that which is occupied by any other individual of his fellow-creatures;-and, in the same manner, every person has relations to other human beings, by which his duties, and the opportunities given for the display of his affections, are varied from those that characterize the lot of all the other members of the great family of man.

The fact we are endeavouring to point out is indeed indisputable, and it is one which,—whether contemplated in regard to the subordinate portions of the workmanship of God, or in respect of the duties and stations of living agents, is fitted to extend, to an immeasurable range, our conceptions of the vast scheme of Divine Providence,-and of the boundless goodness and wisdom by which all its parts are pervaded.

The three following observations, however, are important, and are indeed necessary to be kept in view, if we would have a satisfactory conception of this peculiarity of the Divine scheme.

In the first place, that in every instance there is a fine adjustment between the powers of each individual and the station assigned him for the exercise of these powers;-that his history at any one moment of its progress has also a divinely-ordered re

lation to other and future portions of it, which the ceaseless lapse of time is to evolve;-and that the farther we extend our view of the entire relations of our different lots, or the wider our experience of the dispensations of Divine Providence towards each of us becomes, the more reason do we see for admiring that faultless wisdom and unfailing goodness which have at all times made all the parts of our lot to "work together for good."

In the second place, that the true grandeur of the plan of Providence is only perceived, when we think that the purposes of Divine Providence are - brought about, over the wide extent of his universal kingdom, and throughout all the lapse of everlasting ages, by the direction of all particular events towards one general and divinely-contrived result.

In the third place,—that infinitely varied as the lots of the individuals of mankind are, each individual is able to say for himself what is the peculiar sphere of duty with which he has been intrusted ;or that, provided the sense of duty is properly awakened in an individual, it will enable him,— even though he should be stationed in the lowest rank, and gifted with the humblest powers,-to find

out with great accuracy his whole course of duty

even to its minutest and finest ramifications.

This

observation coincides with that already made in concluding the preceding section of this chapter,—but it is sufficiently important, to admit of being repeated under a variety of aspects,—and confirmed by distinct proofs.

MEN APPARENTLY LEFT TO THEIR OWN MANAGE

MENT OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL TRUSTS.

The idea selected by our Lord for his Parable of the Talents, which we are now assuming as the foundation of these remarks,-a finer or more luminous idea of human duty and human obligation never having been given by any other teacher,—is that of a master "who called to him his servants, and delivered unto them his goods;-and having given unto one five, and to another two, and to another one, he straightway," says our Lord, " took his journey into a far country."

The fact accordingly is, that mankind seem to be left entirely to their own discretion in the management of the trusts that have been committed to them ;—they are placed amidst the temptations and

difficulties that surround them on every side, but with a powerful feeling, at the same time, of the awful responsibility that attaches to the fulfilment of their trust,—while he who has imposed that trust is invisible to sense,-and seems only to have intimated that, at an indefinite time, he will yet come to "take account of his servants," and to apportion unto them their recompense according to their deserts.

And there is no question, that it is this idea of their being unobserved by the eye of a Master,-who indeed seems to them to have " gone into a far country,”-in other words, it is their apparent liability to no immediate responsibility that so often induces men to act as if no account would ever be taken of their conduct,—and that, even in the case of more conscientious men, renders their perception of the greatness and strictness of their trust sometimes so weak and uninfluential. In cases of greater debasement,or of more practised crime,—it is also this apparent removal of the witness of their actions that sometimes inclines the sinner to believe that no account will ever be demanded,—and that he may consequently indulge in all the follies which his own wayward and vicious propensities may occasionally suggest to him.

But a juster and wider view of our nature and of our situation in existence will convince us,-that here, also, as in all the other parts of the conduct of Providence, we may trace the provisions of a wisdom which only appears more wonderful and perfect the more accurately we observe its manifestations. In fact, the whole nature of man, as a moral and accountable being, would have been changed, had he not been thus left apparently to the unobserved employment of the trust committed to him ;-and there is mercy as well as wisdom on the part of God in having so ordered the situation of man, that the discharge of his task assumes to him the aspect rather of a choice of his own free will,—than of an imperative command which he dared not disobey,-and from the voluntary adoption of which he would, by this constant inspection of his Lord, have been of necessity precluded. By the actual arrangements of Providence, a course of duty becomes not so much a task, as a labour of love, which the heart gratefully embraces,-and by means of which it delights to signify its affection to a kind and merciful parent.

Indeed by far the noblest virtues of the human character are connected with this fine ordination ;