the two branches of the legislature, which no good citizen would wish to fee diffevered: it helps to keep the government of the country in the houfe of commons, in which, it would not perhaps long continue to refide, if fo powerful and wealthy a part of the nation as the peerage compofe, were excluded from all fhare and intereft in its conftitution. If there be a few boroughs fo circumftanced as to lie at the difpofal of the crown, whilft the number of fuch is known and fmall, they may be tolerated with little danger. For where would be the impropriety, or the inconveniency, if the king at once fhould nominate a limited number of his fervants to feats in parliament; or, what is the fame thing, if feats in parliament were annexed to the poffeffion of certain of the most efficient and refponfible offices in the ftate? The prefent reprefentation, after all thefe deductions, and under the confufion in which it confeffedly lies, is ftill in fuch a degree popular; or rather the representatives are fo connected with the mass of the community, by a fociety of interests and paffions, that the will of the people, when it is determined, permanent, and general, almost always at length prevails.

Upon the whole, in the feveral plans which have been fuggested, of an equal or a reformed reprefentation, it will be difficult to discover any propofal that has a tendency to throw more of the bufinefs of the nation into the houfe of commons, or to collect a fet of men more fit to tranfact that bufinefs, or in general more interested in the national happinefs and profperity. One confequence, however, may be expected from thefe projects, namely, "lefs flexi

bility to the influence of the crown." And fince the diminution of this influence, is the declared, and perhaps the fole defign of the various fchemes that have been produced, whether for regulating the elections, contracting the duration, or for purifying

the

authority in a mixed government, of which the members do not individually poffefs a refpectable fhare of perfonal importance. Now, whatever may be the defects of the prefent arrangement, it infallibly fecures a great weight of property to the houfe of commons, by rendering many feats in that houfe acceffible to men of large fortunes, and to fuch men alone. By which means thofe characters are engaged in the defence of the feparate rights and interefts of this branch of the legiflature, that are beft able to fupport its claims. The conftitution of most of the fmall boroughs, efpecially the burgage tenure, con.tributes, though undefignedly, to the fame effect; for the appointment of the reprefentatives we find commonly annexed to certain great inheritances. Elections purely popular are in this refpect uncertain: in times of tranquility, the natural afcendancy of wealth will prevail; but when the minds of men are inflamed by political diffenfions, this influence often yields to more impetuous motives.-The variety of tenures and qualifications, upon which the right of voting is founded, appears to me a recommendation of the mode which now fubfifts, as it tends to introduce imo parliament a correfponding mixture of characters and profeffions. It has been long obferved that confpicuous abilities are moft frequently found with the reprefentatives of fmall boroughs. And this is nothing more than what the laws of human conduct might teach us to expect when fuch boroughs are fet to fale, thofe men are likely to become purchafers who are enabled by their talents to make the beft of their bargain: when a feat is not fold, but given by the opulent proprietor of a burgage tenure, the patron finds his own intereft confulted, by the reputation and abilities of the member whom he nominates. If certain of the nobility hold the appointment of fome part of the house of commons, it ferves to maintain that alliance between

the

the two branches of the legislature, which no good citizen would wish to fee diffevered: it helps to keep the government of the country in the house of commons, in which, it would not perhaps long continue to refide, if fo powerful and wealthy a part of the nation as the peerage compofe, were excluded from all fhare and intereft in its conftitution. If there be a few boroughs fo circumflanced as to lie at the difpofal of the crown, whilft the number of fuch is known and small, they may be tolerated with little danger. For where would be the impropriety, or the inconveniency, if the king at once fhould nominate a limited number of his fervants to feats in parliament; or, what is the fame thing, if feats in parliament were annexed to the poffeffion of certain of the moft efficient and refponfible offices in the ftate? The prefent reprefentation, after all thefe deductions, and under the confufion in which it confeffedly lies, is ftill in fuch a degree popular; or rather the reprefentatives are fo connected with the mass of the community, by a fociety of interefts and paffions, that the will of the people, when it is determined, permanent, and general, almost always at length prevails.

Upon the whole, in the feveral plans which have been fuggefted, of an equal or a reformed representation, it will be difficult to discover any propofal that has a tendency to throw more of the bufinefs of the nation into the houfe of commons, or to collect a fet of men more fit to tranfact that business, or in general more interested in the national happinefs and profperity. One confequence, however, may be expected from thefe projects, namely, lefs flexibility to the influence of the crown." And fince the diminution of this influence, is the declared, and perhaps the fole defign of the various fchemes that have been produced, whether for regulating the elections, contracting the duration, or for purifying

cr

the

the conftitution of parliament by the exclufion of placemen and penfioners; it is obvious to remark, that the more apt and natural, as well as the more fafe and quiet way of attaining the fame end, would be, by a direct reduction of the patronage of the crown, which might be effected to a certain extent without hazarding farther confequences. Superfluous and exorbitant emoluments of office may not only be fuppreffed for the prefent; but provifions of law be devifed, which fhould for the future restrain within certain limits, the number and value of the offices in the donation of the king.

But while we difpute concerning different fchemes of reformation, all directed to the fame end, a previous doubt occurs in the debate, whether the end itfelf be good, or fafe-whether the influ ence fo loudly complained of can be destroyed, or ́even much diminished, without danger to the ftate. Whilft the zeal of fome men beholds this influence with the jealoufy, which nothing but its entire abolition can appeafe, many wife and virtuous politicians deem a confiderable portion of it to be as neceffary a part of the British conftitution, as any other ingredient in the compofition-to be that, indeed, which gives cohesion and folidity to the whole. Were the measures of government, fay they, oppofed from nothing but principle, government ought to have nothing but the rectitude of its meafures to fupport them; but fince oppofition fprings from other motives, government muft poffefs an influence to counteract these motives; to produce, not a bias of the paffions, but a neutrality: it must have fome weight to caft into the fcale to fet the balance even. It is the nature of power always to prefs upon the boundaries which confine it. Licentioufnefs, faction, envy, impatience of control or inferiority; the fecret pleafure of mortifying the great, or the hope of dif poffefling them; a conftant willingnefs to queftion and thwart whatever is dictated or even propofed by

another;

another; a difpofition common to all bodies of men to extend the claims and authority of their order; above all, that love of power and of fhowing it, which refides more or lefs in every human breaft, and which, in popular affemblies, is inflamed, like every other paffion, by communication and encouragement: these motives, added to private defigns and refentments, cherished alfo by popular acclamation, and operating upon the great share of power already poffeffed by the houfe of commons, might induce a majority, or at least a large party of men in that affembly, to unite in endeavouring to draw to themfelves the whole government of the state; or at least so to obftruct the conduct of public affairs, by a wanton and perverfe oppofition, as to render it impoffible for the wifeft statesman to carry forwards the bufinefs of the nation with fuccefs or fatisfac tion.

Some paffages of our national history afford grounds for these apprehenfions. Before the accef fion of James the Firft, or, at leaft, during the reigns of his three immediate predeceffors, the government of England was a government by force; that is, the king carried his meafures in parliament by intimidation. A fenfe of perfonal danger kept the members of the house of commons in fubjection. A conjunction of fortunate caufes delivered at laft the parliament and nation from flavery. That overbearing fyftem, which had declined in the hands of James, expired early in the reign of his fon. After the restoration there fucceeded in its place, and fince the revolution has been methodically purfued, the more fuccefsful expedient of influence. Now we remember what paffed between the lofs of terror, and the establishment of influence. The tranfactions of that interval, whatever we may think of their occafion or effect, no friend of regal government would wish to fee revived. But the affairs of this kingdom afford a more recent atteftation to the fame doctrine. In