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we are acquainted with, are directed to beneficial purposes. Evil no doubt exifts; but is never, that we can perceive, the object of contrivance. Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache; their aching now and then is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps, infeparable from it; or even, if you will, let it be called a defect in the contrivance; but it is not the object of it. This is a diftinction which well deferves to be attended to. In defcribing implemerts of hufbandry, you would hardly fay of a fickle, that it is made to cut the reaper's fingers, though from the conftruction of the inftrument, and the manner of ufing it, this mifchief often happens. But if you had occafion to defcribe inftruments of torture or execution, this engine, you would fay, is to extend the finews; this to dislocate the joints; this to break the bones; this to fcorch the foles of the feet. Here pain and mifery are the very objects of the contrivance. Now nothing of this fort is to be found in the works of nature. We never difcover a train of contrivance to bring about an evil purpose. No anatomist ever discovered a fyftem of organization, calculated to produce pain and difeafe; or, in explaining the parts of the human body, ever faid this is to irritate; this to inflame; this duct is to convey the gravel to the kidneys; this gland to fecrete the humour which forms the gout; if by chance he come at a part of which he knows not the use, the most he can say is, that it is ufelefs; no one ever suspects that it is put there to incommode, to annoy, or torment. Since then God hath called forth his confummate wifdom to contrive and provide for our happiness, and the world appears to have been conftituted with this defign at firft, fo long as this conftitution is upholden by him, we muft in reason fuppofe the fame defign to continue.

The contemplation of univerfal nature rather bewilders the mind than affects it. There is always a bright spot in the profpect, upon which the eye

refts:

refts; a fingle example, perhaps, by which each man finds himself more convinced than by all others put together. I feem, for my own part, to fee the benevolence of the Deity more clearly in the pleafures of very young children, than in any thing in the world. The pleafures of grown perfons may be reckoned partly of their own procuring; efpecially if there has been any induftry, or contrivance, or purfuit, to come at them; or if they are founded, like mufic, painting, &c. upon any qualification of their own acquiring. But the pleafures of a healthy infant are fo manifeftly provided for it by another, and the benevolence of the provifion is fo unqueftionable, that every child I fee at its fport affords to my mind a kind of fenfible evidence of the finger of God, and of the difpofition which directs it.

But the example, which strikes each man moft ftrongly, is the true example for him; and hardly two minds hit upon the fame; which fhews the abundance of fuch examples about us.

We conclude therefore, that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures. And this conclufion being once eftablished, we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon it, namely, "that the

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"method of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is, to inquire into the tendency of that action, to promote or diminish the general happiness."

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CHAP.

CHA P. VI.

UTILITY.

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O then actions are to be estimated by their tendency. Whatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone which conftitutes the obligation of it.

But to all this there feems a plain objection, viz. that many actions are ufeful, which no man in his fenfes will allow to be right. There are occafions, in which the hand of the affaffin would be very useful. The prefent poffeffor of fome great eftate employs his influence and fortune, to annoy, corrupt, or opprefs all about him. His eftate would devolve, by his death, to a fucceffor of an oppofite character. It is useful, therefore, to difpatch fuch a one as foon as poffible out of the way; as the neighbourhood will exchange thereby a pernicious tyrant for a wife and generous benefactor. It may be ufeful to rob a mifer, and give the money to the poor; as the money, no doubt, would produce more happinefs, by being laid out in food and clothing for half a dozen diftreffed families, than by continuing locked up in a mifer's cheft. It may be ufeful to get poffeffion of a place, a piece of preferment, or of a feat in

* Actions in the abstract are right or wrong, according to their tendency; the agent is virtuous or vicious, according to his defign. Thus, if the question be, Whether relieving common beggars be right or wrong? we inquire into the tendency of fuch a conduct to the public advantage or inconvenience. If the queftion be, Whether a man, remarkable for this fort of bounty, is to be esteemed virtuous for that reafon ? we inquire into his defign, whether his liberality fprung from charity or from oftentation. It is evident that our concern is with actions in the abstract.

parliament,

parliament, by bribery or falfe fwearing; as by means of them we may ferve the public more effectually than in our private ftation. What then shall we fay? Muft we admit thefe actions to be right, which would be to juftify affaffination, plunder, and perjury; or muft we give up our principle, that the criterion of right is utility?

It is not neceffary to do either.

The true answer is this; that thefe actions, after all, are not ufeful, and for that reafon, and that alone, are not right.

To fee this point perfectly, it must be observed, that the bad confequences of actions are two-fold, particular and general,

The particular bad confequence of an action, is the mifchief which that fingle action directly and immediately occafions.

The general bad confequence is, the violation of fome neceffary or useful general rule.

Thus the particular bad confequence of the affasfination above defcribed, is the fright and pain which the deceafed underwent; the lofs he suffered of life, which is as valuable to a bad man, as to a good one, or more fo; the prejudice and affliction, of which his death was the occafion, to his family, friends and dependants.

The general bad confequence is, the violation of this neceffary general rule, that no man be put to death for his crimes, but by public authority.

Although therefore, fuch an action have no particular bad confequence, or greater particular good confequences, yet it is not useful, by reason of the general confequence, which is of more importance, and which is evil. And the fame of the other two inftances, and of a million more, which might be mentioned.

But as this folution fuppofes, that the moral government of the world muft proceed by general

rules,

rules, it remains that we fhew the neceffity of this.

СНА Р. VII.

THE NECESSITY OF GENERAL RULES.

You

OU cannot permit one action and forbid another, without fhewing a difference between them. Confequently, the fame fort of actions muft be generally permitted or generally forbidden. Where, therefore, the general permiffion of them would be pernicious, it becomes neceffary to lay down and support the rule which generally forbids

them.

Thus, to return once more to the cafe of the af faffin. The affaffin knocked the rich villain on the head, because he thought him better out of the way than in it. If you allow this excufe in the prefent inftance, you must allow it to all, who act in the fame manner, and from the fame motive; that is, you must allow every man to kill any one he meets, whom he thinks noxious or ufelefs; which, in the event, would be to commit every man's life and fafety to the spleen, fury, and fanaticifin of his neighbour- a difpofition of affairs which would foon fill the world with mifery and confufion; and ere long put an end to human fociety, if not to the human fpecies.

The neceffity of general rules in human govern ments is apparent: but whether the fame neceflity fubfift in the divine ceconomy, in that distribution of

reward

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