other; and in that fituation, covenants, being of little ufe, are little regarded: but husbandry, requiring the co-operation of many hands, draws men together for mutual affiftance; and then covenants make a figure: arts and commerce make them more and more neceffary; and in a polifhed fociety great regard is paid to them. But contracts and promifes are not confined to commercial dealings: they ferve also to make benevolence a duty; and are even extended to connect the living with the dead a man would die with regret, if he thought his friends were not bound by their promises to fulfil his will after his death and to quiet the minds of men with refpect to futurity, the moral fenfe makes the performing fuch promifes our duty. Thus, if I promise to my friend to erect a monument for him after his death, confcience binds me, even tho' no perfon alive be entitled to demand performance: every one perceives this to be my duty; and I muft expect to fuffer reproach and blame, if I neglect my engagement. To fulfil a rational promise or covenant, deliberately made, is a duty no lefs inflexible than thofe duties are which arife independent of confent. But as man is fallible, often misled by igno rance, and liable to be deceived, his condition would be deplorable, did the moral fenfe compel him to fulfil every engagement, however imprudent or irrational. Here the moral fenfe gives way to human infirmity: it relieves from deceit, from impofition, from ignorance, from error; and binds a man by no engagement but what anfwers the end fairly intended. There is ftill lefs doubt that it will relieve us from an engagement extorted by external violence, or by overbearing paffion. The dread of torture will force moft men men to submit to any terms; and a man in imminent hazard of drowning, will voluntarily promise all he has in the world to fave him. The moral fenfe would be ill fuited to the imbecillity of our nature, did it bind men in conscience to fulfil engagements made in fuch circumstances. The other branch of duties, thofe we owe to ourselves, fhall be difcuffed in a few words. Propriety, a branch of the moral sense, regulates our conduct with refpect to ourselves; as Justice, another branch of the moral fenfe, regulates our conduct with refpect to others. Propriety dictates, that we ought to act up to the dignity of our nature, and to the station allotted us by Providence: it dictates in particular, that temperance, prudence, modefty, and uniformity of conduct, are felf-duties. Thefe duties contribute to private happiness, by preferving health, peace of mind, and felf-esteem; which are ineftimable bleffings: they contribute no lefs to happiness in fociety, by gaining the love and efteem of others, and aid and fupport in time of need. Upon reviewing the foregoing duties respecting others, we find them more or lefs extenfive; but none fo extenfive as to have for their end the good of mankind in general. The moft extenfive duty is that of restraint, prohibiting us to harm others: but even that duty has a limited end; for its purpose is only to protect others from mifchief, not to do them any pofitive good. The active duties of doing pofitive good are circumfcribed within ftill narrower bounds, requiring fome relation that connects us with others; fuch as thofe of parent, child, friend, benefactor. The flighter relations, unless in peculiar circumftances, are not the foundation of any active duty: neighbourhood, for for example, does not alone make benevolence a duty but fuppofing a neighbour to be in distress, relief becomes our duty, if it can be done without diftrefs to ourselves. The duty of relieving from diftrefs, feldom goes farther; for tho' we always fympathife with our relations, and with those under our eye, the diftreffes of the remote and unknown affect us very little. Pactions and agreements become neceffary, if we would extend the duty of benevolence beyond the limits mentioned. Men, it is true, are capable of doing more good than is required of them as a duty; but every fuch good must be a free-will offering. And this leads to arbitrary or discretionary actions, fuch as may be done or left undone; which make the fecond general head of moral actions. With respect to thefe, the moral fenfe leaves us at freedom: a benevolent act is approved, but the omiffion is not condemned. This holds ftrictly in fingle acts; but in viewing the whole of a man's conduct, the moral fenfe appears to vary a little. As the nature of man is complex, partly focial, partly felfifh, we have an intuitive perception, that our conduct ought to be conformable to our nature; and that in advancing our own interest, we ought not altogether to neglect that of others. The man accordingly who confines his whole time and thoughts within his own little fphere, is condemned by all the world as guilty of wrong conduct; and the man himself, if his moral perceptions be not blunted by selfishnefs, muft be fenfible that he deferves to be condemned. On the other hand, it is poffible that free benevolence may be extended beyond proper bounds: where it prevails, it commonly leads to excefs, by prompting a man to facrifice a great intereft of his own to a fmall intereft of others; and the moral fenfe dictates, that fuch conduct is wrong. The juft temperament, temperament, is a fubordination of benevolence to felf-love. Thus, moral actions are divided into two claffes: the first regards our duty, containing actions that ought to be done, and actions that ought not to be done; the other regards arbitrary or difcretionary actions, containing actions that are right when done, but not wrong when left undone. Society is indeed promoted by the latter; but it can fcarce fubfift unlefs the former be made our duty. Hence it is, that actions only of the first class are made indispensable; thofe of the other clafs being left to our free-will. And hence alfo it is, that the various propenfities that difpofe us to actions of the firft clafs, are diftinguifhed by the name of primary virtues; leaving the name of fecondary virtues to thofe propenfities which difpofe us to actions of the other clafs t. The deduction above given makes it evident that the general tendency of right actions is to promote the good of fociety, and of wrong actions, to obftruct that good. Univerfal benevolence is indeed not required of man; becaufe to put it in practice, is beyond his utmost abilities. But for promoting the general good, every thing is required of him that he can accomplish; which will appear from reviewing the foregoing duties. The prohibition of harming others is an eafy task: and upon that account is made univerfal. Our active duties are very different: man is circumfcribed both in capacity and power: he cannot do good but in a flow fucceffion; and therefore it is wifely ordered, that his obligation to do good fhould be confined to his relations, his friends, his benefactors. Even diftrefs makes not benevolence a general duty: all a man can readily do, is to VOL. II. U relieve Virtue fignifies that difpofition of mind which gives the afcendant to moral principles. Vice fignifies that difpofition of mind which gives little or no afcendant to mural principles. relieve those at hand; and accordingly we hear of diftant misfortunes with little or no concern. But let not the moral fyftem be misapprehended, as if it were our duty, or even lawful, to profecute what upon the whole we reckon the most beneficial to fociety, balancing ill with good. The moral fenfe permits not a violation of any perfon's right, however trivial, whatever benefit may thereby accrue to another. A man for example in low circumstances, by denying a debt he owes to a rich mifer, faves himself and a hopeful family from ruin. In that cafe, the good effect far outweighs the ill, or rather has no connterbalance: but the moral sense permits not the debtor to balance ill with good; nor gives countenance to an unjust act, whatever benefit it may produce. And hence a maxim in which all moralifts agree, That we must not do ill to bring about good; the final caufe of which fhall be given below (a). SECT. IV. Principles of Duty and of Benevolence. HAVING AVING thus fhortly delineated the moral laws of our nature, we proceed to an article of great importance, which is, to enquire into the means provided by our Maker for compelling obedience to thefe laws. The moral fenfe is an unerring guide; but the most expert guide will not profit those who are not difpofed to be led. confideration makes it evident, that to complete the moral system, man ought to be endued with fome principle or propenfity, fome impulfive pow (a) Sect. 7. This er, |