ple. Abusing their power in a tyrannical manner, some they put to death, others they banished, confiscating their estates with impunity. All who ventured to oppose this change, or even to complain of it, were butchered upon false pretexts; and those would have met with a bad reception, who demanded justice of the murderers. The 400, soon after their establishment, sent 10 deputies to Samos to gain the concurrence of the army.

• All that had passed at Athens was already known there, and the news had enraged the soldiers to the highest degree. They deposed immediately several of their chiefs, whom they suspected, and put others into their places, of whom Thrasylus and Thrasybulus were the principal, and in highest credit. Alcibiades was recalled, and chosen generalissimo by the whole army. They were desirous to sail directly for the Piræus to attack the tyrants. But he opposed it, representing that it was necessary he should first have an interview with Tissaphernes, and that as they had chosen him general, they might rely upon him for the care of the war. He set out immediately for Miletus. His principal design was to show himself to that governor with all the power with which he had been invested, and to let him see that he was in a condition to do him much good or much harm. The consequence of which was, that as he had kept the Athenians in awe by Tissaphernes, he now awed Tissaphernes no less by the Athenians; and we shall see in the sequel that this interview was not unnecessary,

Alcibiades, upon his return to Samos, found the army more inflamed than at first. The deputies of the 400 had arrived there during his absence, and had endeavoured in vain to justify the alterationmade at Athens to the soldiery. Their discourses which were often interrupted by tumultuous cries, served only to exasperate them more, and they earnestly demanded to be led against the tyrants directly. Alcibiades did not act on this occasion, as every body else would have done in consequence of having been raised to so high a dignity by the favour of the people: for he did not think himself obliged to an absolute and implicit compliance with them in every thing, though, from an exile and a fugitive they had made hin general of so great a fleet, and so numerous and formidabie an army: but, as a statesman and great politician, he believed it his duty to oppose the blind fury that hurried them on into evident danger, and to prevent them from committing a fault, which must have been attended with their utter ruin. This wise steadiness preserved the city of Athens. For had they sailed thither at first, the enemy wonld have made themselves masters of Ionia, the Hellespont, and all the

a Thucyd. I. viji. p. 595-604. Plat. in Alcib. p. 205. Diod. p. 165.

islands, without resistance; whilst the Athenians, by carrying the war into their own city, would have exhausted their whole forces against one another. He prevented the deputies from being ill-treated, and dismissed them; saying, that he did not object to the 5,000 citizens having the supreme authority in the republic, but that it was necessary to depose the 400, and to re-establish the senate.

b

• During these commotions, the Phoenician fleet, which the Lacedæmonians impatiently expected, approached, and news came that it was arrived at Aspendus Tissaphernes went to meet it; nobody being able to divine the cause of that journey. He had sent for that fleet at first to flatter the Lacedæmonians with the hopes of so powerful an aid, and to put a stop to their progress, by making them wait its arrival. It was believed that his journey had the same motive; to prevent their doing any thing in his absence, and that their soldiers and mariners might disband for want of pay. However this might be, he did not bring the fleet with him, from the view, no doubt, of keeping the balance equal, which was the king of Persia's interest, and of exhausting both parties by the length of the war. For it had been very easy to have put an end to it by the assistance of this additional fleet, as the Lacedæmonians alone were already as strong at sea as the Athenians. His frivolous excuse, of its not being complete, which he alleged as the reason for not bringing it with him, sufficiently shows that he had other motives for his conduct.

The return of the deputies without success, who had been sent to Samos, and the answer of Alcibiades, excited new troubles in the city, and gave a mortal wound to the authority of the 400. The tumult increased exceedingly, when news was brought, that the enemy, after having beaten the fleet, which had been sent by the 400 to the aid of Euboea, had made themselves masters of the island. Athens was in the highest terror and consternation on this account. For neither the defeat of Sicily, nor any other preceding it, were so considerable as the loss of this island, from whence the city received considerable supplies, and almost all its provisions. If in the confusion in which Athens was at that time between two factions, the victorious fleet had fallen upon the port, as it might have done, the army of Samos would have been indispensably obliged to have flown to the defence of their country and then the republic would have had only the city of Athens remaining of all its dominions. For the Hellespont, Ionia, and all the islands, seeing themselves aban

a Thucyd. 1. viii. p. 604, 606

b A city of Pamphylia. Thucyd. viii p. 607-614. Plut. in Alcib, p. 206-210. Diod. p. 171. 172, & 175-177, & 189-192.

doned, would have been reduced to choose a side, and go over to the Peloponnesians. But the enemy were not capable of such great designs; and this was not the first time that the Lacedæmonians had been observed to have lost their advantages by their natural slowness and procrastination.

Athens without delay deposed the 400, as the authors of all the troubles and divisions under which they groaned. Alcibiades was recalled by unanimous consent, and earnestly solicited to make all possible haste to the assistance of the city. But judging, that if he returned immediately to Athens he should owe his recall to the compassion and favour of the people, he resolved to render his return glorious and triumphant, and to deserve it by some considerable exploit. For this purpose, leaving Samos with a small number of ships, he cruised about the island of Cos and Cnidos; and having learnt that Mindarus, the Spartan admiral, was sailed to the Hellespont with his whole fleet, and that the Athenians were in pursuit of him, he steered that way with the utmost diligence to support them, and arrived happily with his eighteen vessels, at the time that the fleets were engaged near Abydos in a battle, which lasted till night, without any advantage on either side. His arrival gave the Spartans new courage at first, who believed him still their friend, and dispirited the Athenians But Alcibiades, hanging out the Athenian flag in the admiral's galley, fell upon the Lacedæmonians, who were strongest, and were vigorously pursuing the Athenians, put them to flight, drove them ashore; and animated by his success, sunk their vessels, and made a great slaughter of the soldiers, who had thrown themselves into the sea to save themselves by swimming; though Pharnabasus spared no pains to assist them, and had advanced at the head of his troops to the coast, to favour their flight, and to save their ships. The Athenians, after having taken 30 of their gallies, and retaken those they had lost, erected a trophy.

