I. To show thofe falfe caufes, upon which men are apt to charge their fins.

II. To fhow pofitively, that luft is the true and proper caufe of them.

III. To show the way by which it causes them; and that, the text tells us, is by feducing and enticing. Every man is tempted, when he is drawn afide of his own luft, and enticed.

I. And for the first of these, the miftaken causes of fin; in the number of which we may reckon thefe that follow:

1. The decree of God concerning things to come to pass, is not a proper caufe for any man to charge his fins upon; though perhaps there is nothing in the world that is more abused by weak and vulgar minds, in this particular. I fhall not concern myself to difpute how God decrees the event of fins: But this I fhall affirm in general, that be the divine decree never fo abfolute, yet it has no caufal influence upon finful actions; no, nor indeed upon any actions elfe: for as much as the bare decree, or purpose of a thing, produces or puts nothing in being at all. It is, as the fchools call it, an immanent act; that is, fuch an one as refts wholly within God, and effects nothing without him. A decree, as fuch, is not operative or effective of the thing decreed,

Befides,

Befides, whenfoever God decrees that a thing fhall come to pass, he decrees the manner of its production alfo, and that fuitably to the way of working proper to that cause by which it is effected: As if he decrees that a man fhall do fuch or fuch a thing, he decrees that he shall do it freely, and agreeably to that liberty of will that his nature invests him with.

But it will be reply'd, Does not every thing decreed by God certainly and neceffarily come to pass? And then, how can we prevent it? And if fo, is there not a force upon us from heaven, to do the thing that is thus decreed?

I anfwer, no; for there is a great deal of difference between a mere illative neceffity, which confifts only in the logical confequence of one thing upon another, and between a caufal neceffity, which efficiently and antecedently determines and puts the faculty upon working. But fo does not the divine decree it exerts no force or impulfe upon man's will, but leaves it to its own natural liberty. However, it is certain, that, by the former kind of merely illative neceffity, the thing decreed will affuredly have its event. But this is no greater a neceffity, than God's fore-knowledge puts upon the event of the thing fore-known: for it is impoffible, that God fhould not foreknow all things that fhall come to pafs; and it is equally impoffible, if God fore-knows a thing fhall come to pafs, that that thing fhould

fhould not come to pafs. And yet I fuppofe that none will say, that God's fore-knowledge of a man's actions does, by any active influence, neceffitate that man to do thofe actions: albeit, that this confequence stands unshakeable, that whatsoever God fore-knows a man will do, that fhall certainly and infallibly be done. Otherwise, where is God's omniscience and his infallibility? He knows the last point to which the Will will incline its choice: he is before-hand with all futurities, and fo takes them into his view with the fame certainty, as if they were present or actually paft,

Now let any one compare thefe two, God's decree, and his fore-knowledge, and he will find, that, as to the event, the fame neceffity paffes both upon the thing decreed, and the thing fore-known, And therefore, if men will confefs, that God's fore-knowledge does not force or push a man upon the doing of any thing, it will follow alfo, that neither does his decree. But if, in the scanning of either, there occurs any difficulty, to our apprehenfions not refolvable, it is because God is infinite; and because an infinite mind, both in its knowledge and purposes, proceeds not according to the methods and measures of a finite understanding. And, upon this account, all the arguments, that, with fo much noife and confidence, are urged against God's decrees, will be found but popular and falla

cious,

cious, and grounded upon the application of men's ways of acting and apprehending to God; and confequently tend to difprove God's infinity as much or more than any thing elfe.

Let no bold or ignorant finner, therefore, think to take fanctuary here; or to alledge God's decree as an excufe for those villanies, which, with full purpose and choice of will, he committed. If God, by the unfearchable counsel of his will, defigns, forefees, and orders, what yet the finner does moft freely, what is that to him? That alters not the nature of his action, any more than if I had a defign to kill my enemy, and another, without any knowledge of fuch a defign of mine, fhould, of his own accord, kill him. Would this free him from bearing the guilt of his own action, and undergoing the deferved punishment of a murderer? None fo apt to babble about predeftination, and God's decrees, as the illiterate vulgar; and from hence to take reafons for what they are to do. But what can warrant them to infift upon myfteries, when they are called to duty? And to pore and break their brains upon the hidden Tenfes of a decree, when they have the plain and intelligible voice of a precept? God hath shewed thee, O man, what is good, and what is evil. He has placed life and death before thee. This is the rule by which thou must ftand or fall and no man will find, that his

fulfilling

fulfilling God's fecret Will, will bear him out in the breach of his revealed.

2. The influences of the heavens, and of the ftars, imprint nothing upon men that can impel or engage them to do evil: And yet fome are so fottish, as to father their vices and villanies upon thefe; they were born (forfooth) under fuch a planet, and therefore they cannot chuse but be thieves, or whoremasters, or rebels, all their life after. But it is ftrange, that heaven should prepare men for hell, and imprint thofe qualities upon them, that should hinder them from ever coming to heaven. This would be highly injurious to the great Artificer and Maker of those bodies, that he fhould provide such store-houses of mischief, fuch irrefiftible conveyers of the feeds of fin into men's minds. To be born under any planet, would, in this cafe, be worse than not to be born at all. And to what purpose fhould God allow men the means to fave them, if he places them under fuch an influence as muft certainly damn them?

But these are mere fopperies; the fables and follies of old women and aftrologers, who are feldom able to give an account of that which is under the immediate impreffions of the heavens, that is, of the air and the elements; and upon the ftock of all their acquaintance with these celeftial bodies, to fecure us but one fair day a month or two hence, 'Tis all but confident conjecture, and

cheating