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spite of intelligence-not by property, but in spite of property. The indirect influence, therefore, can no longer be exercised; and unless rank, property, and education, are to be sacrificed at the shrine of popular ambition, they must look for their representation to the Upper House. The constitution no longer resembles the ancient and stable British government; it is more nearly akin to the Roman commonwealth-and if they would avert an Agrarian law, the patrician classes must oppose the firmness of the senate to the vehemence of the popular tribunes.

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In combating the Reform bill, therefore, the Peers are not vainly struggling for their own exclusive privileges against the united voice of the nation they are throwing their shield over all its best and dearest interests; they are protecting the education, thought, and intelligence of the kingdom from the fury of popular delusion; they are saving those qualified to govern from being subjugated by those fitted only to be governed. In such a contest the result cannot be doubtful, if property, education, and worth are sufficiently firm. By supporting the aristocracy, as they did in 1783, this second Whig invasion of the constitution will be defeated, as on that memorable occasion; the great bulk of mankind, who always incline to the side likely to prove victorious, will rally round their hereditary leaders; and the people, wakened from their delusion, will ultimately recognise their real friends, and coerce the populace who have usurped their name.

Look at other countries. What, in a similar crisis, has been the consequence of yielding to such ebullitions of popular ambition? Has it been to confirm the existence of the nobility--to secure the rights of the people-to check the progress of anarchy to chain the demon of revolution? It has been, on the contrary, to fan the flame of popular discontent to rouse the fury of plebeian ambition-to superadd to the asperity of real grievance the passion for chimerical improvement.

The nobles and clergy of France, in 1789, tried to its utmost extent

Segur, iii. 355.

the system of concession. For years previous to the assembling of the States-General, the younger part of the nobility had been extravagantly attached to the principles of freedom: they were flattered by the choice of the populace-they hoped to head the movement; they imagined, that, by yielding to the people, they would preserve their ascendency over them, and avert the disasters of popular commotion. "In 1789," says Segur, "no one in France dreamed of the revolution which was approaching; every one imagined, that the reforms which were commenced would terminate the embarrassment of the government, and establish the public felicity. It was the era of illusion-the king, the ministers, the parliament, the three orders, were all penetrated with the sincerest love of their country-it seemed as if they were swayed by deceitful dreams. All hoped, by a common effort, to widen the base of the monarchy-restore the credit of the finances-conform ancient institutions to modern improvementsefface all traces of pristine servitude, and by blending popular influence with monarchical power, establish, on an immovable basis, the public felicity." "The great judicial bodies, the nobles, the clergy," said Lafayette, in 1790—“ all those, in fine, who are now so vehement in condemning the revolution, have for a series of years attacked the measures of the crown with as much vehemence as the discourses of our tribune. They have, by common consent, appealed to the nation; but no sooner had the people answered the summons, than they saw their danger, and sought to impose silence upon its representatives."+

In pursuance of this delusion, the nobles and clergy of France, upon the meeting of the States-General, made the following submissions to the popular party.

First, when the great contest arose, in June 1789, between the three orders, as to whether the public deliberations should be conducted in one or separate chambers, forty-six of the peers, headed by the Duke of Orleans, Marquis Lafayette, the Duke

+ Ibid. iii. 453,

de Rochefaucault, deserted their own order, and joined the popular assembly.

Next, one hundred and twentyseven of the clergy, chiefly composed of the curés, who sympathized, from their rank in life, with the Tiers Etat, joined the commons, and by this great addition first gave them anumerical majority over the other orders. Disheartened by these great defections-intimidated by the clamours of the populace-yielding obedience to the mandate of their reforming sovereign, the remainder of the nobles, with heavy hearts, also blended with the Tiers Etat, and formed one assembly, under the name of the States-General.

Shortly after, the nobles, led away by the enthusiastic reception which they had experienced, and captivated by the incense of popular applause, voluntarily surrendered all their exclusive privileges. All the rights of feudal property-all the titles of honour-all the personal distinctions of rank, were given up in one night, well styled at the time, "the St Bartholemew of Properties!"

