correlatives. They stamp the signature of their reality upon our political vocabulary. Federal government, federal legislature, federal judiciary, federal executive, federal city, are applications of the federate epithet, which show how deeply the thing intended is engraved upon the public mind, in opposition to the ideas conveyed by the terms concentrated, consolidated, and national, with their kindred appellatives. Believing, however, that enough is said upon the subject, I dismiss it with a single remark, in which I recall your attention to the reason of the interest I feel in pursuing this inquiry into the character of the government of the United States. It is not for mere political purposes. It is not with the expectation or wish to mingle my humble and unknown name, or opinions, with those of the distinguished men of the land, among whom the subject is agitated with feeling as intense as with talent that is eminent. At your request I commenced the discussion. My object in pursuing it is moral, and if you will, even ecclesiastical. You know there are men in our country, of great moral worth, who fear to touch the political institutions of their respective states, because of the relation in which they stand to a supposed immoral general constitution. The remarks which have been made upon the nature of our bond of union, showing it to be federate, and on the relation between it and the several states, indicate the source of mistake. It is far from my wish to induce any man to become a dabbler in politics; but it is my desire that his mind, who is disquieted upon this point, should be set at rest, both with respect to himself and others, in relation to their civil rights and obligations. Should the view now taken of the matter appear to such men to be correct, and upon candid examination I doubt not it will so appear, many grounds of needless uneasiness will surely be removed. a little, I bid you adieu.

For

LETTER IV.

OBJECTIONS CONSIDered.

Dear Sir,

IT will not escape your recollection, that neither for the constitutions of the several states, nor for that of the United States, do I lay in a claim for perfection. They are the productions of men, and though distinguished in their place, yet imperfect men; the circumstances, too, under which they were called to act, were very peculiar. Against these deeds various objections have been alledged with more or less appearance of reason; and part of them, at least, are worthy of consideration. Some six or seven years since, I well recollect, in our conversations which were then frequent upon this and kindred subjects, that the reasons I assigned were not adequate to the removal of some of your exceptions to those instruments. I cannot promise myself to be successful now, in obviating every doubt. Of one thing, however, I assure myself, that your judgment will be candid, and upon a subject somewhat complex, you will further admit the possibility of previous mistake.

1

To one consideration, already hinted at, I beg your particular attention:-the distinction between the provisions of the constitution, and the character, opinions and acts of the administrators, or others under it. To the former a pledge is given, in the spirit in which it is required, but approbation of the latter is not demanded. Indeed the whole constitution is to be considered in the light of articles of peace,' rather than an immutable system. The object was to have a bond of union providing for an orderly and peaceful progress in seeking the common weal, capable of being changed without tumult, and making provision for its own improvement, without danger to the public peace, safety, or liberty. Perhaps no one member of the convention that formed, and no one of the states which adopted it, approved entirely of this deed. Upon it they animadverted with freedom, and to it already are added twelve amendments. Other amendments may and will be added in due time. Of the constitution, its laws, and administrations, you are at liberty to speak with freedom; their reformation you are bound to seek, and in seeking it you have pledged to you their protection, Falsehood, violence, and disorder, are

the only means prohibited in seeking a change; and neither of these are you inclined to employ. Such is the import of the oath of allegiance and of office.

All the objections which I have heard advanced against this federal deed, may be reduced to three general heads: The violation of the principle of fair representation; the establishment and support of slavery; and its irreligious character. A few brief notices of what is alledged under each of these heads, is all that I now intend. Indeed a volume, instead of a short letter, would be requsite for a full discussion of these topics.

The alledged violation of the representative principle, as unjust, giving a sanction to slavery, and a boon to the slave-holder, is the first exception to which I advert.

The complaint is founded upon the following provision of the constitution: "Representation and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states, which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons."* The addition of three-fifths of an unfortunate species of the population, to the citizens, or original representees of the states, is that to which exception is taken. I offer the following thoughts in explanation:

1. It is at once admitted, that this provision violates the equality of representation. And were the Union a consolidated government, purporting to represent individuals associated as a nation, the objection would be valid against this provision. But we have seen that the government is federal; it is a representation of sovereign states, in which equality of individual representation is impossible, and is never required.This is like the wealthy and distinguished man and the man of small possessions and attainments at the polls; there both are equal.

