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THE DUKE OF RICHMOND'S MOTION FOR AN INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF THE NATION.

On the 2nd of December, the Duke of Richmond moved for an inquiry into the state of the nation. In times like those, he said, the country had a right to be informed of the true state of affairs, and it was the duty of Parliament to afford such information. He wished that the country should be apprised of what the war, so far as it had gone, had cost us in blood and treasure. He wished to inquire into the conduct of that war, and the measures which had been taken for the restoration of peace. For these purposes he should move that several accounts and papers be laid before the House. And that there might be time to weigh them, he now moved their Lordships to resolve that the House should take into consideration the state of the nation on Monday, the 2nd of February next.

After some observations from the Earl of Suffolk, the Duke of Richmond said that he wished for no information involving disclosures dangerous to the country. His proposed motions were of a retrospective nature, calculated to call forth matter which was already known to our enemies. His Grace then moved for the returns of the Army and Navy in Ireland and America.

These motions being all agreed to, the Earl of Chatham rose and said :—

"I most cheerfully testify my approbation of the motions now made by the noble Duke: and am firmly persuaded that they have originated in the most exalted motives; nor am I less pleased with the very candid reception

employed by us during the last war in America. Lord Chatham admitted that he knew of their employment; but denied that any act of his had sanctioned their being engaged, except for the necessary purposes of war. Lord Amherst, on being appealed to by Lord Chatham, confessed that they had been employed by the French and by ourselves. (Parl. Hist. vol. xix. pp. 410, 411. But see Lord Brougham's Sketches of Statesmen, vol. i. Appendix II.) In a despatch from Sir Wm. Johnson, dated October 24, 1760, in which he details his personal services, and expresses a desire to be relieved from his fatiguing duties, as agent and superintendent of the Northern Indians, he says, "After General Prideaux's death, the command devolving on me, I did my utmost to employ the Indians in gaining me such intelligence as was of the greatest service, having prevented our being surprised; the consequence of which was the Fort of Niagara capitulated." And again, after stating that the intrigues of the French had caused many of the Indians to leave, he says, "There still remained enough to answer our purpose, and bring us constant intelligence." And Lord Chatham, (then Mr. Pitt), writing to General Amherst, on the same day, desires him "to acquaint his Majesty's faithful Indian allies, under Sir William Johnson, with the just sense the King entertained of the spirit and perseverance they had exerted on all occasions in his service, and that his Majesty had learnt, with sensible pleasure, that by the good order kept by Sir William Johnson among the Indians, no act of cruelty had stained the lustre of the British arms.—Chatham Correspondence, vol. iv. P. 477. Thackeray's History of the Earl of Chatham, vol. i. p. 482. Vide post, pp. 165*, 166*, and note t.

they have met with from your Lordships. I think they will draw forth a great mass of useful information; but as to those respecting the state of our military strength, there appears something yet wanting to render them complete. Nothing has been offered which may lead to inform us of the actual state of the garrisons of Gibraltar and Minorca, those two very important fortresses, which have hitherto enabled us to maintain our superiority in the Mediterranean, and one of them (Gibraltar), situated on the very continent of Spain, the best proof of our naval power, and the only solid check on that of the House of Bourbon; yet those two important fortresses are left to chance, and the pacific dispositions of France and Spain, as the only protection; we hold them but by sufferance. I know them to be in a defenceless state. None of your Lordships are ignorant that we lost Mahon at the commencement of the last war. It was indeed a fatal disaster, as it exposed the trade and commerce of the Mediterranean to the ravages of our inveterate and then powerful enemies. My Lords, such was the light the acquisition of that fortress was looked upon when it was first taken, that the Duke of Marlborough, who was no great penman, but who employed a secretary to draw up his despatches, in answer to the letter from the able general and consummate statesman who conquered it, (the father of my noble relation now in my eye, Earl Stanhope,*) trusted the despatch to the secretary, but added a postscript in his own handwriting, where he recommended particularly to the victorious general, to by no means neglect putting that fortress in the best possible state of defence, and to garrison it with natives, and not foreigners. When I had the honour, soon after it fell into the hands of the French, to be called into the councils of the late King, I never lost sight of that circumstance. Gibraltar still remained in our hands: and the war in Germany, which Parliament thought fit to engage in, and bind themselves to, before I came into office; though we were carrying on the most extensive operations in America; though the coast of Africa, and the West India Islands, required a suitable force to protect them; and though these kingdoms called for a proportionate army, not only to act defensively, but offensively on the coasts of our enemies; notwithstanding all those pressing services, my Lords, having the counsel of that great man constantly in view, it determined me, that whatever demands, or how much soever such troops might be wanting elsewhere, that Gibraltar should never want a full and adequate defence. I never had, my Lords, less than eight battalions to defend it. I think a battalion was then about eight hundred strong. So that, my Lords, I affirm that Gibraltar was never trusted to a garrison of less than six thousand men. My Lords, this force was, as it were, locked up in that fortress during the whole of the late war; nor could any appearance of the most urgent necessity induce me to weaken it. My Lords, I know that the very weak and defenceless state of these islands does not seem to admit of any troops being spared from the home defence; but, my Lords, give me leave to say, that

