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us, "is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance." It is said, in the beginning, when the earth was without form, and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep, that the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the And Job says, "By his Spirit hath he garnished the heavens." By the agency of this Spirit is the general work of provi. dence conducted, not excluding that part of it, which involves the actions of wicked men. The same hand, which could create a thou. sand other evils, which are hateful both to God and man, without defiling itself, may give being to moral evil, out of regard to a common end, and in just such and so many instances, as infinite wisdom sees will be profitable to the grand result.

Once more. It will be objected to the scheme of sentiment which is presented in what we have offered upon the character and government of God, that it is not more satisfactory, and is much less to the honour of God, than to suppose he barely permits men to sin, and then overrules their sin to his own glory. If this hypothesis is more rational and more honourable to God, than the one, which it would set aside, it will be well for us to ascertain, if the task be not too dif ficult, wherein it is so. If this cannot be done, nothing will be gained by taking sides with the objector. And we may proceed upon it as a good maxim, never to shift our ground, unless we can shun a difficulty by it,

without running ourselves into another e qually great. And what is the difficulty, out of which the present objection proposes to extricate us? It is, as I suppose, the difficulty of reconciling God's chusing the existence of sin, and bringing it about by his own agency, with his essential love of holiness and hatred of sin. The better plan, which the objector offers, holds forth a God, who, without wil ling the existence of sin, only wills the per mission of it. And can a God, who infinite ly hates sin, and uniformly forbids it, in the most express terms, grant a permission to its extensive prevalence in the world? If he permits it, the reason must be because he prefers the existence to the non-existence of it. And if, for any reason whatever, he es teems it better, that it should have a being than not, will it not as certainly follow from this, that he loves it, or feels friendly towards it, in case of permission, as in any other case? If two men, in presence of a third, should engage in a sharp contention, and even proceed to blows, and the other should stand by. a calm spectator and suffer, or permit, them to abuse each other, when, with a word's speaking he might end the quarrel; would you say he had a greater abhorrence of fighting than the other two? He would not be deemed less guilty than they. But, says one, though the Deity chuses there should be no sin in the world, yet it may be better to permit, than actually interpose to hinder, it. If it be better to permit sin than restrain it, in

certain cases, it is on account of some good end, that is, in one way or another, connect, ed with the existence of sin. And if such a reason may be assigned to justify the permission of sin, the same may be a good rea son why God should actually cause its exist. ence. His character is, at least, as free from reproach upon the latter supposition as upon the former. But some have presumed to say, that God could not prevent the introduction of sin without desroying the moral agency of man. If this be true, he will never be able in any measure to banish sin from the universe, without the banishment of mor al agents. But is it so, indeed, that the bare permission of sin, on God's part, is enough to insure its existence? One answers, if God leaves men, or gives them up to themselves, they sin of course, without any positive divine efficiency to ensure it. With just as much reason I might say, that if God should. withhold all influence from a plant, the consequence would be, that it would grow and bear corrupt fruit. Would not the consequence rather be, that it would perish? If by. leaving men to themselves be meant continuing them as they are, and have been used to be, it is confessed that sinners, if left to themselves, will continue to sin. But if being left. to one's self ineans, that all influence is withdrawn, so that if he acts at all, it must be by his own underived strength; it is denied, that either holiness, or sin, can be exercised in such a state, Who will say, that Adam's

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first sin was in consequence of his being left to himself? If he was then the subject of any moral propensity, it was to holiness, and not to sin. His being left, therefore, to the influence of an established propensity, must have perpetuated his innocence, rather than have plunged him into guilt. And if it was a necessary consequence of his being left to the freedom of his own will, then none can be preserved in a state of holiness, unless freedom of will is taken, or kept, from them. The bare permission of sin is, therefore, no principle at all, on which to account for it. Does God's sending Joseph into Egypt, and the Babylonians against Jerusalem, giving them a charge to take the spoil, &c. express no more than his bare permission, or not interposing to hinder those events? Or is there nothing implied, in his stirring up the spirit of the Medes against the Chaldeans, but merely not stopping them, or not laying upon them a positive restraint to prevent their going against the nation, which was to be subdued by their arms? How would this convey an idea of God's exercising government in these great revolutions and changes in the state of the world? To this it will, doubtless, be replied, that he overrules all the base conduct, which he permits, for important and wholesome purposes in his kingdom, and, in this way, governs by means of these unpropitious events. This idea may give some satisfaction, for aught I know, provideu it can be determined what it is, precisely.

What do we mean by God's overruling sin, for his own glory, when none of it is brought to pass under the control, or direction, of his almighty hand? It is pretended, that all sin takes place by the permission and not by any positive influence, or interposition, of the divine will; and yet that it is all overruled for good. How is it overruled? How did God overrule the sin of Joseph's brethren, who sold him into Egypt, for good to him, to mankind, and the church? The answer will be, by bringing the young captive into a state of great dignity and preferment in the land of Egypt. And how did he ef fect this? Read the story, and you will find sin, of various names and aggravations, used as the grand instrument of conducting_the affair, from the gross lasciviousness of Potiphar's wife to the ungrateful perfidy of the forgetful butler. But the present plea is, that these were all by permission, without a single iota of positive agency to cause them. But how a chain of bare permissions, extended to whatever length, can be considered as an overruling of some prior event, it will be difficult to imagine. Let us rather resolve the whole into the positive will and agency of the great Judge of all the earth, and then the final event will be sure, and not more sure than desirable and happy. Thus, after a long, and I am afraid you will deem it, a severe, exercise of your patience, upon the present subject, I have only to request leave at a future day to improve the subject. EE