2. This provision now complained of, is not the only instance which the constitution furnishes, of such a violation of equal individual representation:-The senate of the United States exemplifies it more strongly. On the floor of that house the state of Delaware or Rhode Island, with a very small pop

*Art. i. Sec. 2. Parag. 3.

ulation compared with that of New-York, Pennsylvania, or Virginia, is equal to each of these states.

Why not complain of this senatorial representation, which, in the highest branch of the government, and in acts of deepest and most extensive interest, raises the little commonwealths of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Delaware, to the rank and power of the great states just named? Why not on the same ground, object to the various qualifying election laws of several of the states, which exclude so many white men from the polls? Why not take exception to the numbering of the multitude of aliens, in the middle and western states, among the representees of the federal legislature, and thus giving an augmented power, beyond that of the citizens, to the representation of those districts? The whole of this finds an easy answer in the fact, that the government is a federal compact. It is a compromise among associated sovereign states. Speculative perfection is out of the question in these practical arrangements. Though the small states, however otherwise important, simply in respect of numbers could not claim an equality with the larger states, yet the larger may have good reasons for conceding that equality, so far as it is given. They have, as moral persons, a right to do so; and that right in this case they wisely exercised. For this apparent discrepancy there is no remedy, but the breaking down of the state sovereignties,those strongest political securities of our personal and public liberty, and forming one sole, extended, consolidation of power. For such a sacrifice, the equality of representation would be found a very inadequate compensation. This inequality, in the present case, is a question, not of morality, but of expediency.

3. I cannot consider this provision as either giving a sanction to slavery, or as a boon to the slave-holder. In case of raising a revenue by capitation, it places three out of every five slaves upon a footing with so many free men. In this light it is to be viewed, not as a boon, but as a tax upon the slave-holder, from which a consideration of them as property would have exempted him. So far it cannot be viewed as giving slavery a sanction.

In another aspect of the subject, the provision is far from granting a boon to the southern planter. The slave-holding

states in this, as in other instances, might have urged, and did urge, their independent sovereignty, and, denying the right of the other states to interfere with their domestic policy, have embraced in their census, their entire population; and with apparent reason and force, they did plead, that, as the whole population of the other states, paupers, apprentices, aliens, and non-voting citizens, and others constituted the basis of their representation, so they, on their part, were entitled to all the advantage in this respect, of the whole population of their own states. Their argument was: "Our representation shall, like yours, be as our population." And had they demandedWhat is the difference between the representative of your disfranchised white men, and of our disfranchised black men ?Upon principle what could have been the reply? Had this plea succeeded, upon the floor of Congress, it would have greatly augmented the representation of the South. And even in that event, the Union could not have been charged with the abetting of slavery. For the representation of their entire population the South did not pertinaciously contend, but in the spirit of concession, yielded up nearly one half of their disfranchised inhabitants; while the non-slave holding states are allowed to profit, in their congressional representation, by the whole number of those within their bounds, who are not entitled to the elective franchise. Contemplated in this light, may I not ask you,-Does not the arrangement, instead of being a boon to the slave holder, evidently appear to be a diminution of his political power, obtained by the confederacy through stipulation, and consequently, while it abstracts from the influence of the slave holding States, increases that of the non-slave holding in the house of representatives? Of slavery there is no approbation in this article, but rather a disapprobation, indicated in cutting off from the representation of those who practise it, two-fifths of their non-voting population; and on the threefifths that remain, a tax equal to that upon citizens may be imposed; a tax not paid by those persons themselves, but by their masters. In this, as in almost every case in which the confederacy was permitted to act, in reference to slavery, we find a cramping and frowning policy adopted, and that to the full extent of the granted power. In it too we find the liberal spirit of southern concession, which it is hoped will be exemplified as often as the cause of the Union demands it.