a full equivalence to those endless miseries which we had deserved. For if the life of a king be (as David's people told him) worth ten thousand lives, of what an infinite value must the life of the Lord of glory and of the Prince of life be, who being the Son of God, of the same nature and essence with his eternal Father, must from thence necessarily derive upon his sacrifice an immensity of worth and efficacy. And hence we are said to be purchased with the blood of God, Acts xx. 28. and to have the life of God laid down for us, 1 John iii. 16. and to be redeemed, not with corruptible things, as silver and gold, but with the precious blood of Christ, 1 Pet. i. 18, 19. and accordingly the author to the Hebrews makes the virtue and efficacy of Christ's blood to consist in the worth and value of it; for if the blood of bulls and goats, &c. sanctified to the purifying of the flesh; how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your consciences from dead works to serve the living God? Heb. ix. 13, 14. By all which it is evident, that it was the infinite dignity of Christ's person which derived that infinite merit on his sacrifice, whereby it became an equivalent to the infinite demerit of our sins. Nay, of such an infinite sacrifice, that it not only

value and worth was his countervailed for the punishment due for our sin, but did abundantly preponderate it; upon which account God engaged himself, not only to remit that punishment, in consideration of it, but also to bestow his Spirit and eternal life on us, both which, as hath been shewn before, are as well the purchase of Christ's blood as the remission of our sins: for God

might have remitted our punishment without superadding the gift of his Spirit and eternal life to it; and therefore, since, in consideration of Christ's blood, he hath superadded these gifts to the remission of our punishment, it is evident that his blood was equivalent to both; i. e. that it was not only a valuable consideration for the pardon of our sins, but also for the assistance of his Spirit, and our eternal happi

ness.

IV. His death was on his part voluntary and unforced for since, as a sacrifice, he was to be innocent, and yet to undergo the punishment of our sin, he could not be the one, and do the other, without his own free consent and approbation: for no innocent person can be justly made obnoxious to punishment but by his own act and choice; because punishment bears a necessary respect to sin, and the desert of suffering evil doth originally spring out of doing evil. So that an innocent person, considered as such, cannot deserve to be punished, nor consequently be justly obliged thereunto; but yet, notwithstanding his innocency, he may, by his own will and consent, oblige himself to undergo a punishment which otherwise he did not deserve; and when he hath so obliged himself, the punishment may be justly exacted of him for though he hath no sin of his own to be punished for, yet he may by his own act oblige himself to undergo the punishment of another man's. And therefore, though merely as an innocent person he cannot deserve to be punished, either upon his own account or any other man's, because having no sin of his own, he cannot be guilty of another man's; yet, so far as he hath the free disposal of himself, he may substitute himself in the room of one that is

guilty, and thereby render himself obnoxious to his punishment. As for instance; Suppose that, by some criminal action of his own, a man hath forfeited his liberty or life to the law, it is certain that no innocent man, as such, can be thereupon obliged to suffer death or imprisonment; but suppose that this innocent man, having the free disposal of himself, shall voluntarily offer his own life or liberty to the magistrate in exchange for the forfeited life or liberty of the criminal, and the magistrate shall think meet to accept it, in this case he is justly liable, notwithstanding his innocence, to undergo the punishment that was due to the offender: for if he may justly offer this exchange, as there is no doubt but he may, supposing that he hath the free disposal of himself, to be sure the magistrate may justly accept of it; because the life of the offender is as much in his disposal, as the life that is offered him in exchange for it is in the disposal of the offerer: so that he hath as much right to give the offerer the offender's life for his, as the offerer hath to give his own life for the offender's: and when both parties have a right to the goods which they exchange with each other, and the goods which they receive are on both sides equivalent to the goods which they give, it is impossible the exchange should be injurious to either: the magistrate cannot be injured, because for the life of the offender which he gives, he receives the life of the offerer, which is equivalent: the offerer cannot be injured, because for his own life which he gives, he receives the life of the offender, which is dearer to him; and neither party being injured, the exchange must be just and equal on both sides. Now that Christ had the free disposal of his own life, he

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himself tells us, John x. 18. No man taketh my life from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again. This commandment have I received of my Father. And that the lives of our souls were-in God's free disposal, as being justly forfeited to him by our sins, the scripture assures us, when it tells, that all have sinned, and that the wages of sin is death. Christ's life therefore being in his own free disposal, he had an undoubted right to exchange it with God for the lives of our souls; and the lives of our souls being in God's free disposal, he had as undoubted a right to exchange them with Christ for his life, upon the free tendry which he made of it. And in this exchange neither party could be injured, because they both received an equivalent for what they gave; Christ gave his own life to God, for which God gave him the lives of our souls in exchange, which were far dearer to him; God gave the lives of our souls to Christ, for which Christ gave him his own most precious life in exchange; which, considering the infinite dignity of his person, was at the least tantamount. It is true indeed, both parties having a right to the free disposal of the goods which they exchange with each other, to render the exchange just and valid, it was necessary that both should be freely consenting to it: now that God was freely consenting I shall shew by and by; and that Christ was so too the scripture expressly testifies; for so we are told, that he gave himself for our sins, Gal. i. 4. and that he gave his life a ransom for many, Matth. xx. 28. and gave his flesh for the life of the world, John vi. 51. and, in a word, that he gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, Tit. ii. 14.

and that he laid down his life for us, 1 John iii. 16. all which plainly imply, that by his own voluntary consent he substituted himself to suffer in our stead, that we might escape; and freely exchanged his own life with God for the lives of our souls, which were forfeited to him. And if, notwithstanding his innocence, it were just in God to expose him, without any respect to our sins, to all those bitter sufferings he endured, (and that it was so the Socinians themselves must acknowledge, or charge God with injustice,) how much more was it just, when of his own accord he substituted himself to bear our punishment for us, and freely exchanged his life for our salva•tion!

V. And lastly, his death was admitted and accepted by God in lieu of the punishment which was due to him from mankind; and it is this that completes it an expiatory sacrifice, and without this it had been altogether insignificant to the expiation of sin, notwithstanding all the abovenamed qualifications: for it is the personal punishment of the offender which sin gives God a right to, and which the obligation of his violated law exacts. Since therefore all mankind had sinned, they all stood bound to God to suffer the desert of their sin in their own persons; and therefore the suffering of another in our stead can signify nothing towards the releasing us from this obligation, unless God, in pure grace and favour to us, shall please to admit and accept it; because another's suffering is not ours, and it is ours that God hath a right to. Indeed the punishment of the guilty person himself, supposing it to be equal to his fault, doth, without any interposal of grace, extinguish the guilt of it, and by its own force and virtue dissolve