1 With respect to veracity in particular, man is fo conftituted, that he must be indebted to information for the knowledge of most things that benefit or hurt him; and if he could not depend upon information, fociety would be very little beneficial. Further, it is wifely ordered, that we should be bound by the moral fenfe to fpeak truth, even where we perceive no harm in tranfgreffing that duty; because it is fufficient that harm may enfue, though not foreseen. At the fame time, falfehood always does mifchief: it may happen not to injure us externally in our reputation, or in our goods; but it never fails to injure us internally': the fweetest and most refined pleafure of fociety, is a candid intercourfe of fentiments, of opinions, of defires, and wishes; and it would be poisonous to indulge any falfehood in fuch intercourfe. Because man is the weakest of all animals in a ftate of feparation, and the very ftrongest in fo. ciety by mutual aid and fupport; covenants and promises, which greatly contribute to thefe, are made binding by the moral fenfe."" } The final caufe of the law of propriety, which enforces the duty we owe to ourfelves, comes next in order. In difcourfing upon thofe laws of nature which concern fociety, there is no occafion to mention any felf-duty but what relates to fociety; of which kind are prudence, temperance, induftry, firmnefs of mind. And that fuch qualities fhould be made our duty, is wifely ordered in a double refpect; firft, as qualifying us to act a proper part in fociety; and next, as intitling us to good-will from others. It is the intereft, no doubt, of every man, to fuit his behaviour to the dignity of his nature, and to the ftation allotted him by Providence; for fuch rational conduct contributes to happinefs, by preferving health, procuring plenty, gaining the efteem of others, and, which of all is the greateft bles fing, by gaining a justly founded felf-efteem. But here intereft folely is not relied on: the powerful authority of duty is added, that in a matter of the utmost importance to ourselves, and of fome importance to the fociety we live in, our conduct may be regular and fteady. Thefe duties tend not only to render a man happy in himfelf; but alfo, by procuring the good-will and efteem of others, to command their aid and affistance in time of need. I proceed to the final caufes of natural rewards and punishments. It is laid down above, that controverfies about property and about other matters of intereft, must be adjusted by the standard of right and wrong. But to bring rewards and punishments under the fame ftandard, without regard to private confcience, would be a plan unworthy of our Maker. It is clear, that to reward one who is not confcious of merit, or to punish one who is not confcious of demerit, cannot anfwer any good end; and in particular, cannot tend either to improvement or to reformation of manners. How much more like the Deity is the plan of nature, which rewards no man who is not confcious that he merits reward, and punishes no man who is not confcious that he merits punishment! By that plan, and by that only, rewards and punifhments accomplish every good end, a final caufe moft illuftrious! The rewards and punishments that attend the primary and fecondary virtues, are finely contrived for fupporting the diftinction between them fet forth above. Punishment must be confined to the tranfgreffion of primary virtues, it being the intention of nature that fecondary virtues be entirely free. On the other hand, fecondary virtues be entirely free. On the other hand fecondary virtues are more highly rewarded than primary: generofity, for example, makes a greater figure than than justice; and magnanimity, heroism, undaunted courage, a ftill greater figure. One would imagine at first view, that the primary virtues, being more effential, fhould be intitled to the firft place in our esteem, and be more amply rewarded than the fecondary; and yet in elevating the latter above the former, peculiar wisdom and forefight are confpicuous. Punishment is appropriated to enforce primary virtues; and if these virtues were also attended with the higheft rewards, fecondary virtues, degraded to a lower rank, would be deprived of that enthusiastic admiration which is their chief fupport: felf-intereft would universally prevail over benevolence; and would banish those numberlefs favours we receive from each other in fociety, which are beneficial in point of interest, and still more fo by generating affection and friendship. In our progrefs through final caufes, we come at laft to reparation, one of the principles destined by Providence for redreffing wrongs committed, and for preventing reiteration. The final caufe of this principle where the mischief arifes from intention, is clear for to protect individuals in fociety, it is not fufficient that the delinquent be punished; it is neceffary over and above, that the mifchief be repaired. Secondly, Where the act is wrong or unjust, though not understood by the author to be fo, it is wifely ordered that reparation fhould follow; which will thus appear. Confidering the fallibility of man, it would be too fevere never to give any allowance for error. On the other hand, to make it a law in our nature, never to take advantage of error, would be giving too much indulgence to indolence and remiffion of mind, tending to make us neglect the improvement of our rational faculties. Our nature is fo happily framed, as to avoid these extremes by diftinguishing between gain and lofs. No man is confcious of wrong, when he takes advantage of an error committed by another to fave himfelf from lofs if there must be a lofs, common fenfe dictates that it ought to rest upon the perfon who has erred, however innocently, rather than upon the perfon who has not erred. Thus, in a competition among creditors about the eftate of their bankrupt debtor, every one is at liberty to avail himfelf of an error committed by his competitor, in order to recover payment. But in lucro captando, the moral fense teacheth a different leffon, which is, that no man ought to lay hold of another's error to make gain by it. Thus, an heir finding a rough diamond in the repofitories of his ancestor, gives it away, mif. taking it for a common pebble: the purchaser is in confcience and equity bound to restore, or to pay à juft price. Thirdly, The following confiderations refpecting the precaution that is neceffary in acting, unfold a final caufe, no lefs beautiful than that laft mentioned. Society could not fubfift in any tolerable manner, were full fcope given to rashness and negligence, and to every action that ftrictly speaking is not criminal; whence it is a maxim founded no lefs upon utility than upon juftice, That men in fociety ought to be extremely circumfpect, as to every action that may poffibly do harm.On the other hand, it is alfo a maxim, That as the profperity and happinefs of man depend on action, activity ought to be encouraged, inftead of being difcouraged by dread of confequences. These maxims, feemingly in oppofition, have natural limits that prevent their encroaching one upon the other. There is a certain degree of attention and circumfpection that men generally bestow upon affairs, proportioned to their importance: if that degree were not fufficient, to defend against a claim of reparation, individuals would would be too much cramped in action; which would be a great difcouragement to activity if a lefs degree were fufficient, there would be too great scope for rafh or remifs conduct; which would prove the bane of fociety. Thefe limits, which evidently tend to the good of fociety, are adjusted by the moral fenfe; which dictates, as laid down in the fection of Reparation, that the man who acts with forefight of the probability of mischief, or acts rafhly and uncautioufly without fuch forefight, ought to be liable for confequences; but that the man who acts cautiously, without foreseeing or fufpecting any mischief, ought not to be liable for confequences. In the fame fection it is laid down, that the moral fenfe requires from every man, not his own degree of vigilance and attention, which may be very small, but that which belongs to the common nature of the fpecies. The final caufe of that regulation will appear upon confidering, that were reparation to depend upon perfonal circumstances, there would be a neceffity of enquiring into the character of individuals, their education, their manner of living, and the extent of their understanding; which which would render judges arbitrary, and fuch law-fuits inextricableBut by affuming the common nature of the fpecies as a standard, by which every man confcience judges of his own actions, law-fuits about reparation are rendered eafy and expeditious. in SECT. |