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ties that are fallacious; and that on this account they deserve credit.

It is ftrange, that this philofopher, who found himself under a neceffity of yielding to the testimony of consciousness, did not find the fame neceffity of yielding to the teftimony of his fenfes, his memory, and his understanding: and that while he was certain that he doubted, and reasoned, he was uncertain whether two and three made five, and whether he was dreaming or awake. It is more ftrange, that fo acute a reafoner fhould not perceive, that his whole train of reafoning to prove that his faculties were not fallacious, was mere fophiftry; for if his faculties were fallacious, they might deceive him in this train of reafoning; and fo the conclufion, That they were not fallacious, was the only teftimony of his faculties in their own favour, and might be a fallacy.

It is difficult to give any reafon for diftrufting our other faculties, that will not reach confciousness itself. And he who diftrufts the faculties of judging and reafoning which God hath given him, must even reft in his fcepticism, till he come to a found mind, or until God give him new faculties to fit in judgement upon the old. If it be not a first principle, That our faculties are not fallacious, we must be abfolute fceptics: for this principle is incapable of proof; and if it is not certain, nothing elfe can be certain.

Since the time of Des Cartes, it has been fashionable with those who dealt in abstract philofophy, to employ their invention in finding philofophical arguments, either to prove thofe truths which ought to be received as firft principles, or to overturn them and it is not eafy to fay, whether the authority of firft principles is more hurt by the first of these attempts, or by the laft: for fuch principles can ftand fecure only upon their own bottom ;

3

bottom; and to place them upon any other foundation than that of their intrinfic evidence, is in effect to overturn them.

I have lately met with a very sensible and judicious treatise, wrote by Father Buffier about fifty years ago, concerning first principles and the fource of human judgements, which, with great propriety, he prefixed to his treatife of logic. And indeed I apprehend it is a fubject of fuch consequence, that if inquifitive men can be brought to the fame unanimity in the first principles of the other fciences, as in thofe of mathematics and natural philofophy, (and why fhould we defpair of a general agreement in things that are felf-evident?), this might be confidered as a third grand ra in the progrefs of human reafon.

SKETCH II.

Principles and Progrefs of Morality.

THE principles of morality are little under.

ftood among favages and if they arrive at maturity among enlightened nations, it is by flow degrees. This progrefs points out the hiftorical part, as first in order; but as that history would give little fatisfaction, without a rule for comparing the morals of different ages, and of different nations, I begin with the principles of morality, fuch as ought to govern at all times, and in all nations.— The present sketch accordingly is divided into two parts. In the firft, the principles are unfolded; and the second is altogether hiftorical.

PART

PART I

Principles of Morality,

SECT. I.

Human Actions analyfed,

THE hand of God is no where more vifible,

than in the nice adjustment of our internal frame to our fituation in this world. An animal is endued with a power of felf-motion; and in performing animal functions, requires no external aid. This in particular is the cafe of man, the nobleft of terreftrial beings. His heart beats, his blood circulates, his ftomach digefts, evacuations proceed, &c. &c. By what means? Not surely by the laws of mechanifm, which are far from being adequate to fuch operations. They are effects of an internal power, bestowed on man for preferving life. The power is exerted uniformly, and without interruption, independent of will, and without consciousness.

Man is a being fufceptible of pleasure and pain these generate defire to attain what is agreeable, and to fhun what is difagreeable; and he is

enabled

enabled by other powers to gratify his defires. One power, termed inftinct, is exerted indeed with consciousness; but without will, and blindly without intention to produce any effect. Brute animals act for the most part by inftinct: hunger prompts them to eat, and cold to take fhelter; knowingly indeed, but without exerting any act of will, and without forefight of what will happen. Infants of the human fpecies, little fuperior to brutes, are, like brutes, governed by instinct they lay hold of the nipple, without knowing that fucking will fatisfy their hunger; and they weep when pained, without any view of relief. Another power is governed by intention and will in the progrefs from infancy to maturity, the mind opens to objects without end of defire and of averfion; the attaining or fhunning of which depend more or lefs on our own will: we are placed in a wide world, left to our own conduct; and we are by nature provided with a proper power for performing what we intend and will. The actions performed by means of this power are termed voluntary. Some effects require a train of actions; walking, reading, finging. Where these actions are uniform, as in walking, or nearly fo, as in playing on a mufical inftrument, an act of will is only neceffary at the commencement: the train proceeds by habit without any new act of will. The body is antecedently adjusted to the uniform progrefs; and is difturbed if any thing unexpected happen: in walking for example, a man feels a fhock if he happen to tread on ground higher or lower than his body was prepared for. The power thus acquired by habit of acting without will, is an illuftrious branch of our nature; for upon it depend all the arts, both the fine and the ufeful. To play on the violin, requires wonderful fwift

nefs

nefs of fingers, every motion of which in a learner is preceded by an act of will: and yet by habit folely, an artist moves his fingers with no lefs accuracy than celerity. Let the most handy perfon try for the first time to knit a ftocking: every motion of the needle demands the ftricteft attention; and yet a girl of nine or ten will move the needle fo fwiftly as almoft to efcape the eye, without once looking on her work. If every motion in the arts required a new act of will, they would remain in infancy for ever; and what would man be in that cafe? In the foregoing inftances, we are conscious of the external operation without being conscious of a caufe. But there are various internal operations of which we have no confcioufnefs; and yet that they have exifted is made known by their effects. Often have I gone to bed with a confufed notion of what I was ftudying; and have wakened in the morning completely master of the fubject. I have heard a new tune of which I carried away but an imperfect conception. A week or perhaps a fortnight after, the tune has occurred

me in perfection; recollecting with difficulty where I heard it. Such things have happened to me frequently, and probably alfo to others. My mind must have been active in these inftances, tho' I knew nothing of it.

There ftill remain another fpecies of actions, termed involuntary; as where we act by fome irresistible motive againft our will. An action may be voluntary, though done with reluctance; as where a man, to free himself from torture, reveals the fecrets of his friend: his confeffion is voluntary, tho' drawn from him with great reluctance. But let us fuppofe, that after the firmest resolution to reveal nothing, his mind is unhinged by exquifite torture: the discovery

he

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