is preferred. With these notions, and with a conviction that, in reality, the result was made to depend upon what the Jews understood at the time, I strongly suspected that the hermeneutical principles already discussed had been in operation. On examining them, I soon found that I had warrant for suspicion. Not that the case was eminently clear; as the reader will collect from the following passage, which I present as a perfect specimen of the indefinite in writing:

"The whole science of interpretation, or, as it is technically called, hermeneutics, whether applied to a sacred or profane author, depends upon one simple and obvious principle:-The true meaning of a word or phrase is that which was attached to it at the time when the person, whom we interpret, wrote or spoke. Language is intended only to convey to our hearers, as nearly as possible, the ideas which pass in our own thought; and that person possesses the best command of it, who most exactly transfuses, by his expressions, into the minds of others, the impressions which exist in his own. But, as words and phrases have certain definite meanings at any given period, it follows that the speaker necessarily selects such, as his knowledge of their exact force. teaches him will represent precisely his thoughts and feelings. From this we deduce, that the impression naturally made by any expressions upon the hearer, or, in other words, the sense in which he must have understood them, is, generally speaking, the proper criterion of the sense intended by the speaker. I have said generally speaking; because words are occasionally misunderstood. But this is an extraordinary case: it supposes a defect in the speaker or hearer; and we always take it for granted that our words are rightly understood, unless there is a special reason to suppose the contrary. Still, even this case does not affect my observations, nor the prin ́ciples of hermeneutics, which are based upon them; because

this science does not decide by impressions actually made, but by those which the words were necessarily calculated to make, at the time, upon that audience; and this is the sense in which the word impression is to be understood..... Of course, when I speak of our Saviour's dicourses being understood, I do not mean that they were comprehended." (pp. 20, 21.)

The

That person is not a little to be envied for his "understanding" or "comprehension," or both, who, after winding through the foregoing labyrinth of sentences, can flatter himself that he emerges with even the slightest notion of the bearings of his position, at any single point of his course. Let us once more endeavour to thread the maze. learned writer begins with "the meaning of a word or phrase;" and if I rightly conjecture, glides without hesitation to the impression made by an entire address, or section of an address:--when it is clear that "a word or phrase" might be understood by one, who mistook the import of the sentenceand the sentence, by one who misapprehended the whole discourse. Then as to the discourse, we are first told that the sense is that in which it must have been understood-in other words, in which it was understood; for although we are immediately informed that it may have been misunderstood-yet without "a special reason," we are by no means to suppose that it was. This, however, is of no consequence; as we are not to consider the impression actually made, but that which the words were calculated to make.... In the midst of

such transitions-from fallacy to ambiguity, and from ambiguity to fallacy-it is lamentable to think how completely the minds of men-of young men especially-must be bewildered. And not to dwell upon the extreme improbability that such devious paths should lead to truth-is he, who has thus been taught to wander in uncertainty, in a disposition at all likely either to discover the truth, or hold it in estimation? If such be the science of hermeneutics, I trust that no reader of these pages will ever engage in the study....There is only one remark by Dr Wiseman, respecting the application of these principles to our Lord's discourses: namely, that "when he speaks of the discourses being understood, he does not mean to say they were comprehended." The natural inference seems to be, that the principles laid down, if principles they can be called, are quite inapplicable to the purpose for which they were designed. When, indeed, we consider the low and unworthy notions of our Lord's immediate followers themselves, respecting the Messiah's kingdom-when we recollect how often he reproved even them, on account of their dulness of apprehension and hardness of heart, with regard to the objects of his mission-and when we bear in mind how thoroughly carnal, worldly and selfish, the crowds that surrounded him frequently manifested themselves to be-we feel shocked at the idea of making our Lord's hearers the interpreters of his

discourses-in those instances, more especially, in which, as in John vi. they are of a highly spiritual character. He had, too often, reason to complain of a faithless and stubborn generation; but through God's good providence, the very perversion of his instructions has afforded admonitions, of unspeakable importance to all succeeding ages. On this subject, let me finally observe, that I do not oppose the application, of the above-mentioned principles of interpretation, to our Lord's discourses, from any dread that Dr Wiseman would, by their application, secure some advantage; but because I would guard young men against the application of such principles in other cases....But the particulars of the second lecture now demand attention.

I agree with Dr Wiseman in thinking that "the phrases which occur in the first part of the discourse (John vi.) were calculated to convey to the minds of those who heard our Saviour, the idea of listening to his doctrines and believing in him; the more so, as he positively explained them in that sense." I moreover maintain that the first part ought to be extended from v. 47, Dr Wiseman's limit, to v. 51. It is requisite, however, to examine the learned author's arguments, in proof of the proposition just stated in his own language; for they throw great light upon his subsequent reasoning. To the consideration of those arguments, therefore, I now betake myself.

By virtue of passages not only from the Old Testament*, but from Philo Judæus, the Talmud, the Rabbins and the Sanscrit-Dr Wiseman learnedly proves that bread, or food, or that (by whatever name it may be called) which supports the body, had in discourse been used figuratively for those spiritual communications which, when duly received, afford nutriment and health to the soul. He thus professes to "demonstrate that to the Jews it was no unusual image, no harsh phrase, to speak of doctrines under the form of bread or food;" and so evinces the propriety with which our Saviour, "the Word and Wisdom of the Father," addressed his hearers, when, "identifying himself with his doctrines," he "called himself the bread of lifet." The truth is, that our Lord, throughout his ministry, employed the miracles he wrought, and the events which daily occurred, as the means of instruction in the things appertain

* The following are the passages from the Old Testament. Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters, and he that hath no money; come ye, buy and eat; yea, come, buy wine and milk without money and without price. Wherefore do ye spend money for that which is not bread? and your labour for that which satisfieth not? hearken diligently unto me, and eat ye that which is good." Is. Lv. 1, 2;-"Thy words were found, and I did eat them." Jer. xv. 16;- I will send a famine in the land, not a famine of bread, nor a thirst for water, but of hearing the words of the LORD." Amos viii. 11;-"Come [Wisdom speaks] eat of my bread, and drink of the wine which I have mingled." Prov. ix. 5.... Also, from the Apocrypha, "With the bread of understanding shall she feed him, and give him the water of wisdom to drink." Ecclesiasticus xv. 3.

Lectures, pp. 52, 53.

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