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SECT. VIII.

Liberty and Neceffity confidered with respect to Morality.

HAVING in the foregoing sections afcertain

ed the reality of a moral fenfe, with its fentiments of approbation and difapprobation, praise and blame; the purpose of the prefent fection is, to fhew, that thefe fentiments are confiftent with the laws that govern the actions of man as a rational being. In order to which, it is firft neceffary to explain these laws; for there has been much controverfy about them, especially among divines of the Arminian and Calvinist fects.

Human actions, as laid down in the first section, are of three kinds: one, where we act by inftinct, without any view to confequences; one, where we act by will in order to produce fome effect: and one, where we act against will. With refpect to the first, the agent acts blindly, without deliberation or choice; and the external act follows neceffarily from the instinctive impulfe *.Actions done with a view to an end, are in a very different condition: into thefe, defire, and will,

* A ftonechatter makes its neft on the ground or near it; and the young, as foon as they can fhift for themselves, leave the nest instinctively. An egg of that bird was laid in a swallow's neft, fixed to the roof of a church. The swallow fed all the young equally without diftinction. The young ftonechatter left the neft at the ufual time before it could fly; and falling to the ground, it was taken up dead. Here is instinct in pu rity, exerting itself blindly without regard to variation of circumstances.The fame is obfervable in our dunghill-fowl. They feed on worms, corn, and other feeds dropt on the ground. In order to discover their food, nature has provided them with an instinct to scrape with the foot; and the inftinct is fo regularly exercised, that they scrape even when they are fet upon a heap of corn.

will, enter: defire to accomplish the end goes first; the will to act in order to accomplish the end, is next; and the external act follows of course. It is the will then that governs every external act done as a mean to an end; and it is defire to accomplish the end that puts the will in motion; defire in this view being commonly termed the motive to act. Thus hearing that my friend is in the hands of robbers, I burn with defire to free him: defire influences my will to arm my fervants and to fly to his relief. Actions done against will come in afterward.

But what is it that raifes defire? The answer is ready it is the profpect of attaining fome agreeable end, or of avoiding one that is difagreeable. And if it be enquired, What makes an object agreeable or difagreeable; the answer is equally ready, that our nature makes it fo. Certain

vifible objects are agreeable, certain founds, and certain fmells: other objects of thefe fenfes are difagreeable. But there we must stop ;. for we are far from being fo intimately acquainted with our own nature as to affign the caufes. These hints are fufficient for my prefent purpose: if one be curious to know more the theory of defire, and of agreeableness and difagreeablenefs, will be found in Elements of Criticifm (a).

With respect to inftinctive actions, no perfon, I prefume, thinks that there is any freedom: an infant applies to the nipple, and a bird builds a neft, no lefs neceffarily than a ftone falls to the ground. With refpect to voluntary actions, done in order to produce fome effect, the neceffity is the fame, though lefs apparent at first view. The external action is determined by the will: the will is determined by defire and defire by what is agreeable or difagreeable. Here is a chain

of

(a) Chap. 2.

of caufes and effects, not one link of which is arbitrary, or under command of the agent: he cannot will but according to his defire: he cannot defire but according to what is agreeable or difagreeable in the objects perceived:

nor do thefe qualities depend on his inclination or fancy; he has no power to make a beautiful woman ugly, nor to make a rotten carcafe smell fweetly.

Many good men apprehending danger to morality from holding our actions to be neceffary, endeavour to break the chain of caufes and effects above mentioned, maintaining, "That what"ever influence defire or motives may have, it is "the agent himself who is the caufe of every "action; that defire may advife, but cannot com"mand; and therefore that a man is still free "to act in contradiction to defire and to the

"ftrongest motives." That a being may exift, which in every cafe acts blindly and arbitrarily, without having any end in view, I can make a fhift to conceive: but it is difficult for me even to imagine a thinking and rational being, that has affections and paffions, that has a defirable end in view, that can eafily accomplish this end; and yet, after all, can fly off, or remain at reft, without any caufe, reafon, or motive, to fway it. If fuch a whimsical being can poffibly exift, I am certain that man is not the being. There is perhaps not a person above the condition of a changeling, but can fay why he did fo and fo, what moved him, what he intended. Nor is a fingle fact ftated to make us believe, that ever a man acted against his own will or defire, who was not compelled by external force. On the contrary, conftant and univerfal experience proves, that human actions are governed by certain inflexible laws; and that a man cannot exert his

felf

self-motive power, but in pursuance of fome defire or motive.

Had a motive always the fame influence, actions proceeding from it would appear no lefs neceffary than the actions of matter. The various degrees of influence that motives have on different men at the fame time, and on the fame man at different times, occafion a doubt by fuggefting a notion of chance. Some motives however have fuch influence, as to leave no doubt: a timid female has a phyfical power to throw herfelf into the mouth of a lion, roaring for food; but he is withheld by terror no lefs effectually than by cords if the fhould rufh upon the lion, would not every one conclude that fhe was frantic? A man, though in a deep fleep, retains a phyfical power to act, but he cannot exert it. A man, though defperately in love, retains a phyfical power to refuse the hand of his miftrefs; but he cannot exert that power in contradiction to his own ardent defire, more than if he were fast afleep. Now if a strong motive have a neceffary influence, there is no reafon for doubting, but that a weak motive must also have its influence, the fame in kind, tho' not in degree. Some actions indeed are ftrangly irregular: but let the wildeft action be fcrutinized, there will always be discovered fome motive or defire, which, however whimsical or capricious, was what influenced the perfon to act. Of two contending motives, is it not natural to expect that the ftronger will prevail, however little its excefs may be? If there be any doubt, it must arise from a fuppofition that a weak motive can be refifted arbitrarily. Where then are we to fix the boundary between a weak and a strong motive? If a weak motive can be refifted, why not one a little ftronger, and why not the ftrongeft? In Elements of Criticifm (a)

VOL. II.

Y

(a) Chap. 2. part 4.

not

the reader will find many examples of contrary motives weighing against each other. Let him ponder thefe with the ftricteft attention: his conclufion will be, that between two motives, however nearly balanced, a man has not an arbitrary choice, but muft yield to the ftronger.The mind indeed fluctuates for foine time, and feels itfelf in a meafure loofe: at laft, however, it is determined by the more powerful motive, as a balance is by the greater weight after many

vibrations.

Such then are the laws that govern our voluntary actions. A man is absolutely free to act according to his own will; greater freedom than which is not conceivable. At the fame time, as man is made accountable for his conduct, to his Maker, to his fellow-creatures, and to himfelf, he is not left to act arbitrarily; for at that rate he would be altogether unaccountable: his will is regulated by defire; and defire by what pleafes or difpleases him. Where we are fubjected to the will of another, would it be our wifh, that his will should be under no regulation? And where we are guided by our own will, would it be reasonable to wish, that it fhould be under no regulation, but be exerted without reafon, without any motive, and contrary to common fenfe? Thus, with regard to human conduct, there is a chain of laws eftablished by nature, no one link of which is left arbitrary. By that wife system, man is made accountable: by it, he is made a fit fubject for divine and human government: by it, perfons of fagacity forefee the conduct of others: and by it, the prefcience of the Deity with refpect to human actions, is clearly established.

The abfurd figure that a man would make acting in contradiction to motives, fhould be fufticient to open our eyes without an argument.

What a def.

2

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