Children, so soon as they begin to speak at all, inquire more anxiously, and more universally, concerning causation and efficiency, than concerning any other subject of investigation. Every one, conversant with them, must have observed, that they almost continually inquire, who did this, that, and the other thing; or produced the several changes, of which they are witnesses? Who made themselves, and the various objects around them? In this manner, they teach us, that this is, to man, the natural and the only natural mode of conceiving: for all children think and speak in this

manner.

Nor, are the views of mankind less forcibly evident concerning this subject, in their actions. No man ever acted, without regarding himself as a cause; and without expecting to produce some change in himself, or in the objects around him, by his efficiency; nor made use of any instrument, without expecting from it a degree of efficacy, which should produce some change, or other, not to be looked for without it. Thus, all men eat and drink; lie down, and act, universally, with a design to effectuate certain changes in themselves, or other objects: and atheists, as truly, and uniformly, as any other men. Thus, also, children act, from the beginning. Indeed, were men not to act in this manner, they would never act at all. No proof of absolute and universal conviction, concerning this, or any other subject, can be more perfect.

3dly. We learn this connexion from experience; and in two ways, by the testimony of our senses, and by the inspection of our minds. Causes operate without us, and within us; and produce their proper effects in both cases. Those which operate without us, produce their effects before our senses; and so far our knowledge of the connexion between cause and effect, arises from sensitive testimony. Those which operate within us, produce their effects before the eye of the mind only; and so far our knowledge of this connexion is intuitive. I as clearly perceive, that I think, reflect, remember, choose, wish, love, and hate; that by a determination of my will, I turn my thoughts from one subject to another; and transfer my affections and my conduct, voluntarily, from one object to another, and from one course to another; as, that I exist. I also perceive this in the same manner, and with the same certainty; viz. with the bare inspection of the mental eye; commonly termed, intuition, and acknowledged to be attended with the highest possible certainty. Mr. Hume is, therefore, totally erroneous in his assertion, that the connexion between cause and effect exists, or rather is perceived, only in the names; and that, if we would call both by the name, events, we should not suppose any connexion to exist between them.

This opinion is sufficiently refuted by the fact, that these names, and not that of events, have been given to them. Mankind never give names without ideas; nor form any names, which do not express such ideas, as they really have; nor suppose themselves to

have ideas, which they have not; or different ideas from those, which they really have. Wherever names have been given, the very ideas, which they denote, have certainly existed in the minds of those, by whom they were given.

The thing which we really perceive in this case, is, however, merely the fact, that cause and effect are thus connected; and not the nature of the causation, or efficiency, on which the connexion is founded. That I, and not something else, think, and act, in such manners as have been recited, and that but for me the thought and action would not have existed, I perceive intuitively; but I do not perceive at all why, or by what power, I think, and act. The nature of this subject lies, in every case, beyond the bounds of the human capacity. Yet this infers not, in any degree, any want of evidence, attending the fact. The contrary opinion would be attended with this absurdity that we cannot perceive one thing without perceiving at the same time another, totally diverse, and, in the view of the mind, entirely separated: an absurdity which cannot need to be exposed by me.

4thly. The mind cannot realize the fact, that existence, or change, can take place without a cause.

This is, at least, true with respect to my own mind. I have very often made the attempt, and with no small pains-taking, but have never been able to succeed at all. Supposing other minds to have the same general nature with my own, I conclude, that all others will find the same want of success. If nothing had originally existed, I cannot possibly realize, that any thing could ever have existed. Causes, absolutely the same, must, in the same circumstances, produce absolutely the same effects. This is, I think, certainly selfevident, and admitted as such. An absolute want of cause involves an absolute sameness of an opposite kind; and must, with nearly the same evidence, continue for ever. The necessity of causes to all the changes of being is, so far as I know, universally admitted. Mr. Hume, particularly, talks as commonly, or rather as uniformly, in this manner, as any Christian does; and not only argues from cause to effect, and from effect to cause, as much as other men, but discusses this subject abundantly, and gives directions, and principles, for this kind of argumentation. Indeed, without admitting it, neither he, nor any other man, could argue at all. But, if no change can take place without a cause, how can it be supposed, that existence can take place without a cause? Certainly less violence is done to our reason by supposing a being to be changed in some respect or circumstance without a cause, than to begin to exist without a cause.

5thly. No absurdity can be greater than to argue with a man who denies this connexion.

He himself, in speaking, exhibits himself as the cause of all the words uttered by him, and the opinions communicated; and, in the act of arguing, admits you to be a similar cause. If his body be

not a cause, and your eyes another, you cannot see him. If his voice, and your ear, be not causes, you cannot hear him. If his mind and yours, be not causes, you cannot understand him. In a word, without admitting the connexion between cause and effect, you can never know that he is arguing with you, or you with him. With these observations premised, which you will see to be inwoven with this and all other subjects of discussion, I observe, in the first place, that the existence of things, universally, proves the being of GOD.

The argument which leads to this conclusion is, for substance, conducted by Mr. Locke in the following manner: Every man knows, with absolute certainty, that he himself exists. He knows, also, that he did not always exist, but began to be. It is clearly certain to him, that his existence was caused, and not casual; and was produced by a cause, adequate to the production. By an adequate cause, is invariably intended, a cause possessing and exerting an efficacy sufficient to bring any effect to pass. In the present case, an adequate cause is one possessing and exerting all the understanding necessary to contrive, and the power necessary to create, such a being as the man in question. This cause is what we are accustomed to call GOD. The understanding necessary to contrive, and the power necessary to create, a being compounded of the human soul and body, admit of no limits. He who can contrive and create such a being, can contrive and create any thing. He who actually contrived and created man, certainly contrived and created all things.