* Minorca was taken on the 18th of September, 1708, by General Stanhope.

whatever reluctance or disgust there may have appeared in several veteran and able Generals to the service, where the tomahawk and scalping-knife were to be the warlike instruments employed as the engines of destruction, I am convinced there are many, some of whom I have in my eye,* who would, with ardour and alacrity, accept of any command, where the true honour, interest, and safety of their country were concerned. My Lords, the moment is arrived when this spirit should be exerted. Gibraltar is garrisoned by Hanoverians. I am told, if any accident should happen to the present commanding officer there, that the care of the fortress, and the command of the troops, would devolve on a foreigner. I do not recollect his name, but this is my information; and if I do not hear it contradicted, I must take it for granted. I am well authorized to say, my Lords, that such is the present defenceless state of Gibraltar, that there is not a second relief in case of an attack; not men sufficient to man the works, while those fatigued with service and watching go to refresh, eat, or sleep; though Germany and the wilds of America have been ransacked for the purpose.

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My Lords, we should not want men in a good cause; and nothing ought to be left untried to procure them. I remember, soon after the period I shall take the liberty to remind your Lordships of, after an unnatural rebellion had been extinguished in the northern part of this island, men not fighting for liberty, or the constitution of their country, but professedly to annihilate both, as advocates for popery, slavery, and arbitrary power; not like our brethren in America, Whigs in principle, and heroes in conduct: I remember, I say, my Lords, that I employed these very rebels in the service and defence of their country. They were reclaimed by this means; they fought our battles; they cheerfully bled in defence of those liberties which they attempted to overthrow but a few years before. What, then, do your Lordships imagine would be the effect of a similar conduct towards the Whigs and freemen of America, whom you call rebels ? Would it not, think you, operate in like manner? They would fight your battles; they would cheerfully bleed for you; they would render you superior to all your foreign enemies; they would bear your arms triumphant to every quarter of the globe. You have, I fear, lost the affection, the good-will of this people, by employing mercenary Germans to butcher them; by spiriting up the savages of America to scalp them with a tomahawk. My Lords, I would have you consider, should this war be pushed to extremities, the possible consequences. It is no further from America to England than from England to America. If conquest is to be the issue, we must trust to that issue, and fairly abide by it.

"The noble Earl at the head of the Admiralty, the last night I had the honour to address your Lordships, contradicted me when I asserted we had not above twenty ships of the line fit to proceed to sea (on actual service), at a short warning. I again repeat the assertion, though I gave it up at that time, on account of the plausibility and confidence with which the fact was

• His Lordship was supposed to allude to the Lords Townshend and Amherst.

asserted. I now say, there are not above twenty ships of the line, on which any naval officer of eminence and skill in his profession would stake his credit. The noble Earl in office said, there were thirty-five ships of the line fit for sea; but acknowledged that there was a deficiency of near three thousand of the complements necessary to proceed upon actual service. How did the noble Earl propose to fill up that deficiency? By supernumeries, by transfers, by recruits, &c. Will the noble Earl say, that twenty-one thousand

