their own. Let us liften to a judicious writer, to whom every one liftens with delight: "Nous remarquons aujourd'hui, que nos armées périffent "beaucoup par le travail immodéré des foldats; "et cependant c'étoit par un travail immenfe que "les Romains fe confervoient, La raison en eft, je croix, que leurs fatigues étoient continuelles; au lieu que nos foldats paffent fans ceffe d'un "travail extreme à une extreme oifivété, ce qui

eft la chofe du monde la plus propre à les faire "perir. Il faut que je rapporte ici ce que "les auteurs nous difent de l'education de fol"dats Romains. On les accoutumoit à aller le

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pas militaire, c'eft-a-dire, à faire en cinq heures ❝vingt milles, et quelquefois vingt-quatre. Pendant ces marches, on leur faifoit porter de poids de foixante livres. On les entretenoit dans l'habitude de courir et de fauter tout armés ; "ills ills prenoient dans leurs exercices des epées, de javelots, de flèches, d'une péfanteur double "des armes ordinaires ; et ces exercices étoient

continuels. Des hommes fi endurcis étoient or"dinairement fains; on ne remarque pas dans les ' auteurs que les armées Romaines, qui faifont la "guerre en tant de climats, periffoient beaucoup par les maladies; au lieu qu'il arrive prefque continuellement aujourd'hui, que des armées, fans avoir combattu, fe fondent, pour ainfi dire, dans une campagne* (a)." Our author muft be

(a) Montefquieu, Grandeur de Romains, chap. 2.

here

* "We obferve now-a-days, that our armies are confumed by the fa"tigues and fevere labour of the foldiers; and yet it was alone by la"bour and toil that the Romans preferved themfelves from deftruction. "I believe the reafon is, that their fatigue was continual and unremitting, while the life of our foldiers is a perpetual tranfition from fevere labour to extreme indolence, a life the most ruinous of all others. I must here recite the account which the Roman authors give of the "education of their foldiers. They were continually habituated to the military pace, which was, to march in five hours twenty, and fome"times twenty-four miles. In thefe marches each foldier carried fixty "pounds weight. They were accuftomed to run and leap in arms; and in their military exercifes, their fwords, javelins, and arrows, " were

here understood of the early times of the Roman ftate. Military difcipline was much funk in the fourth century when Vegetius wrote (Lib. 3. cap. 14. 15.). The fword and Pilum, thofe formidable weapons of their forefathers, were totally laid afide for flings and bows, the weapons of effeminate people. About this time it was, that the Romans left off fortifying their camps, a work too laborious for their weakly conftitutions. Marefchal Saxe, a foldier, not a phyfician, afcribes to the ufe of vinegar the healthinefs of the Roman legions were vinegar fo falutary, it would of all liquors be the most in request. Exercife without intermiffion, during peace as well as during war, produced that falutary effect; which every prince will find, who is difpofed to copy the Roman difcipline *. The Marefchal gueffes better with refpect to a horfe. Difcourfing of cavalry, he obferves, that a horfe becomes hardy and healthful. by constant exercife, and that a young horfe is unable to bear fatigue; for which reafon he declares against young horfes for the service of an

army.

That the military branch of the British government is fufceptible of improvements, all the world will admit. To improve it, I have contributed my mite; which is humbly fubmitted to the pub

f

"

lic,

• were twice the ordinary weight. These exercises were continual, which
"fo ftrengthened the conftitution of the men, that they were always in
"health.
We fee no remarks in the Roman authors, that their armies,
in the variety of climates where they made war, ever perished by dif
"eafe; whilst now-a-days it is not unusual, that an army, without ever.
coming to an engagement, dwindles away by disease in one campaign.”
*Rei militaris periti, plus quotidiana armorum exercitia ad fanitatem
militum putaverunt prodeffe, quam medicos. Ex quo intelligitur quanto
ftudio fius armorum artem docendus fit femper exercitus, cum ei laboris con-
fuetudo et in caftris fanitatem, et in conflictu poffit præftare victoriam.
Vegetius, De re militari, lib. 3. cap. 2.-In English thus: "Our mafters of
"the art-military were of opinion, that daily exercise in arms contributed
σε
more to the health of the troops, than the skill of the phyfician : from
"which we may judge, what care fhould be taken, to habituate the
"foldiers to the exercise of arms, to which they owe both their health
in the camp, and their victory in the field."

