from the sympathies of human nature, apt to produce in those who behold it a similar effect. If a child is accustomed to see his parents and those who are about him revengeful, and if revenge, when it appears, is not checked in himself, is not this feeling or state of mind likely to become predominant in his conduct? and will not the same thing happen in regard to other passions of a similar kind?

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OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS.

SOME observations have already been made respecting the nature of the human mind, and the means by which we become acquainted with it. Without repeating any thing that has been said, we shall now proceed to a concise analysis of the various powers or faculties which the mind is said to possess.

By analysis, in general, is meant a separation of the parts of which any thing consists, with a view to consider each of them by itself. In this sense, it is not strictly applicable to the mind, which is in its nature indivisible; but when thus applied, it signifies merely an examination of the various states of the mind as it is affected by different circumstances, or of the various modes of operation of which it is capable.

Every one, who thinks at all how his mind is employed in the acquisition and application of knowledge, must perceive, that the state of its existence, or the mode of its exertion, is different in different circumstances; he will discover that to feel, and to remember what he has felt, to perceive and to imagine, though states or acts of the same thinking principle, are easily distinguishable from each other; an ac

cording to the differences that may thus be discovered, he will reckon the number of the intellectual faculties. The operations of the mind which have been commonly distinguished from each other, and to which the term faculty has been applied, are the following: namely, consciousness, attention, sensation, perception, abstraction, association, conception, imagination, memory, reason.

Of Consciousness.

CONSCIOUSNESS is that faculty by which we know what is passing in our minds, and which serves as a key to our knowledge of all the other faculties; insomuch, that when asked how we know that we feel, perceive, remember, &c., we can only say that we are conscious of it. The word conscious, and its derivative consciousness, are sometimes applied to the inferior animals, as well as to man; thus, when a dog or a horse does any thing, for which on a former occasion he was chastised, and on being observed, shews symptoms of fear, we say that he is conscious of having done wrong; but in such instances, we do not mean exactly the same thing, as when we apply this term to man; for though a brute animal may thus remember, that what he has now done is a thing

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of the same kind, for which he formerly received punishment, and may consequently experience fear; it does not appear from any thing we can discover in his conduct, that he either knows, or is capable of knowing the nature of memory or of fear.

Consciousness, as denoting the knowledge which the mind has of itself, is the high prerogative of man, and is beautifully alluded to by Milton in the following lines:

"There wanted yet the master work, the end

Of all yet done; a creature who, not prone
And brute as other creatures, but endued
With sanctity of reason, might erect
His stature, and upright, with front serene,
Govern the rest, self-knowing, and from thence
Magnanimous to correspond with heaven,
But grateful to acknowledge whence his good
Descends, thither with heart, and voice, and eyes,
Directed in devotion, to adore

And worship God supreme, who made him chief
Of all his works."

In the exercise of consciousness, we are not sensible of any particular act or volition; conscious we must be while we are awake, whether we have any inclination to be so or not. The degree in which we are conscious, may vary with circumstances; and consciousness, as it respects a knowledge of our intellectual faculties, may be directed and improved.

In childhood, and in the earlier periods of youth, consciousness, as a means of becoming acquainted with the operations of our minds, is but little exercised; this, however, is probably more owing to our not being directed to this exercise, than to any real difficulty in the thing itself.

If, in strict propriety of language, consciousness may be termed a faculty, there is one remarkable difference between it and every other. We do not always remember, feel, perceive, combine, &c.; but we are always conscious, and it seems impossible for us to exercise any faculty, or, in other words, to perform any mental operation, without being conscious that we do so.

One of the most important facts, with regard to consciousness, is, that we have an irresistible belief of the existence of every thing of which we are conscious.

Of Attention.

ATTENTION is a voluntary application, or direction of the mind, to any thing suggested or presented to it, by consciousness, sensation, perception, memory, or otherwise. By some writers, it has been represented as a more intense exercise of consciousness, and not a distinct act or operation of the mind; but