follow the common mode of separating the agent into two capacities: placing ourselves in one, as the approving or disapproving spectators; the agent himself in the other, as the virtuous or vicious subject who excites those emotions. Accommodating our phraseology then to this mode of stating the case, we may be said to have been explaining, first, why certain ends are fit, certain actions obligatory; how certain individuals are virtuous or of good desert; how they come to be so, and wherein their virtue or desert consists: and secondly, why and how we judge that such ends are fit, that such actions are obligatory, that such individuals deserve reward; why we are pleased to see fit ends effected, why we approve of those actions by which they are sought to be effected: in other words, we explain, at once, wherein moral distinctions consist, and how we come to perceive them.

That the various emotions and affections now described must arise, of necessity, from the nature of the judgments to which they have been traced, seems indisputably clear. When a rational being perceives as a truth, by his reason, that something is right to be done, it is impossible for him to feel an entire indifference as to whether that be done or not: as impossible to be pleased at its not being done, or displeased at its being done. In like manner, if there is any thing that he is thus pleased to see done, he must be pleased

with the one who desires or seeks to do it. He cannot be satisfied with the effect, dissatisfied with the intending producer of that effect. Now it is to be observed that this representation does not suppose any implanted susceptibility or faculty, additional to mere life and intelligence. The affections and emotions described are strictly necessary consequences of the mere intellectual perception of right and wrong; as strictly so, as the equality of the halves is the necessary consequence of the equality of the wholes which those halves compose. The very notion of right carries along with it that it is what we must desire to be done, and cannot fail to desire; and it would be a contradiction to say that we could think any thing to be right, and yet be entirely indifferent whether it were done or not; or regard in the same manner him who does what is right, and him who does not.

The observation of Bishop Butler, that the moral faculty includes "both a perception of the understanding and a sentiment of the heart," though, in a general sense, conveying the substance of the foregoing statement, would require, before it could be taken as fully expressing the views therein contained, to be attended with the following explanations :

First, That the popular expression "the heart," is not to be held as necessarily implying any principle distinct from, or superadded to, the possession of a rational mind. I say necessarily implying: for I am not concerned to argue against the possibility, or even the fact, of an implanted and positive capacity of emotion, * as connected with the view of particular actions. It is sufficient for me to maintain that the existence of certain emotions can be accounted for, without the supposition of any such positive constitution; that they may be shewn to arise from the mere possession of intelligence, and cannot but arise where there is intelligence.

But secondly, and more particularly, - That though, when a right or wrong action is really performed, there is both a perception of the understanding and a sentiment of the heart, yet, as we can determine an action to be right or wrong without its being performed at all, and therefore (since the emotion only takes place in relation to the performance) without any emotion, - the emotion has no share whatever, in determining it to be right or wrong.

The opinion that reason discriminates between right or wrong has suffered considerably from its having been the practice of theorists to confine their speculations on this subject exclusively to what takes place in our minds when an action is performed. Now we can just as clearly judge

that one action is right, another wrong, without their being actually performed, as we can judge that all the parts are equal to the whole, without making the experiment of dividing material bodies and reuniting the parts. Talk, as an abstract case, of inflicting pain or misery in any living being : on merely understanding what this means we pronounce the action wrong. This is a moral determination perfect in itself; and it is quite unmixed with emotion. We behold this wrong action performed, and we then feel a painful emotion because the wrong action is performed. If we have thought of it before performance, the act of judgment has taken place by itself;* if only upon seeing the performance, the act of judgment is immediately followed by the emotion; the emotion takes full possession of the mind, and we are apt to overlook the judgment: but the judgment, the judgment alone, is the distinctive operation;† the emotion is but consequent upon the perception of the distinction.

A man hears that a particular occurrence has taken place, which, though he is not directly affected by it, he perceives will be, in its consequences, extremely prejudicial to him: he pronounces it an unfortunate occurrence, and feels much regret that it has happened. In this case, his contemplation of the occurrence includes both "a perception of the understanding and a sentiment of the heart." But surely the sentiment or emotion of regret has nothing to do in characterizing the occurrence as unfortunate. He could have pronounced that it would be unfortunate without its happening at all - of course without any sentiment of regret, and also without any sentiment of fear, if the occurrence had been unlikely to happen. It is not unfortunate because of his regret, nor does his regret attend the perception that it is unfortunate-as that perception exists by

for which it is determined to be right or wrong. This is a separate act from both of those which I have described, and precedes both. It is generally neither emotion nor judgment, in the strict sense, (though judgment may sometimes be employed) but perception or knowledge. I see a man receive a wound from another. This is the action. I perceive or know that it creates pain and inconvenience. This is the quality of the action which makes it the subject of a moral judgment. Reason pronounces that, as inflicting pain, the action is wrong. The actual performance of this wrong action moves in me a painful emotion.

The instinctive feeling of pity or compassion again is different from all those, and what we have here no concern with.