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caufe in them were locked up all the treasures of useful knowledge. This study has long ago ceafed to be the chief object of education; and yet the original plan is handed down to us with very little variation. Wishing to contribute to a more perfect fyftem of education, I prefent to the public the following sketches. The books that have been published on morality, theology, and the art of reafoning, are not eminent either for fimplicity, or for perfpicuity. To introduce thefe into the fubjects mentioned, is my aim; with what fuccefs, is with deference fubmitted to the judgement of others. The historical part, hitherto much neglected, is necessary as a branch of my general plan; and I am hopeful, that, befide inftruction, it will contribute to recreation, which, in abftract ftudies, is no less necessary than pleasant.

SKETCH

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EVERY

Principles of Reafon.

VERY affirmation, whatever be the subject, is termed a propofition.

Truth and error are qualities of propofitions. A propofition that fays a thing is what it is in reality, is termed a true propofition. A propofition that fays a thing is what it is not in reality, is termed an erroneous propofition.

Truth is fo effential in conducting affairs, that man would be a disjointed being were it not agreeable to him. Truth accordingly is agreeable to every human being, and falfehood or error difagreeable. The purfuit of truth is no lefs pleafant than the pursuit of any other good *.

Our knowledge of what is agreeable and difagreeable in objects is derived from the fenfe of beauty, handled in Elements of Criticism. Our knowledge of right and wrong in actions, is de

rived

* It has been wifely observed, that truth is the fame to the understanding that music is to the ear, or beauty to the eye,

rived from the moral fenfe, to be handled in the sketch immediately following. Our knowledge of truth and error is derived from various fources.

Our external fenfes are one fource of knowledge they lay open to us external fubjects, their qualities, their actions, with events produced by these actions. The internal fenfes are another fource of knowledge: they lay open to us things paffing in the mind; thinking, for example, deliberating, inclining, refolving, willing, confenting, and other acts; and they alfo lay open to us our' emotions and paffions. There is a fenfe by which we perceive the truth of many propofitions; fuch as, That every thing which begins to exist must have a caufe; That every effect adapted to fome end or purpose, proceeds from a defigning caufe; and, That every effect adapted to a good end or purpose, proceeds from a defigning and benevolent cause. A multitude of axioms in every fcience, particularly in mathematics, are equally perceived to be true. By a peculiar fenfe, of which afterward, we know that there is a Deity. There is a fenfe by which we know that the external figns of paffion are the fame in all men; that animals of the fame external appearance are of the fame fpecies; and that animals of the fame fpecies, have the fame properties (a). There is a fense that dives into futurity: we know that the fun will rife to-morrow; that the earth will perform its wonted courfe round the fun; that winter and fummer will follow each other in fucceffion; that a ftone dropt from the hand will fall to the ground; and a thoufand other fuch propo

fitions.

VOL. II.

I

(a) Preliminary Difcourfe.

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There are many propofitions, the truth of which is not fo apparent a procefs of reafoning is neceffary, of which afterward.

Human teftimony is another fource of knowledge. So framed we are by nature, as to rely on human teftimony; by which we are informed of beings, attributes, and events, that never came under any of our fenfes.

The knowledge that is derived from the fources. mentioned, is of different kinds. In fome cafes, our knowledge includes abfolute certainty, and produces the highest degree of conviction: in other cafes, probability comes in place of certainty, and the conviction is inferior in degree. Knowledge of the latter kind is diftinguished into belief, which concerns facts; and opinion, which concerns relations, and other things that fall not under the denomination of facts. In contradiftinction to opinion and belief, that fort of knowledge which includes abfolute certainty and produces the highest degree of conviction, retains its proper name. To explain To explain what is here faid, I enter into particulars.

The fenfe of feeing, with very few exceptions, affords knowledge properly fo termed it is not in our power to doubt of the exiftence of a perfon we fee, touch and converfe with. When fuch is our conftitution, it is a vain attempt to call in queftion the authority of our fenfe of feeing, as fome writers pretend to do. No one ever called in queftion the existence of internal actions and paffions, laid open to us by internal fenfe; and there is as little ground for doubting of what we fee. The fenfe of feeing, it is true, is not. always correct: through different mediums the fame object is feen differently: to a jaundic'd eye every thing appears yellow; and to one intoxicated with liquor, two candles fometimes appear four. But we are never left without a remedy

in fuch a cafe: it is the province of the reafoning faculty, to correct every error of that kind.

An object of fight recalled to mind by the power of memory, is termed an idea or fecondary perception. An original perception, as faid above, affords knowledge in its proper sense; but a fecondary perception affords belief only. And Nature in this, as in all other inftances, is faithful to truth; for it is evident, that we cannot be fo certain of the existence of an object in its abfence, as when present.

With refpect to many abstract propofitions, of which inftances are above given, we have an abfolute certainty and conviction of their truth, derived to us from various fenfes. We can, for example, entertain as little doubt that every thing which begins to exift must have a caufe, as that the fun is in the firmament; and as little doubt that he will rife to-mor row, as that he is now fet. There are many other propofitions, the truth of which is probable only, not abfolutely certain; as, for example, that winter will be cold and fummer warm. That natural operations are performed in the fimpleft manner, is an axiom of natural philofophy: it may be probable, but is far from being certain *.

In every one of the inftances given, conviction arifes from a fingle act of perception: for which reafon, knowledge acquired by means of that perception, not only knowledge in its proper fenfe, but alfo opinion and belief, are termed intuitive knowledge. But there are many things, the knowledge of which is not obtained with fo much facility.Pro

I 2

I have given this propofition a place, because it is affumed as an axiom by all writers on natural philosophy. And yet there appears fome room for doubting, whether our conviction of it do not proceed from a bias in our nature, rather than from an original sense. Our taste for fimplicity, which undoubtedly is natural, renders fimple operations more agreeable than what are complex, and confequently makes them appear more natural. It deferves a most serious difcuffion, whether the operations of nature be always carried on with the greatest fimplicity, or whether we be not misled by our tafte for fimplicity to be of that opinion,

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