This argument is, in my view, perfectly conclusive: nor has it been, nor will it ever be, answered, except with sophistry, or sneers. I will not insist, that every step of it is attended with what logicians. call intuitive evidence: nor, that it amounts to what is, in the logical sense, an absolute demonstration. But it is, in every step, attended with such evidence as excludes all rational doubt; and approaches so near to the character of demonstration as to leave the mind completely satisfied. At the same time, it is opposed by no counter evidence.

2dly. The state of existing things completely proves the being of GOD.

The manner in which the argument, derived from this source, is conducted by Bishop Berkeley, is clearer, and more happy, than any other within my knowledge; and is substantially the following:

We acknowledge the existence of each other to be unquestionable; and, when called upon for the evidence, on which this acknowledgment is founded, allege that of our senses; yet it can by no means be affirmed with truth, that our senses discern, immediately, any man. We see, indeed, a form; and the motions and actions of that form; and we hear a voice, communicating to us the thoughts, emotions, and volitions, of an intelligent being. Yet it is

intuitively certain, that neither the form, the motions, the actions, the voice, the thoughts, nor the volitions, are that intelligent being; or the living, acting, thinking thing, which we call man. On the contrary, they are merely effects, of which that living, acting thing, denoted by the word man, is the cause. The existence of the cause, or, in other language, of the man, we conclude from the effects, which he thus produces. In the same manner, and with the like certainty, we discover the existence of God. In the universe without us, and in the little world within us, we perceive a great variety of effects, produced by some cause, adequate to the production. Thus the motions of the heart, arteries, veins, and other vessels; of the blood and other juices; of the tongue, the hands, and other members; the perception of the senses, and the actions of the mind; the storm, the lightning, the volcano, and the earthquake; the reviviscence and growth of the vegetable world; the diffusion of light, and the motions of the planetary system, are all effects; and effects of a cause, adequate to the production. This cause is God; or a being, possessed of intelligence and power, sufficient to contrive and bring them to pass. He, with evidence from reason, equally clear with the testimony of the Scriptures, thundered marvellously with his voice; holdeth the winds in his fists, sendeth lightnings with rain; looketh on the earth, and it trembleth; toucheth the hills, and they smoke; melteth the mountains like wax, at his presence; causeth the outgoings of the morning and the evening to rejoice; and maketh his sun to arise on the evil and the good. Him, also, we are bound to praise, because we are fearfully and wonderfully made by him; our substance was not hid from him, when we were made in secret. His eyes saw our substance, yet being imperfect, and in his book all our members were written, which in continuance, were fashioned by him, when as yet there were none of them. He also breathed into our nostrils the breath of life; and the inspiration of the Almighty hath given us understanding.

Should it be said, that these things are the natural and necessary result of certain inherent powers of matter and mind, and therefore demand no extrinsic agency; I answer, that this objection affects the conclusion, only by removing it one step farther back in the course of reasoning. That matter should have possessed these powers eternally, without exerting them, is impossible; and that it should have exerted them from eternity is equally impossible. As I cannot enter into the consideration of these two positions at the present time; as I intend soon to resume it, and believe, that I shall be able to demonstrate both of them; I shall, for the present only, take them for granted. If they are true, it follows irresistibly, from both of them united, that the properties and the exertions, of matter, are derived from an extrinsic cause; and that that cause is possessed of intelligence and power, to which no bounds can be assigned.

The same argument, conducted in a more general and popular manner, may be thus exhibited. The agency of God is clearly

and certainly seen in the preservation and government of all things. The existence of all the forms and states of being, which we behold in the universe, is plainly derived; because it is a change in the former state of things, commencing, continuing, and terminating; and, as it is impossible that any being should commence its own existence, derived certainly from an extrinsic and adequate cause. This cause can be no other than God.

Thus the production, existence, and structure, of vegetables and animals; their growth, perfection, and decay; their functions and operations; are all plainly effects of boundless intelligence and power. The universe, of which we are inhabitants, is plainly a system, made up of parts, fitted to each other, and arranged and proportioned, so as to make one great and glorious whole. The parts also, are, to say the least, in immense multitudes, subordinate, but wonderful systems.

To pass by the mineral kingdom, in which, however, there are innumerable proofs of design, art, and arrangement, fitting the parts of it, by a happy subserviency, to the accomplishment of many illustrious and valuable ends, but demanding more time than can be allotted, at present, to the consideration of them; I observe, that every organized being, every vegetable and every animal, is a complete system within itself. Each has all the parts and faculties which are suited to the purposes of its existence, purposes obvious, useful, and wonderful; and yet regularly and completely accomplished. Thus grass is exactly fitted to adorn the earth with beauty, and to become food for the sustenance of an innumerable multitude of animals. Thus hortulan productions, fruits, grains, and various kinds of animals, are fitted to become food for mankind. Thus trees are fitted to yield their shade, and to become useful materials for furniture, fencing, and building. Thus the earth, the air, the rain. and the sunshine, are suited to the production of vegetable life, of action, warmth, and comfort; together with innumerable other things, necessary to preserve and invigorate man. Thus the su is fitted to shine; the planets to receive light from his beams; and the whole system, to move on with regularity and harmony, and to accomplish all the great and glorious purposes for which it was contrived.

In every one of these things, even the least of them, there is a skill and power manifested, which, were any other skill and power employed in labouring to bring them to pass, infinitely transcend the efficiency of all beings, except God. In every one of them, and in all parts of every one, He is seen in this efficiency, and is therefore present in all. In all, and throughout all, he acts. Every moment, in every place, and with respect to every being, he preserves, conducts, and manages, all the parts of this stupendous machine, this vast universe, this immense kingdom, which he hath made for himself, and not for another. Power and skill, literally infinite, are every moment conspicuous in every beir g.

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