Alcibiades, vain of his success, had the ambition to desire to appear before Tissaphernes, in this triumphant equipage, and to make him rich presents, as well in his own, as in the name of the people of Athens. He went to him therefore with a magnificent retinue, worthy of the general of Athens. But he did not meet with the favourable reception he expected. For Tissaphernes, who knew he was accused by the Lacedæmonians, and feared that the king would punish him at length for not having executed his orders, found Alcibiades's resenting himself very opportune, and caused him to be seized and sent prisoner to Sardis; to shelter himself

A. M. 3595 Ant, J. C# 109.

by that injustice from the representations of the Lacedæmonians.

Thirty days after, Alcibiades, having found means to get a horse, escaped from his guards, and fled to Clazomena, where, to revenge himself on Tissaphernes, he gave out, that he had set him at liberty. From Clazomenæ, he repaired to the Athenian fleet, where he was joined by Theramenes with 20 ships from Macedonia, and by Thrasybulus with 20 more from Thasos. He sailed from thence to Parium in the Propontis. All those ships, to the number of 86 being come thither, he left that place in the night, and arrived the next morning at Proconnesus, a small isle near Cyzicum. He heard there, that Mindarus was at Cyzicum with Pharnabasus and his land-army. He rested that whole day at Proconnesus. On the morrow he harangued his soldiers, and represented to them the necessity there was for attacking the enemy by sea and land, and for making themselves masters of Cyzicum; demonstrating, at the same time, that without a complete and absolute victory, they could have neither provisions nor money. He had taken great care that the enemy should not be apprized of his approach. Fortunately for him, a great storm of rain and thunder, followed by a thick gloom, helped him to conceal his enterprise so successfully, that not only the enemy were prevented from perceiving that he advanced, but the Athenians themselves, whom he had caused to embark with precipitation, did not know that he had weighed anchor and put

to sea.

When the gloom was dispersed, the Lacedæmonian fleet appeared exercising at some distance before the port. Alcibiades, who apprehended that the enemy, upon the sight of so great a number of ships, would make for the harbour, ordered the captains to keep back a little, and to follow him at a good distance; and taking only 40 vessels, he advanced towards the enemy, to offer them battle. The enemy, deceived by this stratagem, and despising his small number, advanced against him, and began the fight. But when they saw the rest of the Athenian fleet came up, they immediately lost courage, and fled. Alcibiades, with 20 of his best ships, pursued them to the shore, landed, and killed a great number of them in the flight. Mindarus and Pharnabasus opposed his efforts in vain; the first, who fought with astonishing valour, he killed, and put the other to flight.

The Athenians by this victory, which made them masters of the slain, the arms, spoils, and whole fleet of the enemy, and by the taking of Cyzicum, not only possessed themselves of the Hellespont, but drove the Spartans entirely out of that sea. Letters were intercepted, in which the latter, with a

conciseness truly laconic, informed the Ephori of the blow they had received, in terms to this effect; "The flower of your army is cut off; Mindarus is dead; the rest of the troops are dying with hunger; and we neither know what "to do, nor what will become of us."

66

The news of this victory occasioned no less joy at Athens than consternation at Sparta. They dispatched ambassadors immediately to demand, that an end should be put to a war equally destructive to both people, and that a peace should be concluded upon reasonable conditions, for the reestablishment of their ancient concord and amity, of which they had for many years experienced the salutary effects. The wisest and most judicious of the citizens of Athens were unanimously of opinion, that it was proper to take the advantage of so favourable a conjuncture for the concluding of a treaty, which might put an end to all jealousies, appease all animosities, and remove all distrusts. But those who found their advantage in the troubles of the state, prevented the good effects of that disposition. b Cleophon, amongst others, the orator in greatest repute at that time, animated the people from the tribunal, by a violent and seditious discourse, insinuating, that their interests were betrayed by a secret intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, which aimed at depriving them of all the advantages of the important victory they had lately gained, and at making them lose for ever the opportunity of being fully avenged for all the wrongs and misfortunes Sparta had caused them to suffer. This Cleophon was a worthless fellow, a' musical instrument-maker. It was reported also that he had been a slave, and had got himself fraudulently enrolled in the register of the citizens. He carried his audacity and fury so far, as to threaten to plunge his dagger into the throat of any one who should talk of peace. The Athenians, puffed up with their present prosperity, forgetting their past misfortunes, and promising themselves all things from the valour and good fortune of Alcibiades, rejected all proposals of accommodation, without reflecting, that there is nothing so fluctuating and precarious as the success of war. The ambassadors retired without being able to effect any thing. Such infatuation and irrational pride are generally the forerunners of some great misfortune.

Alcibiades knew well how to take advantage of the victory he had gained, and presently after besieged Chalcedon, which had revolted from the Athenians and received a Lacedamonien garrison. During this siege, he took another town, called Sely inbria. Pharnabasus, terrified by the rapidity of his conquests, made a treaty with the Athenians to this efa Diod. l. xiii. p. 177-179. 6 Esch. in Orat. de fais, legat.