perception of the high connexion in which all earthly objects and interests stand with some greater and purer order of existences,—and with forms of being which are to be more completely evolved in future stages of the providential dispensations of God, enters into all his views of present objects, and gives a character and expression to every thing around him and within him;—because, consequently, he cannot divest himself of the hopes and the fears,the joys and the sorrows, the high aspirations and the sense of "exceeding riches" belonging to these aspirations which originate in this grand constitution of his religious frame ;-and because, as a consequence of all this, he only acts in his true,—and entire, and undivided,—as well as in his highest,— and most characteristic,—and appropriate character, -when he states himself, in all that he does, or thinks, or intends, as a "subject of the Moral Sovereignty of God," and orders all his actions on the same plan,—and gives to all of them the character which this view of his relation presents to him.

It is by a similar process of simplification and combination that the only just and satisfactory view which the present subject of our contemplation admits of can be attained;—and, accordingly, the

principle which the Author is anxious to establish in this section is, that the virtues or graces are not to be viewed as distinct or insulated substances or forms, but merely as generalizations useful for the purposes of ordinary discourse ;-that they are, in their actual and living operation, but exhibitions of the internal and sentimental part of man, giving form, and direction, and character to the actions that, in his external conduct, more directly meet our eye, and are the visible symbols of these inward dispositions;-and that, hence, they have all an ultimate relation to that external conduct in which they terminate, of which they are the movers,— and with which they are connected, not simply as the harmonizing exertions of two entirely different and insulated substances, but as the united and varying exhibitions of one fine organization, which, whether viewed as chiefly corporeal, or as more purely intelligent and spiritual, is yet the constitution of one and the same being, manifesting itself under different aspects, according as we contemplate it by our sentient or by our intellectual powers.

The virtues or graces, then, are not distinct or insulated substances or forms, but merely abstractions formed for common use, and subservient to

common advantage; they have no separate or substantial existence;-they have in all instances a relation to action;-and can only be exemplified in actual conduct, of which they are the prime movers, and which is to them their exponent or visible manifestation.

Simple as this statement may seem to be,-and little worthy of being made the subject of such lengthened discussion,-it is in fact the opposite error which has been the most fertile source of the perplexities that have pervaded the speculations of philosophers and moralists;-and a just and satisfactory view of the actual arrangements of nature, in regard to our moral constitution and moral duties, cannot be expected till this simple and combined aspect of forms, which, in common use, have been separated and set in opposition to each other, has been made familiar to us.

The two following remarks seem important for giving a more complete view of the nature of the virtues.

In the first place, that, being only descriptive of particular modes or habits of acting, they sometimes have a reference more especially to those internal feelings which are the first movers of

conduct, as in the instances of faith,—hope,— piety,-love,-pity, &c. In other instances, they are descriptive rather of those external actions by which conduct is terminated and its character manifested, as in the case of the virtues of temperance,— industry, chastity,-and so forth. Sometimes they express not simply either internal or external aspects of conduct, but a mixed character of action combining both these peculiarities,—as seems to be the case when we speak of kindness,—beneficence,— mercy,-forgiveness,-sympathy,—and almost all the virtues which relate to our good conduct towards our fellow-men. And, on other occasions, we give different names to the same general virtue or grace, -according as we are disposed to view it, in its particular aspects, either as more immediately connected with our spiritual or with our corporeal part,-as when the general virtue of repentance is designated sometimes as contrition,-humiliation,-remorse ;and, at other times, as regeneration,-amendment,and so forth. In all cases, however, it is plain, that the virtues are but generalizations of particular aspects of conduct, and not distinct existences which can be separated from conduct, or can have any value but as they relate to it, and are manifested by it.

In the second place, the virtues presuppose peculiar aspects of the general situation of man in this world,—and derive their value and appropriateness from their conformity with these peculiar aspects. Thus there is one set of virtues which flow from the consideration of the condition of man, as a being who, though acting amidst the visible scenes of this earth, has yet sentiments and hopes that ally him with the order and interests of an invisible and higher life;—these are the virtues of faith,—hope, -piety,―reverence for the character of God,-zeal for his glory in the world,—charity in its most comprehensive sense, as uniting him not only with men, but with the whole intelligent family of the Creator, and inspiring him with a belief that he shall yet be more perfectly united with them.

There are other virtues which are founded solely on his relation to the other beings, of a nature similar to his own, with whom he is associated in this world, and to whom he is related as a child of the same great family. Such are the virtues of beneficence,―sympathy for the sufferings of those who are in distress,-forgiveness of injuries that have been done to himself,-and mercy, or a spirit of

forbearance and pity towards those who have been