dominions, considered as cut off from the rest,which is exposed to our observation.

We formerly noticed the perplexities pervading all our speculations respecting the Divine plans, from the mingling of those two charts according to which the appearances of nature arrange themselves in our imaginations;—and, assuredly, a more remarkable instance of this perplexity could not be selected, than that which is afforded by the subjects now under our review.

If we take the first and narrowest chart,—that is to say, if we consider the appearances of nature as terminating in themselves, or without any relation to higher and future arrangements, then imperfection and evil are general expressions for the mixed aspect under which the events of nature present themselves to our view ;-and as general terms, or exponents of abstract ideas, their origin must be sought for in the tendency of the human mind to form such conceptions, and to embody them in corresponding terms.

If we take, however, the more extended chart,that is, if we view that portion of the divine king

dom which we now behold, as but a part of an immense series of causes and effects, extending to all worlds, and to all the ages of duration,-then what seemed fixed and absolute evil and imperfection, assumes an entirely new and most essentially different character;-all the events and objects of this world are but parts of one vast scheme, without reference to which, we cannot say whether, in their true relations, they are good or evil;—and, in fact, when this subordination of all things to one boundless plan is taken into account, evil and imperfection vanish altogether as absolute and fixed qualities,— and every thing appears but as a means leading to a future and beneficial result.

But if we keep to neither of the charts,—but mingle the two, then we inquire, when we ask what is the origin of evil or of imperfection, what is the source of a general term under which we have classed the peculiar appearances which this world, considered not as a portion of a vast whole, but as entire within itself, offers to our view;-and if, instead of referring the origin of this term,—or of the general conception which it embodies, to our peculiar powers of combination, and to our limited view of

the actual arrangements of life,—we endeavour to trace it to causes having a place in the actual arrangements of that great plan, the entire extent of which forms the grand scheme of the Divine dominions, then it is evident that we are applying to each other two things which have nothing whatever in common, and that all our attempts to explain the one by the other must only lead us into still increasing perplexities and doubts.

that

In one word, the appearances which characterize that portion of the Divine kingdom which we see, assume their peculiar aspect simply from the fact that they present themselves to us as if cut off from any connexion with the entire scheme ;—hence they lose their proper character of means, and assume of ends or ultimate arrangements;—and it is only necessary to restore to them their proper relationship, or to keep in view, that we see but a small portion of a vast whole,-in order to be satisfied, that the actual character of the events of life is essentially different from that which we assign to them, or that, in this view,-evil, and imperfection, are but the results of our limited views and abstract conceptions,—and have no place in the exist

ing or possible arrangements of that kingdom of perfect beauty and faultless order which embraces the interests of all worlds, and unites into one whole the boundless ages of time and of eternity.

Still it is a fact that imperfection and evil,—or that mixed system of appearances from which these ideas are derived, do present themselves as actual characteristics of nature,-as viewed by us, and influencing our destiny as living, and sentient, and active beings;—this world, with this mixed character, does offer itself to us, in our ordinary modes of viewing it, as a part of nature separated from the whole ;—and it becomes, consequently, an interesting inquiry how far these traces of good and evil, or of imperfection, have a place in nature,—and to which of them, in the actual appearances of life, the preponderance is to be ascribed. Our conviction of the perfect beauty of the entire plan will evidently be much strengthened, if we can be satisfied, that even in that portion of it which we now see,―happiness, and virtue, and good order have the ascendency over their opposites.

And, first, with respect to the quantity of virtue

VOL. I.

H

that is in life, the following observations seem to merit attention :

In the first place,—that no man is utterly worthless, the worst characters having still something that is good,—as the best have also much that is evil and imperfect.

In the second place, that the worst characters will always be found to have been those who have had the fewest opportunities of knowing what was good, or the greatest temptations to do that which is wrong; and that the best are as much indebted to natural constitution,-to early training,—and to favourable circumstances,-as to their own deliberate choice and voluntary exertions.

In fact, even the best of men cannot say into what errors of conduct or of feeling he might be led, if his circumstances were altogether changed and made more conducive to evil;-and, on the other hand, even in the least worthy characters there may occasionally be detected a great latent fund of good and amiable feeling, when circumstances occur of such a kind as to call that feeling forth,-or when, in the application of moral motives, we have obtained the skill of properly touching their deepest sentiments and most native feelings.