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Thus, the faculties of the understanding and the sentiments proper to man favor sociality.

It is not precisely thus with the faculties common to man and animals. Some of them, however, are social, as attachment, and, in a certain degree, amativeness and philoprogenitiveness; but the greatest number are eminently antisocial. The interested, for instance, do not like the interested, except in as far as their own selfishness is satisfied. Proud persons cannot suffer others endowed with the same feeling. The haughty and interested not only dislike one another, but are also disliked by those who are possessed of the superior sentiments. This is the case, too, with the propensities to fight and to destroy. Thus every one will sympathize with those in whose society his faculties are satisfied; and antipathy will be proportionate to the obstacles in the way of this, that is, to the prevention of enjoyment.

It is the animal nature which causes so many unhappy and illassorted marriages. Amativeness or adhesiveness brings husband and wife together; perhaps they have thought of money, beauty, sometimes of health and intelligence, but they have forgotten the other dispositions, which are independent of physical love and of attachment, which cannot be bought, and which no intelligence can give, but which, nevertheless, contribute greatly to the happiness of those who bind themselves by indissoluble ties. All the other numerous faculties which are not satisfied soon change the original sympathy of the couple into indifference or even into antipathy, and then follow disorder and misery.

CHAPTER IV.

On Happiness and Unhappiness.

IN speaking of happiness or unhappiness it is difficult to understand each other. Both ancient and modern philosophers take different views of happiness, and modify accordingly their ethical doctrines. Thales placed it in the health of body, in a competent fortune, and in a cultivated mind; Socrates in the love of truth, useful knowledge and virtue; Plato in the contemplation and knowledge of the first Good, God; and in endeavoring to make man as like to it as the conditions of human nature will permit; Aristippus in agreeable impressions on the senses; Anniceris in pleasant sensations and moral feelings; Hegasias, a disciple of Aristippus, in voluptuousness; Epicurus in mental tranquillity, bodily ease, and freedom from labor and pain; Diogenes in an absolute independence from circumstances; Zeno in the freedom from all sense of pleasure, and pain, from hope and fear, from all feeling and emotions in every situation, in self-denial and selfcommand. Marcus Aurelius said, that the true contentment of heart is not found in the study of arts, in eloquence, riches, glory, sensual pleasures, in short nowhere but in the practice of actions which the human nature demands. Paley denied that happiness consists in the pleasures of sense, as in the animal gratification of eating and drinking, or by which the species is preserved; neither in the refined pleasures of music, painting, architecture, gardening, theatrical exhibitions, splendid shows; nor in the pleasure of active sports, as of hunting, shooting, fishing; neither in greatness, rank, honors, nor in the exemption from pain, care, labor, business, molestation; but he placed it, 1st, in the exercise of social affections, as husband, wife, children, kindred, and friends; 2d, in doing good to others; 3d, in the pursuit of great engagements and important occupations, and 4th, in health.

Yet it cannot be denied that some find their happiness in the

cultivation of arts,-in fishing or hunting; whilst another delights in examining metaphysical questions, or mathematical problems; and another in religious proselytism. Servile minds despair of supporting existence in a state of civil liberty, whilst the truly free man considers civil and religious liberty as the greatest good upon earth, and indispensable to his happiness.

Phrenology easily explains these and many other views of happiness. Human nature is composed of numerous special dispositions and every special disposition may be active in different degrees. Now every faculty being active and satisfied, is happy or pleased; and every active faculty which is not satisfied is displeased or unhappy. Every one, then, who gives a definition of happiness, expresses the state of his own mind, or the powers active in him ; he takes his individual happiness as the standard of happiness in general. No one, however, can measure the happiness or unhappiness of others by his own, hence he finds his happiness in the gratification of his active powers, in the same way as the sheep whilst feeding on grass and the tiger whilst devouring its prey, are happy each in its own manner. To speak with precision, it is necessary to divide and subdivide happiness and unhappiness. Both concern individuals, families, associations, nations or mankind at large. Farther, human nature being vegetative, affective, intellectual, animal and human; it follows that individuals, families, associations, nations, or mankind may be happy or unhappy according to the special powers. In individuals the sum of happiness is made up by the sum of gratification of the active faculties, and in every society the sum of happiness consists in the number of happy individuals. Farther, happiness and unhappiness may be subdivided into temporal or eternal. The latter lies beyond the reach of my inquiries. I am satisfied with stating that in my opinion both these sorts of happiness are not incompatible with each other; I do not believe that we must be miserable here on earth in order to be happy in the life to come.