1

lic, a judge from which there lies no appeal. It is fubmitted in three views. The firft is, Whether an army, modelled as above, would not fecure us against the boldest invader; the next, Whether fuch an army be as dangerous to liberty, as an army in its present form; and the laft, Whether it would not be a fchool of industry and moderation to our people.

With refpect to the firft, we fhould, after a few years, have not only an army of fixty thoufand well-difciplined troops, but the command of another army, equally numerous and equally well difciplined. It is true, that tooops inured to war have an advantage over troops that have not the fame experience but with affurance it may be pronounced impracticable to land at once in Bri tain an army that can ftand against 100,000 Britifh foldiers well difciplined, fighting, even the first time, for their country, and for their wives and children.

A war with France raises a panic on every flight threatening of an invafion. The fecurity afforded by the propofed plan would enable us to act offenfively at fea, inftead of being reduced to keep our fhips at home for guarding our coafts. Would Britain any longer be obliged to fupport her continental connections? No fooner does an European prince augment his army or improve military difcipline, than his neighbours, taking fright, muft do the fame. May not one hope, that by the plan proposed, or by fome fuch, Britain would be relieved from jealoufy and folicitude about its neighbours?

With refpect to the fecond view, having long enjoyed the fweets of a free government under a fucceffion of mild princes, we begin to forget that our liberties ever were in danger. But drowsy security is of all conditions the most dangerous; because the state may be overwhelmed before we even

dream

dream of danger. Suppose only, that a British King, accomplished in the art of war and beloved by his foldiers, heads his own troops in a war with France; and after more than one fuccefsful campaign, gives peace to his enemy, on terms advantageous to his people what fecurity have we for our liberties, when he returns with a victorious army, devoted to his will? I am talking of a standing army in its present form. Troops modelled as above would not be so obfequious: a number of the prime nobility and gentry ferving without pay, who could be under no temptation to enflave themselves and their country, would prove a firm barrier against the ambitious views of fuch a prince. And even fuppofing that army to be totally corrupted, the prince could have little hope of fuccess against the nation, fupported by a veteran army, that might be relied on as champions for their country.

And as to the laft view mentioned, the plan propofed would promote industry and virtue, not only among the foldiers, but among the working people in general. To avoid labour and fevere difcipline in the army, men would be fober and induftrious at home; and fuch untractable spirits as cannot be reached by the mild laws of a free government, would be effectually tamed by military law. At the fame time, as fobriety and innocence are conftant attendants upon industry, the manners of our people would be much purified; a circumstance of infinite importance to Britain. The falutary influence of the plan, would reach 'perfons in a higher fphere. A young gentleman, whipt at school, or falling behind at college, contracts an aversion to study; and flies to the army, where he is kept in countenance by numbers, idle and ignorant like himself. How many young men are thus daily ruined, who, but for the temptatition of idleness and gaiety in the army, would have become useful fubjects! In the plan under confi

deration,

deration, the officers who ferve for pay would be fo few in number, and their prospect of advancement fo clear, that it would require much intereft to be admitted into the army. None would be admitted but thofe who had been regularly educated in every branch of military knowledge; and idle boys would be remitted to their ftudies. Here is displayed an agreeable scene with relation to industry. Suppofing the whole threefcore thousand men to be abfolutely idle; yet, by doubling the industry of thofe who remain, I affirm, that the fum of induftry would be much greater than before. And the fcene becomes enchanting, when we confider, that these threefcore thousand men, would not only be of all the most induftrious, but be patterns of industry to others.

Upon conclufion of a foreign war, we fuffer grievously by difbanded foldiers, who must plunder or ftarve. The prefent plan is an effectual remedy men accustomed to hard labour under strict difcipline, can never be in want of bread: they will be fought for every where, even at higher than ordinary wages; and they will prove excellent masters for training the peasants to hard la+ bour.

A man indulges emulation more freely in behalf of his friend, or his country, than of himself: emulation in the latter cafe is selfish; in the former, is focial. Doth not that give us reafon to hope, that the separating military officers into different claffes will excite a laudable emulation, prompting individuals to exert themfelves on every occafion for the honour of their clafs? Nor will fuch emuJation, a virtuous paffion, be any obftruction to private friendship between members of different claffes. May it not be expected, that young offi cers of birth and fortune, zealous to qualify themfelves at their own expence for ferving their country, will cling for inftruction to officers of experi

ence,