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them in the reasoning mind, are perceived to involve such truths as these :

That they can only be, as states of a sentient being, and imply the existence of a sentient being : That pleasure, in its very nature, and from the nature of a sentient being, must move joy, hope, desire; at least that the contrary of this cannot be. That pain must move grief, fear, resentment.

With these conceptions of what pain and pleasure are, and what they imply, the rational mind perceives farther, that pleasure is a state in which a sentient being ought to be, rather than in pain : that his being in a state of pleasure, or at least of ease, is fit, right; his being in a state of pain, unfit, wrong; and again, that an act which produces what is fit in regard to any sentient being, is an act which ought to be performed, or which an agent ought to perform--the performance of which is right: on the contrary, that an act which produces what, in regard to a sentient being, is unfit, ought not to be performed; is what an agent ought not to perform; what the performance of is wrong. A rational being then does not merely, like the inferior animals, feel, or know pleasure or happiness, rejoice in it, desire it, and feel gratitude towards the agency by which it is produced; but he perceives that it is what, in its nature, must necessarily excite those passions: that it is the state in which he and every being ought to be, rather than in the contrary state: that an act which occasions pleasure or happiness, ought to be performed, and is right. In like manner he does not merely feel pain, grieve at being subjected to it, fear its approach, resent the act which inflicts it; but he perceives that it is the natural and necessary cause of grief, fear, resentment; that it is what ought not to be occasioned ; that the acts by which it is occasioned, ought not to performed, and are wrong. This then is reasoning * from the nature of pleasure and pain, or happiness and misery, and of these as occasioned by the acts of an agent; and the truths involved in the conception of these objects, form the first principles of moral science.

A being then who is incapable of reasoning from the conceptions of his mind, of perceiving what these conceptions contain or involve, is incapable of perceiving a moral truth, of forming a moral notion. On the other hand, a being who is capable of reasoning, must be capable of forming moral determinations unless we can suppose a capacity of reasoning on one subject, as disjoined from a similar capacity in regard to another subject. All this seems incontestably true in theory: certainly nothing to the contrary can be shewn

*

Reasoning generally means the deduction of one proposition from another: but the making out of the first and primary proposition, if a necessary intuitive truth, is reasoning from the conception denoted by the terms it employs. Thus the axiom, "the whole is greater than a part," is produced by reasoning from our conceptions of whole and part.

from fact. Every rational being is a moral being --every moral being is a rational being.

Let us now observe the order in which our moral judgments proceed.

The first principle in morals seems to be that which has been derived from the very conception we form of pleasure and pain, happiness and misery, and of a sentient existence of which these are the states: namely, that it is fit that every sentient being should be happy rather than miserable.

The notion of fitness next involves that of obligation. It is impossible to perceive that something is, in itself, fit to be done, without perceiving also that it is what an agent ought to do - what he is under an obligation to do, rather than the contrary, and vice versa.

It seems impossible, in like manner, to have the notion of an agent's being under an obligation to do this, or to avoid doing that, without perceiving it to be fit, in consequence, that his state should be better if he chooses to do what is obligatory, than if he does not; worse, if he chooses to do what it is obligatory to avoid, than if he chooses to avoid it. For it appears a contradiction to say that a man is under an obligation to do something, and yet that he ought to be no better or worse, whether his choice be to do it or not.

So far there may be said to take place, a mere intellectual perception of certain truths, which a rational being finds to be involved in some of the conceptions of his understanding. On considering the nature of the truths thus perceived, however, the perception of them must appear to be necessarily attended, as regards the mind of the percipient being, with the following consequences.

First, If he perceives that a thing is fit to be done, he must feel some wish or desire that it should be done - must have some pleasure or satisfaction in its being done, rather than the contrary.

Secondly, If he feels a wish that something should be done, he must feel some wish or desire to do it.

Thirdly, If he perceives that it is obligatory upon him to do something, he must feel some wish to fulfil the obligation; and this, as an obligation, and independently of the fitness of the effect taken by itself.

Fourthly, He must feel some complacency or affection towards any being who desires or wills to do what is fit or obligatory; and a certain satisfaction with himself, when conscious of such desire or will - and vice versa in each case.

Now this disposition of a rational mind to feel satisfaction or pleasure at the production of fit effects; this desire to be instrumental in producing them, and to fulfil the obligation perceived to result from their being fit; this complacency in the display of similar dispositions in the minds of other beings, and affection towards such beings,

this - for it is all one principle - is moral virtue. In whatever degree an agent is under the influence of such principle, as a general character of his mind, he is a virtuous agent; and in every particular instance in which he actually experiences the satisfaction which a view of the production of fit effects is calculated to afford him, or in which he conceives admiration or attachment towards another virtuous agent, he exercises moral approbation. In explaining then what virtue is in itself, in its nature and origin, we explain what approbation* is, what is its nature and origin. The one thing involves the other: the one is but the other manifested or excited in a particular mode. To approve virtue, and to have virtue, are the same thing; for the one cannot be without the other.†

In developing the origin and nature of virtue and of moral approbation, it has seemed advisable, in the first instance at least, to represent them as in the mind of one agent. In pursuing the investigation, however, it is more convenient to

* i. e. So far as approbation is merely an emotion. † That is, absolutely speaking, and so far as regards the nature of the principle: for when, in ordinary language, we say that a man has virtue, we speak relatively; and mean that he is virtuous in a considerable degree, or that his virtue is perfect, so far as human virtue is generally found to be. In short, I say that he who approves virtue is virtuous, in the same sense as I should say, that there is a fire, where there is a spark..

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