Take the proposition that an agent ought to promote his own happiness and that of others rather than their misery.-Does this truth, or does it not, flow from the conception of the objects to which it relates? Does the contrary (or even the negative) of the proposition contradict fact only, or also possibility? Is it possible that it could ever be right for a being to seek his own misery and that of others?

If one man were so constituted as to find the smell of a rose pleasant, another so constituted as to find it unpleasant, (which is surely possible,) it would be just as true that the perfume of the rose was bad as that it was good; as true that it was good as that it was bad.

If one man were constituted to behold the intentional production of misery by a living agent with an agreeable emotion, another with a disagreeable emotion, (which also is surely possible,) would it be as true that the production of misery is right, as that it is wrong? This is matter of a simple appeal to the mind.

If this appeal is answered in the negative, it then appears that there is at least one moral proposition, the truth of which flows from the nature of the objects considered, and the contrary of which can never be true. This proposition then possesses all the characters of the last species of truth described, and such characters as do not belong to the first. I know nothing more that could be

required to show that such moral proposition is an absolute necessary truth perceived by reason, and that reason is, so far and as much farther as other propositions of similar character can be found a judge of moral distinctions. There is no other criterion that I know of by which the point could be determined.

I am fully aware that the whole hinge on which my arguments turn, is this, that there is some thing, be it what it will, immutable in moral truth. This I am forced to assume-prove it I cannot. Grant this,—no matter how sparingly, how nakedly, or how much in the abstract; no matter how fettered with suppositions or provisions,—and all that I contend for will follow. Deny this, and the whole argument will indeed fall to the ground.

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APPENDIX TO CHAP. III.

66

REMARKS ON SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH'S PRELIMINARY DIS

SERTATION ON THE HISTORY OF ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
THE NEW EDITION OF THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA.

IN

THE first rough draught of this treatise was composed, before the publication of Sir James Mackintosh's learned and interesting "Preliminary Dissertation" in the new edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica,—or at least before I had an opportunity of perusing it. My confidence in some of the opinions advanced by me has been infinitely strengthened, by observing their coincidence with those of so competent a judge. And I think it will be found that, in particular, the views expressed by Sir James as to the prejudice which the philosophy of morals has sustained from the confounding together of two different branches of the inquiry, and those which he has offered regarding the relation of utility to virtue, will, in the course of the present work, meet with some useful illustration and extension.

On one point, however, the system of Sir James is directly at variance with that which I have felt myself constrained to adopt. The doctrine which represents reason as the primary source of moral distinctions, he has treated less as being of ques

tionable or doubtful truth, than as an exposed and almost abandoned error. Indeed the establishment-for as such he views it-of the contrary doctrine, that which I have been at so much pains in endeavouring to controvert, he generally marks as one of the most signal and obvious advances that the theory of morals has effected in modern times.

Considering the weight that is due to the opinions of Sir James Mackintosh on this subject, and also the nature of the composition in which these opinions have been put forth, (a composition which, as being professedly a general historical view of the science, appears to stand in the same relation to an ordinary controversial writing that the summing up of the judge does to the pleading of the advocate, and to be entitled to as much more trust,) I may be pardoned for briefly applying the general views offered in the preceding chapter to the specific points urged by Sir James, so far at least as these do not appear to have been already directly met.

No proof is furnished by Sir James, or any of the sentimentalists, that an emotive act attends every exercise of the moral faculty. In all their arguments on this point, the sentimentalists confound these two things-perceiving an action to be right, and, desiring or willing to perform a right action. Their constant argument is, * before an action *Thus, "What could induce such a being to will and to act?"

"Reason, as reason, can never be a motive to ac

can be performed, there must be a desire or act of will on the part of the agent. Granting this, is it not possible to perceive an action to be right and yet not perform it? or cannot an action be made an object of thought, without performance, without the possibility of performance? But if an action may be perceived to be right, without the agent's yet performing it, this perception of its being right may exist anterior to any emotive process for it is only upon the supposition that the will is moved, that the sentimentalists can ground the necessity of a desire or emotion ; and they cannot shew that the will is moved, when the action is not performed.

tion;" "when the conclusion of a process of reasoning presents to his mind an object of desire, a motive of action begins to operate, and reason may then, but not till then, have a powerful though indirect influence on conduct," (Prel. Diss.) -so the whole paragraph, -- "Let any argument to dissuade a man from immorality," &c. "It is then apparent that the influence of reason on the will is indirect" 66 through whatever length of reasoning the mind may proceed in its advances towards action;" 6.6 some emotion or sentiment which must be touched, before the springs of will and action can be set in motion." —To the same purpose Dr. Thomas Brown: "If we had not previously been capable of loving the good of others, as good, and of hating the production of evil as evil; to shew us that the happiness of every created being depended on our choice, would have excited in us as little eagerness to do," &c. Brown, Lecture 76.

How happy would it be, if, as these writers have seemed to understand, the perceiving of what is right, and the doing of it, did not mean different things!