Spain, which must be carried on principally by sea, if the Government have secrets, the Lords of the Admiralty must be entrusted with the most important of them. Yet, Sir, in this very session, we have, without any secret committees, made inquiry into the conduct of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. We have not only inquired into their conduct, but we have censured it in such a manner as to put an end to the trust which was before reposed in them. Has that inquiry discovered any of the secrets of our Government? On the contrary, the committee found that there was no occasion to probe into such secrets. They found cause enough for censure without it; and none of the Commissioners pretended to justify their conduct by the assertion that papers contained secrets which ought not to be disclosed.

"This, Sir, is so recent, so strong, a proof that there is no necessary connexion between a parliamentary inquiry and a discovery of secrets which it behoves the nation to conceal, that I trust gentlemen will no longer insist upon this danger as an argument against the inquiry. Sir, the First Commissioner of the Treasury has nothing to do with the application of secret service money. He is only to take care that it be regularly issued from his office, and that no more be issued than the conjuncture of affairs appears to demand. As to the particular application, it properly belongs to the Secretary of State, or to such other persons as his Majesty employs; so that we cannot suppose the proposed inquiry will discover any secrets relative to the application of that money, unless the noble lord has acted as Secretary of State, as well as First Commissioner of the Treasury; or unless a great part of the money drawn out for secret service has been delivered to himself or persons employed by him, and applied towards gaining a corrupt influence in Parliament or at elections. Of both these practices he is most grievously suspected, and both are secrets which it very much behoves him to conceal. But, Sir, it equally behoves the nation to discover them. His country and he are, in this cause, equally, although oppositely, concerned; for the safety or ruin of one or the other depends upon the fate of the question; and the violent opposition which this question has experienced adds great strength to the suspicion.

"I admit, Sir, that the noble lord, whose conduct is now proposed to be inquired into, was one of his Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, and consequently that he must have had a share at least in advising all the measures which have been pursued both abroad and at home. But I cannot from this admit, that an inquiry into his conduct must necessarily occasion a discovery of any secrets of vital importance to the nation, because we are not to inquire into the measures themselves.

"But, Sir, suspicions have gone abroad relative to his conduct as a Privy Councillor, which, if true, are of the utmost consequence to be inquired into. It has been strongly asserted that he was not only a Privy Councillor, but that he usurped the whole and sole direction of his Majesty's Privy Council. It has been asserted that he gave the Spanish Court the first hint of the

unjust claim they afterwards advanced against our South Sea Company, which was one chief cause of the war between the two nations. And it has been asserted that this very Minister has advised the French in what manner to proceed in order to bring our Court into their measures; particularly, that he advised them as to the numerous army they have this last summer sent into Westphalia. What truth there is in these assertions, I pretend not to decide. The facts are of such a nature, and they must have been perpetrated with so much caution and secrecy, that it will be difficult to bring them to light even by a parliamentary inquiry; but the very suspicion is ground enough for establishing such inquiry, and for carrying it on with the utmost strictness and vigour.

"Whatever my opinion of past measures may be, I shall never be so vain, or bigoted to that opinion, as to determine, without any inquiry, against the majority of my countrymen. If I found the public measures generally condemned, let my private opinions of them be ever so favourable, I should be for inquiry in order to convince the people of their error, or at least to furnish myself with the most authentic arguments in favour of the opinion I had embraced. The desire of bringing others into the same sentiments with ourselves is so natural, that I shall always suspect the candour of those who, in politics or religion, are opposed to free inquiry. Besides, Sir, when the complaints of the people are general against an administration, or against any particular minister, an inquiry is a duty which we owe both to our Sovereign and the people. We meet here to communicate to our Sovereign the sentiments of his people. We meet here to redress the grievances of the people. By performing our duty in both respects, we shall always be enabled to establish the throne of our Sovereign in the hearts of his people, and to hinder the people from being led into insurrection and rebellion by misrepresentations or false surmises. When the people complain, they must either be right or in error. If they be right, we are in duty bound to inquire into the conduct of the Ministers, and to punish those who appear to have been most guilty. If they be in error, we ought still to inquire into the conduct of our Ministers, in order to convince the people that they have been misled. We ought not, therefore, in any question relating to inquiry, to be governed by our own sentiments. We must be governed by the sentiments of our consituents, if we are resolved to perform our duty, both as true representatives of the people, or as faithful subjects of our King.