The whole exclusive rights of corporations of every description throughout all France, were next given up to the nation.

The tithes were then surrendered by the clergy, in the hopes that by this great concession they would conciliate the good-will, and disarm the opposition, of the powerful leaders of the people.

The game laws were abandoned, and every corner of the country traversed by motley groups in quest of this aristocratic diversion.

It must be admitted, that concession and conciliation to popular ambition, could not well be carried farther by the nobles and clergy of France, on this occasion. What were its consequences?

In return for the junction of the clergy in their hour of peril, which first gave them a decided superiority over the other orders, and compelled their union in one assembly, in consideration of the surrender of the tithes, and the submission of the ecclesiastical claims to the national will, the assembly confiscated the whole property of the church, and sent forth its pastors, wandering and destitute through the realm, whose

liberties they had been so mainly instrumental in confirming.

In return for the voluntary surrender of all their rights, as a reward for the abandonment of feudal power, titles of honour, and personal privileges, the Assembly banished and proscribed the nobles, confiscated their estates, and excited a flame, which brought two-thirds of them to the scaffold.

In return for the liberal concessions of the reforming monarch; in consideration of his having convoked the States General, doubled the number of the Tiers Etat, given them a numerical superiority, by ordering the nobles to sit and vote with them in one assembly; taken the lead in reform, by voluntarily abolishing all the grievances of the people; sanctioned the abolition of titles of honour, corporations, and exclusive privileges; acquiesced in the confiscation of the whole property of the church; published the most severe edicts against the emigrant nobles; declared war against his nearest relation, the Emperor of Austria; accepted the constitution of 1791, fixed on the most democratic basis; acquiesced in biennial parliaments and universal suffrage; relinquished the appointment of bishops, judges, and officers of the national guard, to the people; dismissed his own guards, and separated from all his relations but his wife and children,-the Revolutionists led out Louis to the scaffold.

The House of Peers, in the time of Charles I., also tried the system of conceding to popular frenzy; what were its results to the monarch and to themselves?

When the arbitrary government, illegal exactions, and oppressive punishments of that misguided monarch, coupled with the religious fanaticism of the period, had excited the flame in England, which afterwards broke out in the great Rebellion, the House of Peers, thinned by the proscriptions and bloodshed of the wars of the Roses, and seldom mustering fifty members in any assembly, felt themselves too weak to stem the torrent. They yielded to all the violence of the Long Parliament; they sat by in patient submission, when they usurped all the powers of government; they agreed

to the bill establishing triennial parliaments; they passed the bill of attainder against Strafford, although no grounds could be shewn to support the impeachment previously brought against him; they submitted to the impeachment of the bishops; they made no attempt to check the "Remonstrance" of the Commons. "So violent was the democratic spirit of the nation," says Hume, "that a total confusion of all rank and order was justly to be apprehended; and the wonder was not that the majority of the nobles should seek shelter under the throne, but that any of them should venture to desert it. But the tide of popularity seized many, and carried them wide of the most established maxims of civil policy. Among the opponents of the King, were many of the most distinguished members of the peerage-these men, finding that their credit ran high with the nation, ventured to encourage those popular disorders, which they vainly imagined they possessed authority sufficient to regulate or control."

In pursuance of the system of concession, the Lords next passed the famous bill, conferring on the Commons the whole power of the sword. By this bill, the lieutenants of the counties were intrusted with the power of raising an armed force; they were named by the Parliament, and declared accountable, not to the King, but to the House of Commons. "Should I grant these demands," said the King, when pressed to interpose the royal assent to this bill," I may have my hand kissed; the title of majesty may be continued to me, and the King's authority signified by both Houses may still be the style of your commands. I may have swords and maces carried before me; though even these twigs would not long flourish, when the stock upon which it grew was dead; but as to true and real power, I should remain but the outside, but the picture, but the sign of a king." Yet even these demands were agreed to by the infatuated peers.