is a full war complement for thirty-five ships of the line? or will he undertake to assure this House (even allowing for those odds and ends), that the ships will be properly manned by the numbers now actually on board? But if every particular fact, stated by the noble Earl, be precisely as he would persuade your Lordships to believe; will his Lordship pretend to affirm that thirty-five ships of the line, or even forty-two, (the highest number that his Lordship ventured to affirm,) would, in case of a rupture with the House of Bourbon, be sufficient for all the purposes of offence, defence, and protection? I am sure his Lordship will not. A fleet in the Channel; one in the Western Sea; another in the West Indies; and one in the Mediterranean; besides convoys and cruisers, to protect our commerce and annoy our enemies. I say, my Lords, that thirty-five ships of the line would be necessary for the protection of our trade and fortresses in the Mediterranean alone. We must be equal to the combined force of France and Spain in that sea, or we need not send a single ship there. Ships must be stationed to command respect from the powers on the coast of Barbary, and to prevent their piracies on our merchant vessels. We must have a superior fleet in the Western Sea likewise, and we must have one in the Channel equal to the defence of our own coast.

"These were the ideas which prevailed when I had the honour of assisting in the British councils, and at all other preceding periods of naval hostility since the Revolution. My Lords, if Lord Anson was capable of the high office the noble Earl now presides in, the noble Earl is certainly mistaken in saying that thirty-five or fifty-five ships of the line are equal to the several services now enumerated. That great naval commander gave in a list, at one time, of eighty-four thousand seamen actually on the books. It is well worthy your Lordships' inquiry, to know what are the present number. The motion made by the noble Duke leads to that inquiry, and meets my warmest approbation; but that we may have every necessary information, I recommend to my noble friend to amend his motion by extending it to Gibraltar and Mahon. I do not wish to have anything disclosed at present which may tend to expose the weak state of those fortresses; but I think it is incumbent on your Lordships to learn their strength, in point of numbers of men; and to know how the fact stands relative to the possibility of the command of Gibraltar devolving on a foreigner, in case of any accident happening to the officer who now commands there."

After the Earl of Sandwich and Viscount Townshend had spoken in answer to Lord Chatham, the Duke of Richmond, adopting the recommendation of his Lordship, moved for "Copies of the last monthly returns of his

Majesty's forces, as well foreign as British, in Gibraltar and Minorca." This renewed the debate, which, after a fresh motion had been brought forward and withdrawn by the Duke of Bolton, ended in the concurrence of the Peers in a motion of the Duke of Grafton for "Such papers as relate to the fulfilling that part of the Capture Act, so far as it empowered certain persons to declare any colony, province, city, town, precinct, port or place, at the peace of his Majesty with a return of such colony, &c., which, since the passing of the above act, may be declared at the peace of his Majesty."

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THE EARL OF CHATHAM'S MOTION FOR GENERAL BURGOYNE'S ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS.

December 5. The Earl of Chatham rose. His Lordship began with remarking that "the King's speech at the opening of the session conveyed a general information of the measures intended to be pursued; and looked forward to the probable occurrences which might be supposed to happen and affect the great bodies to whom they were addressed: and, of course, the nation at large, who were finally interested. He had the last speech from the Throne now in his hand, and a deep sense of the public calamity in his heart. They would both co-operate to enforce and justify the measure he meant to propose. He was sorry to say, the speech contained a very unfaithful picture of the state of public affairs. This assertion was unquestionable; not a noble Lord in administration would dare rise, and even so much as controvert the fact. The speech held out a specious outside-was full of hopes; yet it was manifest, that every thing within and without, foreign and domestic, was full of danger, and calculated to inspire the most melancholy forebodings. His Lordship hoped that this sudden call for their Lordships' attention would be imputed to its true motive, a desire of obtaining their assistance in such a season of difficulty and danger; a season in which, he would be bold to maintain, a single moment was not to be lost. It was customary, he said, for that House to offer an address of condolence to his Majesty upon any public misfortune, as well as one of congratulation on any public success. If this was the usage of Parliament, he never recollected a period at which such an address became more seasonable or necessary than at present. If what was acknowledged in the other House was true, he was astonished that some public notice was not taken of the sad, the melancholy disaster. The report was, the fact was acknowledged by persons in high authority, that General Burgoyne and his army were surrounded, and obliged to surrender themselves prisoners of war to the Provincials. He should take the account of this calamitous event, as now stated, and argue upon it as a matter universally allowed to be true. He then lamented the fate of Mr. Burgoyne in the most pathetic terms; and said, that gentleman's

* Lords Germaine and North, in the House of Commons, on the 3rd of December, admitted that intelligence had been received from Quebec, although not of an official character, of the surrender of General Burgoyne's army.

VOL. I.

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