"I perfectly agree with the honourable gentleman that if we are convinced that the public measures are wrong, or that if we suspect them to be so, we ought to make inquiry, although there is not much complaint among the people; but I wholly differ from him in thinking that notwithstanding the administration and the Minister are the subjects of complaint among the people, we ought not to make inquiry into his conduct unless we are ourselves convinced that his measures have been wrong. Sir, we can no more determine this question without inquiry, than a judge without a trial

can declare any man innocent of a crime laid to his charge. Common fame is a sufficient ground for an inquisition at common law; and for the same reason, the general voice of the people of England ought always to be regarded as a sufficient ground for a parliamentary inquiry.

"But, say gentlemen, of what is this Minister accused? What crime is laid to his charge? For, unless some misfortune is said to have happened, or some crime to have been committed, no inquiry ought to be set on foot. Sir, the ill posture of our affairs both abroad and at home; the melancholy situation we are in; the distresses to which we are now reduced, are sufficient causes for an inquiry, even supposing the Minister accused of no particular crime or misconduct. The nation lies bleeding, perhaps expiring. The balance of power has been fatally disturbed. Shall we acknowledge this to be the case, and shall we not inquire whether it has happened by mischance, or by the misconduct, perhaps by the malice prepense, of the Minister? Before the Treaty of Utrecht, it was the general opinion that in a few years of peace we should be able to pay off most of our debts. We have now been very nearly thirty years in profound peace, at least we have never been engaged in any war but what we unnecessarily brought upon ourselves, and yet our debts are almost as great as they were when that treaty was concluded.* Is not this a misfortune, and shall we not make inquiry into its cause?

"I am surprised to hear it said that no inquiry ought to be set on foot, unless it is known that some public crime has been committed. Sir, the suspicion that a crime has been committed has always been deemed a sufficient reason for instituting an inquiry. And is there not now a suspicion that the public money has been applied towards gaining a corrupt influence at elections? Is it not become a common expression, 'The flood-gates of the Treasury are opened against a general election?' I desire no more than that every gentleman who is conscious that such practices have been resorted to, either for or against him, should give his vote in favour of the motion. Will any gentleman say that this is no crime, when even private corruption has such high penalties, inflicted by express statute against it? Sir, a Minister who commits this crime-who thus abuses the public money, adds breach of trust to the crime of corruption; and as the crime, when committed by him, is of much more dangerous consequence than when committed by a private man, it becomes more properly the object of a parliamentary inquiry, and merits the severest punishment. The honourable gentleman may with much more reason tell us that Porteous was never murdered by the mob at Edinburgh, because, notwithstanding the high

* Debt on the accession of George the First, in 1714 Debt at the commencement of the Spanish war, in 1739

£54,145,363

£46,954,623

Decrease during the peace

£7,190,740

-Pebrer on the Taxation of Great Britain, p. 245.

reward as well as pardon proffered, his murderers were never discovered,* than tell us that we cannot suppose our Minister, either personally or by others, has ever corrupted an election, because no information has been brought against him. Sir, nothing but a pardon, upon the conviction of the offender, has ever yet been offered in this case; and how could any informer expect a pardon, and much less a reward, when he knew that the very man against whom he was to inform, had not only the distribution of all public rewards, but the packing of a jury or a Parliament against him? Whilst such a Minister preserves the favour of the Crown, and thereby the exercise of its power, this information can never be expected.

"This shows, Sir, the impotence of the act, mentioned by the honourable gentleman, respecting that sort of corruption which is called bribery. With regard to the other sort of corruption, which consists in giving or taking away those posts, pensions, or preferments, which depend upon the arbitrary will of the Crown, the act is still more inefficient. Although it would be considered most indecent in a minister to tell any man that he gave or withheld a post, pension, or preferment, on account of his voting for or against any ministerial measure in Parliament, or any ministerial candidate at an election; yet if he makes it his constant rule never to give a post, pension, or preferment, but to those who vote for his measures and his candidates; if he makes a few examples of dismissing those who vote otherwise, it will have the same effect as when he openly declares it.† Will any gentleman say

