think such an intellectual system as Calvin's worthy of God, and of proceeding from him, it is impossible any man of reason and judgment can do so. In a treatise of this intended brevity, the observations on the writings of Calvin would not have been so extended or particular, if it did not appear that his doctrine of absolute decrees is gaining ground every day among the lower classes of the people; though it is the most dangerous superstition, the wickedest heresy, that has ever yet prevailed in the world, and therefore is deserving of the strongest opposition, and severest animadversion. OBJECTION II. It is alleged, that there is a promiscuous and indiscriminate distribution made of the things of this life indifferently and equally to bad and good men; a distribution unbecoming not only the goodness of God, but likewise the justice of a superintending providence. With respect to this objection, Solomon expresses himself in these words; "All things come alike to all: there is one "event to the righteous, and to the wicked; "to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the good, so is the sinner; and he "that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath." The Athenian philosophers likewise maintained, that the riches of the robber Harpalus* was a reproach to the justice of the gods. And the Roman writers frequently express the same judgment, from the apparent poverty of good men, and the unmerited wealth of those who were vicious. Marmoreo Licinius tumulo jacet, At Cato parvo; Pompeius nullo! However strong this objection of the indiscriminate lot to good and bad men may appear to be against the providence or goodness of God, I think it will entirely vanish on a fair examination; for this objection can only have reference to external possessions, in the exclusive property of which no sensible man ever yet considered human happiness to consist: and since it is impossible for any * This man was appointed governor of Babylon by Alexander the Great; in whose absence he plundered the royal palace, freighted a ship with its treasures, and lived in the utmost splendor and magnificence at Athens. But this splendor was but of short continuance; as he was pursued by Antipater, from whom he fled, and was slain in Candia. man to know the effect which great prosperity or adversity may have on his mind, temper, principles, or conduct; or how much the possession of the first, or sufferance of the last, may increase or lessen his happiness in a future state; it is utterly impossible for him to know which of the two may be most for his advantage; and therefore the ostensible poverty of the good, or the prosperity of the wicked, is actually and absolutely no just argument against the goodness of God, as the adversity complained of may be, and certainly often to many men is, a blessing in disguise. The greatest miser that ever lived will allow there are several things more valuable than riches; and the most ambitious character will admit the same with respect to dignities and power: they will each allow that health and the senses of hearing and seeing are more valuable; and rather than lose these senses or their health, they would readily part with their money or titles: yet no man, I believe, ever thought of arraigning the decrees or the goodness of God, because some men are healthy, and others unhealthy; or because some see or hear well or ill, whilst others are totally deaf or blind and therefore if the non-possession or deprivation of things, allowed to be of more consequence than what are called the good things of life, are not considered as arguments against the goodness of God, why should an unequal distribution of riches and other external things be so considered? especially as every thinking person must acknowledge, that this inequality and unequal distribution of property should and ought to be in the world; and that if it did not exist, the utmost confusion and inconvenience must every where prevail. In fact, the business of life could not otherwise be carried on; for without this inequality, and with an equal right to command, who would obey? and without obedience, there could be nothing but anarchy and confusion. It is therefore so far from an imputation on the goodness of God that this inequality does exist, that it would be a very great one if it did not, as the goodness of God consists in his consulting the general happiness of mankind: and if this difference in station, and possession of honours and riches, did not prevail, the world would upon the whole be much unhappier than it is. But herein is an astonishing proof of the goodness of God, that, whilst this inequality, for the wisest pur poses, does exist, no man, on a summary contemplation or judgment of human nature, has ever yet been able to determine that one lot or condition in it, abstractedly considered, possesses a more absolute degree of intrinsic happiness than another; or that kings enjoy, on the whole, more happiness than peasants: (the general conclusion is, I believe, in favour of the latter :) which is a convincing proof, supported by the universal suffrage of mankind, how little genuine happiness is implicated in the possession of the external things of life, in its honours, or riches. It may likewise be observed as a mark of the goodness of God, that he has given man that self-love or self-approbation, that, though numbers of men would change fortunes or conditions with others, few would choose to change themselves; and the difference of fortune ought not to be deemed any considerable evil, whilst man is so well satisfied with himself. But I think it may be made to appear, that the goodness of God has, even with respect to external things, decreed as great a preponderancy in favour of a good man, as could possibly be done without violating his own laws by a constant interposition of miracles. Suppose, for ex |