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he makes is in the ftricteft fenfe involuntary: he fpeaks indeed but he is compelled to it abfolutely against his will.

Man is by his nature an accountable being, anfwerable for his conduct to God and man. In doing any action that wears a double face, he is prompted by his nature to explain the fame to his relations, his friends, his acquaintance; and above all, to thofe who have authority over him. He hopes for praife for every right action, and dreads blame for every one that is wrong. But for what fort of actions does he hold himself accountable? Not surely for an inftinctive action, which is done blindly, without intention and without will: neither for an involuntary action, because it is extorted from him against his will and least of all, for actions done without consciousness. What only remain are voluntary actions, which are done wittingly and willingly": for these we must account, if at all accountable; and for these every man in confcience holds himself bound to account.

More particularly upon voluntary actions. To intend and to will, though commonly held fynonymous, fignify different acts of the mind. Intention refpects the effect: Will refpects the action that is exerted for producing the effect.

It is my intention, for example, to relieve my friend from diftrefs: upon feeing him, it is my Will to give him a fum for his relief: the external act of giving follows; and my friend is relieved, which is the effect intended. But thefe internal acts are always united: I cannot will the means, without intending the effect; and ! I cannot intend the effect, without willing the

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*To incline, to refolve, to intend, to will, are acts of the mind relavive to external action. These several acts are well understood; tho' they cannot be defined, being perfectly fimple.

Some effects of voluntary action follow neceffarily: A wound is an effect that neceffarily follows the ftabbing a perfon with a dagger: death is a neceffary effect of throwing one down from the battlements of a high tower, Some effects are probable only: I labour in order to provide for my family; fight for my country to refcue it from oppreffors; take phyfic for my health. In fuch cafes, the event intended does not neceffarily nor always follow.

A man, when he wills to act, muft intend the neceffary effect: a perfon who ftabs, certainly intends to wound. But where the effect is probable only, one may act without intending the effect that follows: a ftone thrown by me at random into the market place, may happen to wound a man without my intending it. One acts by inftinct, without either will or intention: voluntary actions that neceffarily produce their effect, imply intention voluntary actions, when the effect is probable only, are fometimes intended, fometimes not.

Human actions are distinguished from each other by certain qualities, termed right and wrong. But as these make the corner-ftone of morality, they are referved to the following fection,

SECT.

SECT. II.

Divifion of Human Actions into Right, Wrong, and Indifferent.

THE

HE qualities of right and wrong in voluntary actions, are univerfally acknowledged as the foundation of morality; and yet philofophers have been strangely perplexed about them. The hiftory of their various opinions, would fignify little bat to darken the subject: the reader will have more fatisfaction in seeing these qualities explained, without entering at all into controversy.

No perfon is ignorant of primary and fecondary qualities, a diftinction much infifted on by philofophers. Primary qualities, fuch as figure, cohefion, weight, are permanent qualities, that exist in a fubject whether perceived or not. Secondary qualities, fuch as colour, tafte, fmell depend on the percipient as much as on the subject, being nothing when not perceived. Beauty and uglinefs are qualities of the latter fort: they have no existence but when perceived; and, like all other fecondary qualities, they are perceived intuitively; having no dependence on reafon nor judgement, more than colour has, or fmell, or tafte (a).

The qualities of right and wrong in voluntary actions, are fecondary, like beauty and uglinefs

(a) See Elements of Criticism, vol. 1. p. 207. ed, 5.

and

and the other secondary qualities mentioned. Like them, they are objects of intuitive perception, and depend not in any degree on reafon. No argument is requifite to prove, that to rescue an innocent babe from the jaws of a wolf, to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, are right actions: they are perceived to be fo intuitively. As little is an argument requifite to prove that murder, deceit, perjury, are wrong actions: they are perceived to be fo intuitively. The Deity has beftowed on man, different faculties for different purposes. Truth and falfehood are investigated by the reasoning faculty. Beauty and ugliness are objects of a fenfe, known by the name of tafte. Right and wrong are objects of a fenfe termed the moral fenfe or confcience. And fuppofing thefe qualities to be hid from our perception, in vain would we try to discover them by any argument or procefs of reasoning: the attempt would be abfurd; no less so than an attempt to discover by reasoning colour, or tafte, or fmell *.

Right and wrong, as mentioned above, are qualities of voluntary actions, and of no other kind. An inftinctive action may be agreeable, may be difagreeable; but it cannot properly be denominated either right or wrong. An involuntary act is burtful to the agent, and disagreeable to the fpectator; but it is neither right nor wrong. These qualities alfo depend in no degree on the event. Thus, if to fave my friend from drowning I plunge into

* Every perception must proceed from fome faculty or power of perception, termed fenfe. The moral fenfe, by which we perceive the qualities of right and wrong, may be confidered either as a branch of the sense of seeing, by which we perceive the actions to which these qualities belong, or as a fenfe diftinct from all others. The senses by which objects are perceived, are not feparated from each other by dif tinct boundaries: the forting or claffing them feems to depend more on taste and fancy; than on nature. I have followed the plan laid down by former writers; which is, to confider the moral fenfe as a fense diftinct from others, because it is the easiest and clearest manner of conceiving it.

into a river, the action is right, though I happen to come to late. And if I aim a stroke at a man behind his back, the action is wrong, though I happen not to touch him.

The qualities of right and of agreeable, are infeparable; and fo are the qualities of wrong and of difagreeable. A right action is agreeable, not only in the direct perception, but equally fo in every subsequent recollection. And in both circumftances equally, a wrong action is difagreeable.

Right actions are diftinguished by the moral fenfe into two kinds, what ought to be done, and what may be done, or left undone. Wrong actions admit not that distinction: they are all prohibited to be done. To fay that an action ought to be done, means that we are tied or obliged to perform; and to fay that an action ought not to be done, means that we are restrained from doing it. Though the neceffity implied in the being tied or obliged, is not phyfical, but only what is commonly termed moral; yet we conceive ourfelves deprived of liberty or freedom, and neceffarily bound to act or to forbear acting in oppofition to every other motive. The neceffity here defcribed is termed duty. The moral neceflity we are under to forbear harming the innocent, is a proper example; the moral fenfe declares the reftraint to be our duty, which no motive whatever will excufe us for tranfgreffing.

The duty of performing or forbearing any action, implies a right in fome perfon to exact performance of that duty; and accordingly a duty or obligation neceffarily infers a correfponding right. My promise to pay L. 100 to John, confers a right on him to demand performance. The man who commits an injury, violates the right of the person injured; which entitles that perfon to demand reparation of the wrong.

Duty

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