. Locke expressly afferts that the will is not always, but only for the most part, determined by the most preffing uneafinefs or defire. And the exception he makes is, in those instances where the mind has the power of suspending the execution and fatisfaction of its defires, which, he fays, it has in moft cafes. That the mind can be for the most part determined by the most preffing uneafiness or defire; and yet poffefs in moft cafes the power of fufpending the execution of its defires; (both which propofitions Mr. Locke here lays down) I do not comprehend. But thus much feems certain, that he does not maintain the invaIiable determination of the will by the most preffing uneafinefs, which the Dr. imputes to him. Now this fufpending power in the mind implies in it, as far as it extends, that very power of felf-determination on which the whole controversy turns. For if the

mind has fuch a power, so that it can ex