If the system of concession to popular demands were ever destined to be successful, here it was tried on

the greatest scale, and with the fairest prospects of success. What were its consequences? Did it temper the popular fury, place the peerage at the head of the movement, secure their honours or estates, save the throne from destruction? It did the reverse of all these things; it inflamed to madness the ambition of the Commons, roused up what Lord Clarendon calls "the Root and Branch men ;" and excited an universal frenzy throughout the nation. In return for such pliant submission, in reward for the eminent services of Essex, and many of the nobles, in the Parliamentary armies, the House of Peers was voted a nuisance and abolished; the nobles banished, their estates put under sequestration, and the King himself, as a return for so many concessions, brought to the block.

To those who lay all history and experience aside as "an old almanack," who set at nought the lessons of the past, and are resolved at all hazards to pursue the system of inconsiderate innovation, these examples of course will have no weight. But to those who are of an opposite opinion, who speak of renovating, not rebuilding the constitution; who profess to be guided by a retrospect of the past in their measures for the future; who believe that the passions and ambition of men are the same in all ages, when excited by the same causes, we earnestly recommend their consideration. The more they are studied, the more extraordinary will appear their application to the present times.

It is not the mere force of human depravity, or the simple ingratitude of numerous bodies, which made the French and English nobles, and the French and English church, fall the first victims of the Revolution, which they had sought to appease by such abject submissions. These submissions themselves were the cause of their disasters; they excited a spirit which speedily became uncontrollable; they made the great bulk of the nation abandon a cause which had so evidently despaired of itself.

What, on the other hand, enabled the British aristocracy to suppress

* Hume, vi. 394.

Ibid. vi. 410.

‡ Ibid. vi. 424.

the fervour of revolution, which spread to this country by contagion in 1793? What brought the House of Peers triumphantly through the contest with the Whigs, the House of Commons, and the whole forces of the Coalition, in 1783? The same cause which made Rome triumphant over Hannibal, Napoleon victorious at Arcola, and Wellington at Waterloo. Unconquerable firmness-decision in presence of danger-the bravery which, by deserving the smiles of Fortune, speedily obtains them.

"Quid in rebus civilibus," says Bacon; "maxime prodest-Audacia; quid secundum, audacia; quid tertium, audacia.-Nihilominus fascinat et captivos ducet eos qui vel judicio infirmiores sunt, vel animo timidiores; tales autem sunt hominum pars maxima-id circo videmus audaciam in democratiis plurimum valuisse; apud senatores et principes certe minus." In these words is contained the secret of the success of the aristocracy on those memorable occasions, compared with the utter prostration which followed their submission in the others. It is the audacity of revolutionary leaders which so frequently gives them success; because the great bulk of mankind are always inclined to range themselves on the firmest side, and under the most intrepid leaders. Let the British aristocracy oppose to the vehemence of popular tribunes the firmness of the Roman senate, and they will speedily achieve as noble a triumph.

We have said that the time is gone by, when unqualified resistance to Reform could have been made: the

divisions of the Tories have lost them that vantage ground: the rejection of the Reform Bill must be accompanied in one or other House by a more rational plan for remodelling the Constitution. In considering this subject, it is of the utmost moment to attend to what originally was the qualification of voters, and the changes which time has silently made in those who come up to the poll.

In the remotest ages all freemen

appear to have been admitted to vote. This was perfectly safe during the days of baronial power, when the nobles lived in armed state on their estates; when the poor were few and uninformed; when London contained 30,000 souls,† and Lancashire was almost uninhabited; when manufactures and printing were unknown, and the greater part of the rural labourers were disqualified from being freeholders, by actual slavery. In the days of Gurth and Cedric, of Ivanhoe and Wamba, no peril from democratic power was to be appre hended.

In the progress of time the right of voting in the counties was restricted to forty shilling freeholders, the qualification which has ever since continued. This change took place in the time of Henry VI., by the 8th statute, c. 7 of that monarch. It is estimated by Sir James Macintosh, that, in the time of Henry VIII. L.30,000 was equivalent, taking the value of money and the price of articles, to L.1,000,000 of our money:‡ in other words, forty shillings was equal in that reign to above L.70 a-year of the present currency.

