they exert this power into act, are called caufes; and the fubftances which thereupon are produced, or the fimple ideas which are introduced into any fubject by the exerting of that power, are called effects. The effi cacy whereby the new fubftance or idea is produced, is called, in the fubject exerting that power, action; but in the fubject wherein any fimple idea is changed or produced, it is called paffion; which efficacy, however various, and the effects almoft infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual agents, to be nothing elfe but modes of thinking and willing; in corporeal agents, nothing elfe but modifications of motion. I fay, I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two: For whatever fort of action, befides these, produces any effects, I confefs myself to have no notion nor idea of, and fo it is quite remote from my thoughts, apprehenfions, and knowledge, and as much in the dark to me as five other fenfes, or as the ideas of colours to a blind man; and therefore many words, which feem to exprefs fome action, fignify nothing of the action or modus operandi at all, but barely the effect, with fome circumstances of the fubject wrought on, or cause operating; v. g. creation, annihilation, contain in them no idea of the action or manner whereby they are produced, but barely of the caufe, and the thing done. And, when a country man fays the cold freezes water, though the word freezing feems to import fome action, yet truly it fignifies nothing but the effect, viz. that water that was before fluid, is become hard and confiftent, without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done.

12. Mixed Modes made alfo of other Ideas.

I THINK I fhall not need to remark here, that though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes, marked by names, and familiar in the minds and mouths of men; yet other fimple ideas, and their feveral combinations, are not excluded; much lefs, I think, will it be neceffary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes which have been fettled, with names to them. That. would be to make a dictionary of the

greatest part of the words made ufe of in divinity, c-thics, law, and politics, and feveral other fciences. All that is requifite to my prefent defign, is to show what fort of ideas thofe are which I call mixed modes,, how the mind comes by them, and that they are compofitions made up of fimple ideas got from fenfation and. reflection, which, I fuppofe, I have done..

TH

CHAP. XXIII.

OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.

§ 1. Ideas of Subftances, how made,

HE mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the fimple ideas, conveyed in by the fenfes, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice alfo, that a certain number of these fimple ideas go conftantly together; which being prefumed to belong to one thing, and words being fuited to common apprehenfions, and. made ufe of for quick dispatch, are called, fo united in one fubject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterwards to talk of, and confider, as one fimple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas to-gether: Because, as I have faid, not imagining how thefe fimple ideas can fubfift by themfelves, we accuftom ourselves to fuppofe fome fubftratum wherein they do fubfift, and from which they do refult; which there-fore we call fubftance.

§ 2. Our Idea of Subftance in general.

So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure fubftance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a fuppofition of he knows not what fupport of fuch qualities, which are capable of producing fimple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one fhould be ask-ed, What is the fubject wherein colour or weight in-heres? he would have nothing to fay, but the folid extended parts: And if he were demanded, What is it that folidity and extension inhere in? he would not be

in a much better cafe than the Indian before mentioned, who, faying that the world was fupported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant refted on; to which his anfwer was, A great tortoife. But being again preffed to know what gave fupport to the broadbacked tortoise, replied, Something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cafes where we use words without having clear and diftinct ideas, we talk like children, who being questioned what fuch a thing is, which they know not, readily give this fatisfactory anfwer, That it is fomething: which, in truth, fignifies no more, when so used either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what they have no diftinct idea of at all, and fo are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea, then, we have, to which we give the general name Substance, being nothing but the fuppofed, but unknown, fupport of thofe qualities we find exifting, which we imagine cannot subsist fine re substante, without fomething to fupport them, we call that fupport fubftantia, which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, ftanding under, or upholding. $3. Of the forts of Subftances.

AN obfcure and relative idea of fubftance in general being thus made, we come to have the ideas of particular forts of fubftances, by collecting fuch combinations of fimple ideas, as are, by experience and obfervation of mens fenfes, taken notice of to exift together, and are therefore fuppofed to flow from the particular internal conftitution, or unknown effence of that fubftance. Thus we come to have the ideas of a man, horfe, gold, water, &c. of which fubftances, whether any one has any other clear idea, farther than of certain fimple ideas co-existing together, I appeal to every one's own experience. It is the ordinary qualities obfervable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of thofe fubftances, which a smith or a jeweller commonly knows better than a philofopher; who, whatever fubftantial forms he may talk of, has no other idea of those substances than what is framed by a col

lection of those simple ideas which are to be found in them only we must take notice, that our complex ideas of fubftances, befides all thofe fimple ideas they are made up of, have always the confufed idea of fomething to which they belong, and in which they fubfift. And therefore, when we speak of any fort of fubftance, we fay, it is a thing having fuch or fuch qualities; as body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion; fpirit, a thing capable of thinking; and fo hardnefs, friability, and power to draw iron, we fay, are qualities to be found in a loadftone. These, and the like fashions of speaking, intimate, that the substance. is fuppofed always fomething befides the extenfion, figure, folidity, motion, thinking, or other obfervable ideas, though we know not what it is.

§ 4. No clear Idea of Substance in general.

HENCE, when we talk or think of any particular fort of corporeal fubftances, as horfe, ftone, &c. though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of those several fimple ideas of fenfible qualities, which we ufe to find united in the thing called horfe or ftone; yet because we cannot conceive how they should fubfift alone, nor one in another, we fuppose them exifting in and fupported by fome common fubject; which fupport que denote by the name Subftance, though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we fuppofe a fupport.

$5. As clear an Idea of Spirit as Body.

THE fame happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, reafoning, fearing, &c. which we concluding not to fubfift of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think thefe the actions of fome other fubftance, which we call fpirit: whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea or notion of matter, but fomething wherein thofe many fenfible qualities which affect our fenfes, do fubfift; by fuppofing a fubftance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. do fubfift, we have as clear a notion of the fubftance of Spirit, as we have of body; the one being fuppofed

to be (without knowing what it is) the fubftratum to thofe fimple ideas we have from without; and the other fuppofed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the fubftratum to thofe operations we experiment in ourselves within. It is plain, then, that the idea of corporeal fubftance in matter, is as remote from our conceptions and apprehenfions, as that of spiritual fubftance or spirit. and therefore, from our not having any notion of the fubftance of fpirit, we can no more conclude its nonexistence, than we can, for the fame reafon, deny the existence of body; it being as rational to affirm there is no body, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the fubflance of matter, as to say there is no fpirit, becaufe we have no clear and diftinct idea of the fubftance of a spirit.

§ 6. Of the forts of Subftances. WHATEVER, therefore, be the secret abstract nature of fubftance in general, all the ideas we have of particular diftinet forts of fubftances are nothing but feveral combinations of fimple ideas, co-exifting in fuch, though unknown, caufe of their union, as makes the whole fubfift of itself. It is by fuch combinations of fimple ideas, and nothing else, that we reprefent particular forts of subfrances to ourselves; fuch are the ideas we have of their feveral fpecies in our minds; and fuch only do we, by their specific name, figuify to others, v. g. man, horfe, fun, water, iron upon hearing which words, every one who understands the language, frames in his mind a combination of thofe feveral fimple ideas which he has ufually obferved, or fancied to exift together under that denomination; all which he fuppofes to reft in, and be, as it were, adherent to that unknown common subject, which inheres not in any thing elfe. Though, in the mean time, it be manifeft, and every one upon inquiry into his own thoughts will find that he has no other idea of any fubftance, v. g. let it be gold, horfe, iron, man, vitriol, bread, but what he has barely of those fenfible qualities which he supposes to inhere, with a fuppofition of fuch a fubftratum, as gives, as it were, a fupport to thofe qualities or fimple ideas which he has