In speaking of happiness, an important remark is to be kept in view, viz. that the satisfaction of the active powers, not the special

gratification, is the foundation of happiness. The satisfaction of hunger, not the enjoyment of dainties alone, makes happy. Running and moving about makes children happy, the individual game is not the essence; the satisfaction of all special powers varies according to age and social circumstances, and they are mistaken who think that individual and particular gratification constitute happiness. In this respect there is more compensation in the world than many imagine, in taking themselves as the standard of others.

I shall first treat of individual happiness, and then of that of societies. The first condition of happiness certainly is health. Is it then not astonishing that this condition is so much neglected; whilst the laws of hereditary descent and the dietetic rules ought to be put into practice? Without health we are unfit to receive education, and to fulfil our duty in social relations. Without health we are a burden to ourselves and to others.

The next condition of happiness is mental activity. This however is very different according to the special dispositions of the mind. It is a matter of fact that, (and Phrenology explains why,) by far the greater number of individuals look for their happiness in the satisfaction of the faculties common to man and animals, such as in the sensual pleasures, in the love of offspring, in the love of approbation, in the love of acquiring, and so on. In certain countries inferior pleasures alone are permitted; means of subsistence are provided for; the people have plenty to eat and to drink, but all intellectual pleasures, and those beyond the range of mere animality, are interdicted. Very few persons cultivate arts and science for the pleasure they procure in themselves. They do it to furnish means necessary to the satisfaction of some animal desires. Finally, those who are happy in the exercise of the faculties proper to man are exceedingly rare. They are those who, as St. Paul says, have the law written in their hearts; those who find their happiness in the abnegation of selfish desires, and in actions of general happiness; those finally who in the eyes of common people are called dreamers or fools.

It is a common saying, that man to be happy ought to have few

wants. The expression want is here synonymous with desire,the effect of every faculty's activity and is as various in kind as the fundarnental faculties; each want individually being proportionate to the activity of the power from which it results. Wants or desires then, or in other words the activity of the faculties are not the immediate cause of happiness or unhappiness. The whole of the mental powers acting with energy may be sources either of bliss or of misery. This follows on the possibility or impossibility of gratifying their impulses. He who has many faculties active which he can satisfy, is more happy than the man who has no desire whatever but it is better to be without desire than to possess very active faculties with no means of ministering to their cravings. Even those who are eminently endowed with the superior sentiments, and who would like to see every one happy, find a kind of misery in the injustice of mankind. The unfortunate of this kind, however, are by no means the most numerous.

The human as well as animal faculties produce wants or desires. To be just is a want for the righteous, as to take nourishment is for him who is hungry. As, however, the animal faculties are the most generally active in men, if wants are spoken of, we commonly think of inferior powers, as of self-esteem, vanity, personal interest, sensual pleasures, and so on. Now as happiness depends on the gratification of active faculties, and unhappiness on their non-satisfaction, it is obvious why those who are fond of ostentation, luxury, riches, distinctions &c., are commonly unhappy: it is impossible to appease their wants or desires.

It is also necessary to distinguish in the doctrine of wants in reference to morality, between the faculties themselves and the satisfaction of their desires. The satisfaction may vary and produce good and evil.

Religious sentiments are inherent in human nature, they frequently act with great energy, and have done an immensity of mischief to mankind. Yet religion itself should never be ridiculed; well directed, it may increase our own and our neighbor's happiness, though certain notions and certain actions, called religious, are fit

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