a more humiliating tissue of strange blunders! And to crown the whole, these Arminians have published, and thus sanctioned, Dr. Fisk's statements-"whatever God foreknows will undoubtedly (or certainly) come to pass." "It is not at all difficult to conceive how the certainty of an event can beget knowledge" (or foreknowledge). "God knows an event to be certain because it is certain."* Thus they have unwittingly incorporated in their creed the very "doctrine of necessity" (or certainty) which is so carefully defined by Edwards. Edwards himself does not state more clearly than Dr. Fisk the infallible future certainty (or necessity) of all foreknown events, including all the acts of the human will!

To render these Arminian misstatements the more wonderful, Edwards not only defines with great care the Calvinistic use of the term necessity, in discussions about the will, but he largely explains the distinction between natural (or physical) necessity and moral necessity. So far from representing the will to be "passive as the material balance," "obliged to determine by the heaviest weights," &c. as Watson and others allege, he minutely defines what Calvinists mean by moral causes, such as "the strength of inclination, habits and dispositions of the heart, moral motives and inducements

and he particularly distinguishes this sort of certainty of effect and result, from "the natural necessity by which men's bodies move downward when not supported."† Yet these Arminian writers charge him with holding a necessity "not different from that arising from the law of gravitation"-the very thing which he cautiously and expressly disclaims!

To make his meaning most evident, Edwards uses such illustrations as these: "A child of great love and duty to his parents, may have a moral inability to kill his father; or a woman of virtue to prostitute herself to her slave." In Meth. Tract, No. 131, pp. 7, 8.

† On the Will, part 1, sec. 4.

these cases they act under what he means by "a moral necessity," i. e. a certainty of such results under such circumstances -a certainty of such effects from such causes. "It cannot

--

*

be truly said, according to the ordinary use of language," adds Edwards, "that a malicious man, let him be never so malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth." These examples are of external acts -but he adds, "it is more evidently false that such person is unable to exert the acts of the will, * * for the very willing is the doing. * In these mental acts, to ascribe the non-performance to the want of power or ability is not just, * * for he has the faculties of mind and a capacity of nature, and every thing else sufficient but a dispositionnothing is wanting but a will," or a willingness in order to the mental act. Is this the same as to say that man lies under a necessity like that which "sways the beam when moved by the heaviest weight?" If a man hates his neighbor so bitterly that he cannot love him, is he therefore a mere machine-is he excusable, just as if he were impelled by the hand of Omnipotence—excusable, just as really as the sinking of the balance under the weight? This is Arminian doctrine, but not that of Calvinists.

Edwards still more fully explains his meaning when he comes to speak of Foreknowledge. One of his sections bears the title: "Foreknowledge infers necessity." "I allow," he says, "that mere knowledge does not affect the thing known to make it more certain; but I say, it supposes and proves the thing to be already both future and certain." Again: "There must be a certainty in things themselves, before they are certainly known; or, which is the same thing, known to be certain." This is the kind of "necessity" which he advocates, viz. the certainty of events. How it ever entered the brain of Arminians to charge him and other Calvinists with teaching a "necessity" such as moves the

planets in their orbits, is a mystery which we leave others fully to explain. What will not men sometimes do, when hard pressed in argument!

But the embarrassments felt by Arminians when they are pressed with the doctrine of Divine Foreknowledge, are abundantly evident in the curious figment adopted by Dr. Adam Clarke, the commentator. In his headlong zeal to exterminate the doctrine of Predestination, he was forced into the denial of a Divine attribute every where taught in the Scriptures. Adopting the idea of Chevalier Ramsey, Dr. Clarke recommends to his brethren a new and easy theory of foreknowledge. According to his view, God makes a distinction in the universe of knowable things, between those which he will foreknow, and those of which he will choose to remain ignorant. Among the latter, Dr. Clarke places the free actions of intelligent moral agents. God resolves not to foreknow these. Thus it seems, that ignorance is a high perfection of an infinite Being, without which it is impossible, according to the Dr. to govern the moral universe! Dr. C. felt that the commonly received views of foreknowledge are inconsistent with the denial of the doctrine of predestination, and that most of the objections made to the latter, lie with equal weight against the former. Hence the necessity of devising some mode of escaping the difficulties, which press upon the admission of foreknowledge with the rejection of predestination.

66

Mr. Watson and his brethren had too much shrewdness to adopt this weak expedient. They saw at once, that it does not meet the real difficulty of the case, viz. "to reconcile the Divine prescience and the free actions of men." "For," argues Watson, some contingent actions for which men have been made accountable, we are sure have been foretold by the Holy Spirit speaking in the prophets; and if the freedom of man can be reconciled with the prescience of God in these cases, why not in all ?" Most forcibly and logically

said. Even if we were to conclude with Dr. Clarke, that it is consistent with the perfections of God to shut his eyes that he may not see the free actions of men, and thus impose upon himself voluntary ignorance, this strange supposition would bring no aid to Arminianism in the midst of her trials and perplexities.

A simple statement of undeniable truth will place this subject in its proper light. The moral actions of men are foreknown of God hundreds of years before they take place. This no one can doubt who believes the Scriptures. The conduct of men, whether good or evil, is infallibly foreknown therefore, unless the knowledge of God be mere conjecture. It is just as certain, therefore, that it will agree with the Divine foreknowledge, and be precisely what it is known to be, as it is certain God will not and cannot mistake. Here then is a certainty* as infallible as any that grows out of predestination. If we reject one of these, on this account, we must, to be consistent, reject both. But to deny the Divine prescience is to deny God. Thus does Methodism, in her rash haste, direct her course upon the very brink of the dark abyss of atheism.

"If it be alleged that the purpose influences the action, and therefore there is a wide difference, we answer, that if the Divine purpose- -as we maintain has no other influence on the action than to render it certain, there is no difference at all, in this respect, between the theories of foreknowledge and decree; for on some account and for some reason, the thing is as certain as it can be on the theory of mere foreknowledge." - Biblical Repertory, vol. iii. No. 2.

9

LETTER VI.

FOREKNOWLEDGE-PREDESTINATION.

REV. SIR-The subject of the second chapter* of the "Objections to Calvinism" is "Eternal Decrees." It would be a very wrong inference from this, that Arminians reject the doctrine of "eternal decrees." Even Bishop Simpson believes that God will judge the world, and say to the righteous on his right hand: "Come, ye blessed;" and to the wicked at the left, "Depart, ye cursed." If so, when did the omniscient God first form the design or purpose thus to judge the world? Was it in time, or from eternity? Obviously the latter, as even the Bishop will concede. "For," says Watson, "what the creature will do (in order to judgment) is known beforehand with a perfect prescience; and what God has determined (or decreed) to do in consequence, is made apparent by what he actually does, which is with him no new, no sudden thought, but known and PURPOSED FROM ETERNITY in view of the actual circumstances." Then here is an "eternal decree" to judge the world, to acquit and save one part, a number of persons infallibly known to God, and to condemn the rest.

But what is still more surprising, Arminians also teach "eternal decrees" of "election and reprobation!" Here is the proof: "Obedient, persevering believers," says Fletcher, "are God's elect in the particular and full sense of the word, being elected to the reward of eternal life in glory." But may not some of these elect ones perish? Fletcher answers: "We grant that none of these peculiar elect shall ever perish,

On the title-page, Mr. Foster says his book is "a series of Letters to Rev. N. L. Rice, D. D." But there is no such thing as a letter in the volume. There are eight chapters and an appendix, but no "letters." † Inst. part 2, chap. 28.