produce positive proofs of their existence. Ours is a negative proposition. Having evidence which clearly demonstrates that there is One superintending. mind, we contend that there is no evidence of more than one. It generally happens that a negative proposition admits not of proof, and assuredly those who make the positive assertion, ought to be required to prove it. It is undoubtedly the business of those. who maintain that the Supreme mind is divided into three distinct persons, to demonstrate the existence and the absolute divinity of these persons, nor is it till after such a demonstration that we ought to be lieve it. To avoid the possibility of being misunderstood, I wish to state that if it be proved to be revealed by God, that is demonstration. On the present question however, it will be found that many solid arguments may be adduced even to prove a negative.

2d. No plea of necessity can be urged for more than One Supreme All-perfect Mind. It is an universal rule to admit of no more causes than are necessary for the production of the effect. To produce the works of nature we find One great operating cause to have been absolutely necessary. But are we struck with the necessity of more? Have we any plea from reason, for the supposition, that one must direct, a second execute, and a third influence? Have we the slightest ground to suppose that the All-controuling mind must be divided into separate persons to accomplish its object? As a question of previous reasoning the supposition is absurd.

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3d. The doctrine that there are more persons than one, possessing co-equal, co-eternal powers and perfections, deprives that one of his self existence. Selféxistence implies absolute independence. Is it then possible to conceive of two, much less of three absoJutely independent beings? Once admit the idea of the slightest dependance of one being upon another, and his self-existence is destroyed.

4th. One design pervades universal nature, evidently pointing to one over-ruling mind. Since the creation of the world, there has been no variation in the end pursued, nor in the means of acquiring it; no alteration of any of the general laws by which the universe is governed. The end pursued is happiness, general and individual, in proportion to the capacities bestowed; the means are, a compliance with the general laws. In a survey of the works of creation round us, we have the clearest demonstration of the existence of One Intelligent, Omnipotent Mind. If more than One such mind existed might it not naturally be expected that we should have equal evidence of their existence? "New countries," says Dr. Paley, are continually discovered; but the old laws of nature are always found in them. We never get amongst such original, or totally different modes of existence, as to indicate that we are come into the province of a different Creator, or under the direction of a different will."

5th. Infinity has been justly described as a negative idea, clothed with a positive name. It is a nega

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tion of limits. If then the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost be distinct from each other, and be each God, neither can possess the attribute of infinity; otherwise there must be three distinct persons in possession of infinity, and consequently there must be three infinities, which is absurd. For infinity being without limits, there cannot be two infinities; since if there were a second, we could assign limits to the first, namely the point at which the second infinity commences. There cannot therefore be three persons in the Godhead, each possessing all the attributes of Deity; since to suppose three persons in the possession of the attribute of infinity is absurd. It may be proper to observe that the term infinity is here used in its most general sense as applied to all the divine attributes. The argument therefore is, that there cannot be two, and much less three beings each possessing infinite perfections, as infinite power, infinite goodness &c.

6th. Those who believe in the doctrine of the Trinity really believe in three Gods. It is affirmed that there are three persons in the Godhead, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; that the substance which composes each is the same, and that the power and glory of each are equal. These persons therefore must be distinct from each other, since they are taken together, three, and since the attributes of power and glory belong to each, each possessing them in an equal measure.

Let us then endeavour to conceive of a Deity thus

constituted. Let us imagine that there is a distinct person, having a distinct name, a distinct substance and distinct attributes, and that these taken together, constitute God. Let us imagine that there is a second distinct person, having a distinct name, a distinct substance and distinct attributes, and that these also taken together, constitute God. Let us imagine that there is a third distinct person, having likewise a distinct name, a distinct substance, and distinct attributes, and these again taken together constitute God. Let us suppose that while each of these persons, considered by himself, is God, the three taken together are no more than exactly that one God; each considered by himself is perfect God; the whole taken together is no more. By any effort of our faculties can we conceive of this? It is impossible. We must suppose that there are three Gods, or we can have no ideas upon the subject.

7th. As many perhaps will endeavour to evade the force of this reasoning, by declaring that they do not believe that there are three distinct intelligent beings in the Godhead; it may be as well to inquire whether, rejecting this opinion, they can believe the doctrine of the Trinity. The Father, say they, is to be considered as the fountain of Deity, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are derived from him. Supposing that this distinction is intelligible and just, if the Son be derived from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, they cannot all be equal. They cannot be equal in point of origin, they cannot be e

qual in point of rank. That which is derived, cannot be equal in point of origin, with that from which it is derived; since that which is underived must have existed before it could give being to the derived. That which is derived, cannot be equal in point of rank, with that from which it is derived; since that which is derived can only be an effect of the underived. If the Son be derived from the Father, however exalted the Father may have made him he is still nothing but a creature of the Father's will; his very existence is the result of the Father's exertion of his power, and had that power not operated, he would have had no existence. How then can he be equal to the Father? or how is it possible to conceive of him as God, in the strict sense of the word? For how can he be properly God whose very existence depends upon the will of another?

Could the Son produce the Father? If this question must be answered in the negative; if the Father could produce the Son, but the Son could not produce the Father, the Son is inferior in power to the Father. How then can he be equal to him, who is thus confessedly his superior?

8th. Thus far then Reason having been our Guide,' we are reduced to this alternative, either, that two of the persons in the Godhead, are not in the proper sense of the word God, and ought not to be the objects of religious adoration; or that they are three absolute, distinct, independent Gods. The latter case · is Tritheism, the former is Unitarianism. Of a Trinity