obtained, or in prospect, should, as such, excite fear or sorrow, or vice versa with respect to pain. For we cannot even imagine a being, who should have the same feelings on being made to understand that he was about to undergo a great suffering, and to obtain a great enjoyment; or who should behold, with equal indifference, the approach of each. To say, as Dr. T. Brown has somewhere done, that "we know not why we have been so constituted by the Deity as to rejoice at prosperous, and grieve at unfortunate events," seems to me much the same as to say, that we know not why the Deity has made three and two to be equal to five; or the two sides of every triangle to be greater than the third.

Similar to the connection now described as subsisting between pleasure and pain and the emotions respectively related to each, is that between these states, and certain sentiments arising towards other beings, considered as the intentional producers of pleasure or pain. It is equally impossible for any being to be pleased with, or love another being, for causing him to endure pain, simply for the sake of doing so, as it is to be pleased with the pain itself, simply because it is such. It is impossible too that he should view the producer of pain, and the producer of pleasure, with similar sentiments, or with entire indifference in each case.

The principles of sympathy and benevolent affection towards other beings, do not, I apprehend, necessarily result from the nature of mind - at least of mind considered as unendued with reason; but if these principles have been implanted, the emotions of grief for the misery of others, joy on account of their happiness, love of those who benefit them, resentment towards those by whom they are injured, are not to be considered as what may or may not follow. Though the benevolent affections themselves may be merely the effect of positive constitution, the secondary emotions now enumerated flow of necessity from that constitution: for if I possess an affection towards another being, it is a contradiction to suppose that I could rejoice at his suffering, or that I could fail to grieve at such suffering, and resent the infliction of it.

Thus then we account for certain emotions which a view of the actions of other beings excite in our minds: and in doing so, we account for what very much resembles the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, and what these sentiments are generally more or less mixed up with. Love to those who do us good, hatred to those who do us evil, are what must necessarily result from the very nature of mind. Love to those who do good to other beings for whom we entertain a benevolent affection, hatred towards those who injure them, are the necessary results of the possession of that affection.

There exists, then, in the very nature of mind, considered in its relation to the states of pleasure and pain, a necessary connection between these states and certain emotions peculiarly related to each. It is impossible to overlook the strong analogy, in kind, that subsists between these emotions and those of moral approbation and disapprobation; and we have thence the clearest warrant for forming the presumption, that, in the essential nature of mind also — mind in its higher and more developed capacities - we may find the source of moral perceptions in general.

Moral approbation has the closest possible affinity to hope, joy, gratitude; moral disapprobation to fear, grief, resentment. The former are all pleasing, the latter all painful emotions. Moral approbation, hope, joy, gratitude, have all a relation to pleasure or happiness as their object: with each of these emotions is more or less intermixed a feeling of love or desire. Moral disapprobation, fear, grief, resentment, have all a relation to pain or misery as their object: with each of these emotions again is more or less intermixed a feeling of hate or aversion. As surely then as any of these states of emotion have their origin in the essential nature of mind, so surely, we may presume, have the others; as surely as some of these emotions are not arbitrarily connected with their respective objects, so surely may we presume that none of them are arbitrarily connected.

A capability of the emotions of hope, joy, and gratitude, and their opposites, fear, grief, and resentment, does not seem to require a higher degree of intellect, than will enable a living being to know that pleasure or pain is inflicted, or about to be inflicted, and that by the act of another being. This degree, the lower animals seem to possess; and from their being endowed with certain benevolent affections towards their offspring, and sometimes with capacities of attachment or dislike towards other beings, they are necessarily pleased or displeased with those who benefit or injure the objects of those affections.

But an entirely new set of mental phenomena present themselves to our view, when we look to the case of a being endowed with reason; who is not merely capable of feeling pleasure and pain, and, when these are produced by the acts of other beings, of knowing that they are thus produced ; but who can also think and reflect what pleasure and pain are, what is their distinctive nature, and thence, the distinctive nature of the different acts by which they are respectively produced.

The rational faculty may properly be said to consist in the ability, not merely to form a coпсерtion in the mind (for this must perhaps be allowed to the inferior animals) but to discover what any conception necessarily involves or contains in it. Every conception that a rational being can form, must inevitably involve or contain something within it. There must be something which cannot but hold true of it, as long as the conception remains the same ; so that whenever this should not hold true, the conception itself would be changed or destroyed. The power of thus evolving a conception is the reasoning faculty-the possession of which constitutes a rational being.

A being destitute of reason can behold, perceive, or know an object, as it is; but he cannot perceive what, according to the conception it gives birth to, must, with necessary truth, be affirmed or denied of it.* Thus a dog, or a horse, beholds and feels a stone, and knows its existence, as well as a man; but the former cannot, like the latter, deduce a necessary truth from his conception of it;-cannot, for instance, perceive that it is impossible for the stone at once to be, and not to be; that it cannot be in two places at one time; that all its parts are equal to the whole of it, and the like.

Pleasure and pain, happiness and misery, then, which, to the irrational creation, are at most but objects of knowledge or conception, or the exciting causes of certain passions or emotions, become besides, to the rational mind, the objects of thought and reasoning; and the conceptions formed of