mental propofition? In the next place, How does our author know that he thinks? If nothing is to be taken for granted, an argument is no lefs neceffary to prove that he thinks, than to prove that he has intuitive knowledge of his thinking; but has he not the fame of his exifting? Would not a man deferve to be laughed at, who, after warming himself at a fire, fhould imagine the following argument neceffary to prove its existence, "The fire burns, ergo " it exifts?" Listen to an author of high reputatiattempting to demonstrate a self-evident propofition. The labour of B cannot be the labour of C; be"cause it is the application of the organs and pow"ers of B, not of C, to the effecting of fomething; "and therefore the labour is as much B's, as the "limbs and faculties made ufe of are his. Again, "the effect or produce of the labour of B. is not the "effect of the labour of C: and therefore this effect 66 or produce is B's, not C's; as much B's, as the "labour was B's and not C's: Because, what the la"bour of B caufes or produces, B produces by his "labour ; or it is the product of B by his labour: "that is, it is B's product, not C's, or any other's. "And if C fhould pretend to any property in that "which B can truly call his, he would act contrary "to truth (a)." In every fubject of reafoning, to define terms is neceffary in order to avoid mistakes: and the only poffible way of defining a term is to exprefs its meaning in more fimple terms. Terms expreffing ideas that are fimple without parts, admit not of being defined, because there are no terms more fimple to exprefs their meaning. To fay that every term is capable of a definition, is in effect to fay, that terms resemble matter; that as the latter is divifible without end, fo the former is reducible into fimpler terms without end. The habit however of defining is fo inveterate (a) Religion of Nature delineated, se&t, 6 paragr. 2. inveterate in fome men, that they will attempt to define words fignifying fimple ideas. Is there any neceffity to define motion: do not children underftand the meaning of the word? And how is it poffible to define it, when there are not words more fimple to define it by? Yet Worster (a) attempts. that bold task. "A continual change of place," fays he," or leaving one place for another, with"out remaining for any fpace of time in the fame "place, is called motion." That every body in motion is continually changing place, is true: but change of place is not motion; it is the effect of motion. Gravefend (b) defines motion thus, "Motus eft tranflatio de loco in locum, five conti nua loci mutatio;" which is the fame with the former. Yet this very author admits locus. or place to fignify a fimple idea, incapable of a definition. Is it more fimple or more intelligible than motion? But, of all, the most remarkable definition of motion is that of Aristotle, famous for its impenetrability, or rather abfurdity, "Actus entis "in potentia, quatenus in potentiat." His definition of time is numerus motus fecundum prius ac pofterius. This definition as well as that of motion, may more properly be confidered as riddles propounded for exercising invention. Not a few writers on algebra define negative quantities to be quantities less than nothing. Extenfion enters into the conception of every particle of matter; because every particle of matter has length, breadth and thickness. Figure in the fame manner, enters into the conception of every particle of matter; becaufe every particle VOL. II. (a) Natural Philofophy, p. 31. (6) Elements of Phyfics, p. 28, N of "Motion is, the removing from one place to another, or a continual "change of place." "The action of a being in power, fo far as it is in power." of matter is bounded. By the power of abftraction, figure may be conceived independent of the body that is figured; and extenfion may be conceived independent of the body that is extended. Thefe particulars are abundantly plain and obvious; and yet observe what a heap of jargon is employed by the followers of Leibnitz, in their fruitlefs endeavours to define extenfion. They begin with fimple existences, which they fay are unextended, and without parts. According to that definition, fimple existences cannot belong to matter, because the fmalleft particle of matter has both parts and extenfion. But to let that pass, they endeavour to fhow as follows, how the idea of extenfion arifes from thefe fimple existences. "We may look upon fimple existences, "as having mutual relations with refpect to their "internal ftate: relations that form a certain "order in their manner of existence. And this "order or arrangement of things, co-existing and "linked together but fo as we do not diftinctly "understand how, caufes in us a confufed idea, "from whence arifes the appearance of exten"fion." A Peripatetic philofopher being afked, What fort of things the fenfible fpecies of Aristotle are, answered, That they are neither entities nor nonentities, but fomething intermediate between the two. The famous aftronomer Ifmael Bulialdus lays down the following propofition, and attempts a mathematical demonftration of it, "That light is a mean-proportional between corporeal "substance and incorporeal.' " I close with a curious fort of reasoning, fo fingular indeed as not to come under any of the foregoing heads. The first editions of the latest verfion of the Bible into English, have the following preface. "Another thing we think good "to admonish thee of, gentle reader, that we "have not tied ourfelves to an uniformity of "phrafing, or to an identity of words, as fome "peradventure would with that we had done, "because they obferve, that fome learned men "fomewhere have been as exact as they could "be that way. Truly, that we might not vary "from the fenfe of that which we have tran"flated before, if the word fignified the fame in "both places, (for there be fome words that "be not of the fame fenfe every where), we "were especially careful, and made a confcience "according to our duty. But that we fhould ex"prefs the fame notion in the fame particular "word; as, for example, if we tranflate the "Hebrew or Greek word once by purpose, never to call it intent; if one where journeying, c never travelling; if one where think, never fuppofe; if one where pain, never ache; if one "where joy, never gladness, &c.; thus to mince "the matter, we thought to favour more of cuσε riofity than wisdom, and that rather it would "breed fcorn in the Atheist, than bring profit "to the godly reader. For is the kingdom of "God become words or fyllables? Why fhould "we be in bondage to them, if we may be free; "ufe one precifely, when we may ufe another, "no lefs fit, as commodioufly? We might alfo "be charged by fcoffers, with fome unequal dealing toward a great number of good Englifh words. For as it is written by a certain great philofopher, that he fhould fay, that thofe logs were happy that were made images to be "worshipped; for their fellows, as good as they, lay for blocks behind the fire: fo if we fhould "fay as it were, unto certain words, Stand up "higher, have a place in the Bible always; and "to others of like quality, Get ye hence, be ba"nifhed for ever, we might be taxed peradven 66 66 N 2 ture |