The progressive depression in the value of money, therefore, which has since taken place, has operated as a continual lowering of the elective franchise; and has brought it now to embrace properties amounting in value only to one thirty-third part of those originally admitted by the statute of Henry.

This is a most important consideration, which has never met with the attention it deserves. While the people have been constantly exclaiming against the encroachments on their power by the nobles, the silent changes of time, by incessantly lowering the elective franchise, have more than counterbalanced the influence of the higher classes. The discovery of the mines of Potosi, the progress of luxury, Mr Pitt's Bank Restriction act, have all added prodigiously to their power. The forty shilling freeholders who now come up to an English county election, no more resemble the military tenants who formerly returned the knights

Bacon de Audacia, 10. 32. f Hallam, iii. 38.

History of England, ii. 54.

for the shires, than a modern farmer resembles the Barons of Magna Charta.

This increasing and prodigious degradation of the franchise, by the lowering in the value of money, would, when acting in conjunction with the vast increase of commercial and manufacturing wealth, and the spread of political information by means of the press, have long ago overwhelmed the Crown and the Aristocracy, had it not been counteracted by the decay of many boroughs, and the influence acquired over others by the nobles who resided in their vicinity. This cause, as every body knows, threw a great number of the boroughs into the hands of the Aristocracy, and this alone counterbalanced the continual additions which the democratic influence was receiving from the change in the value of money, and progressive lowering of the franchise.

Seeing that the balance of the Constitution was thus maintained, a wise administration, if they deemed the nomination boroughs an eyesore to the people which required to be removed, would have restored matters to their original situation, by restoring the franchise to what it was before the change commenced: in other words, by raising the qualification to the present value of forty shillings in the days of Henry VI., that is to about L.70 Sterling.

Instead of this, what have they done? Proposing, on the one hand, to extinguish the whole nomination boroughs, do they propose, on the other, to reach to the real standard which prevailed before that species of influence had acquired any ascendency? On the contrary, they proposed to lower it to the L.10 householders: in other words, to a class of men, of whom the great majority, so far from being worth L.70 a-year of freehold property, are literally worth nothing. And this is called restoring the balance of the Constitution, and reverting to the pristine order of things!

A mechanist finds a machine in which the opposite weights are nearly equally balanced: conceiving that the weight on one side is not of the kind which he approves, he removes two thirds of it. To restore the equilibrium of the machine, what

corresponding weight does he withdraw from the other side? He quadruples the weight on the other half of the beam, and still insists that the machine will balance itself.

It shews how deplorably ignorant nineteen out of twenty are of those who speak in favour of Reform, when it is recollected that this obvious and decisive consideration has never once been alluded to by the advocates of the proposed change. They speak incessantly of restoring the Constitution to its pristine condition, when they are seriously proposing to lower the qualification of all the borough voters, that is, of two-thirds of the House of Commons, to less than an hundredth part of its former amount. No one can deny, that the qualification of the majority of the L.10 house tenants will be below an hundredth part of the forty shilling freeholders in the time of Henry VI., that is, of L.70 a-year freehold property at this time. Three-fourths of the present electors would be swept off if that standard were really to be adopted: hardly one of the L.10 householders would find an entrance under the old qualification. The freeholders, instead of being raised to a million, would be reduced, in all probability, to little more than a hundred thousand. The Reform candidates with such constituents would have been rejected in twothirds of the English counties.

But this is not all.-The Reformers justify the assumption of this low standard of L.10 householders for the election of these boroughs, that is, of two-thirds of the House of Commons, upon the ground that the potwallopers and scot and lot voters are to be disfranchised. But when does this disfranchisement take effect? Upon the death of the present voters, and not till then. Now it is during the lifetime of the present voters, in the years immediately succeeding the Bill, that the perilous consequences of this sudden addition to democratic ambition are to be apprehended. If we get over the effects of that prodigious change for ten or fifteen years, the remote effects, after the excitement has subsided, are comparatively little to be apprehended. The whole present democratic part of the constitution; all that now counterbalances the no

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