Disturbances being apprehended at the execution of a smuggler, which was appointed to take place at Edinburgh on the 14th of April, 1736, the attendance of the City Guard, under the command of their Captain, John Porteous, was given with a view to preserve the public peace. When the sentence of the law had been carried into effect, the mob, who had hitherto remained peaceable, began to pelt the hangman and soldiers with large stones; whereupon Porteous, who was naturally of an irritable disposition, snatched a musket from one of the soldiers, and having discharged it, commanded his men to fire upon the crowd, by which several deaths were caused. For the violence of his conduct, Porteous was brought to trial before the High Court of Justiciary, and condemned to death. While the populace were assembled to witness his execution, intelligence reached them that he had been reprieved. Indignation and fury seized them. Determined to be avenged on Porteous, they broke into the place of his confinement, carried him to the Grass-market, and themselves hanged him on the spot where the victims of his own indiscretion and violence had fallen. A public reward of £200 was offered for the apprehension and conviction of the persons concerned in the murder of Porteous, but no clue could ever be obtained to any of them. In consequence of the negligence of the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, in suppressing the riots which led to the murder of Porteous, an act of Parliament, 4 George II. c. 34, was passed, disabling him from holding any office of magistracy in Scotland or elsewhere, in Great Britain, and imposing a fine of £2,000 upon the Corporation of Edinburgh for the benefit of Porteous's widow. See Heart of Midlothian, chaps. ii. iii. iv. and vi.

+ It will be recollected that in consequence of his Parliamentary opposition to Sir Robert Walpole, Mr. Pitt had been himself dismissed from the army. The Duke of Bolton and Lord Cobham had also, for a similar reason, been deprived of the command of their regiments.

that this has not been the practice of the Minister? Has he not declared, in the face of this House, that he will continue the practice? And will not this have the same effect as if he went separately to every particular man, and told him in express terms, 'Sir, if you vote for such a measure or such a candidate, you shall have the first preferment in the gift of the Crown; if you vote otherwise, you must not expect to keep what you have? Gentlemen may deny that the sun shines at noon-day; but if they have eyes, and do not wilfully shut them, or turn their backs, no man will believe them to be ingenuous in what they say. I think, therefore, that the honourable gentleman was in the right who endeavoured to justify the practice. It was more candid than to deny it but as his arguments have already been fully answered, I shall not farther discuss them.

"Gentlemen exclaim, What! will you take from the Crown the power of preferring or cashiering the officers of the army?' No, Sir, this is neither the design, nor will it be the effect, of our agreeing to the motion. The King at present possesses the absolute power to prefer or cashier the officers of our army. It is a prerogative which he may employ for the benefit or safety of the public; but like other prerogatives, it may be abused, and when it is so abused, the Minister is responsible to Parliament. When an officer is preferred or cashiered for voting in favour of, or against any court measure or candidate, it is an abuse of this prerogative, for which the Minister is answerable. We may judge from circumstances or outward appearancesfrom these we may condemn, and I hope we have still a power to punish a Minister who dares to advise the King to prefer or cashier from such motives! Sir, whether this prerogative ought to remain as it is, without any limitation, is a question foreign to this debate; but I must observe, that the argument employed for it might, with equal justice, be employed for giving our King an absolute power over every man's property-because a large property will always give the possessor a command over a great body of men, whom he may arm and discipline if he pleases. I know of no law to restrain him-I hope none will ever exist-I wish our gentlemen of estates would make more use of this power than they do, because it would tend to keep our domestic as well as our foreign enemies in awe. part, I think that a gentleman who has earned his commission by his services, (in his military capacity I mean,) or bought it with his money, has as much a property in it as any man has in his estate, and ought to have it as well secured by the laws of his country. Whilst it remains at the absolute will of the Crown, he must, unless he has some other estate to depend on, be a slave to the Minister; and if the officers of our army long continue in that state of slavery in which they are at present, I am afraid it will make slaves of us all.

For my

"The only method to prevent this fatal consequence, as the law now stands, is to make the best and most constant use of the power we possess as members of this House, to prevent any minister from daring to advise the King to make a bad use of his prerogative as there is such a strong suspi