itself; the feeling of regret arises because what is perceived to be unfortunate-has happened.

A man's judgment that an action is morally good or bad his judgment that an event will have consequences beneficial or prejudicial to himself - are, as judgments, entirely different. But in the manner in which each is attended with an emotion, in the manner in which each exists independently of that emotion - they are precisely similar.

It is at all events to be observed - in extension of Bishop Butler's analysis, - that neither the judgment, nor the emotion, of which the act of moral approbation consists, is one, or indivisible, but each twofold. We judge, first, that an effect is fit, secondly, that an action is obligatory. We feel an emotion, first of, satisfaction, at the view of a fit effect, secondly, of attachment and admiration, towards a virtuous agent.

Our perception that an agent is under an obligation to do any thing, must presuppose that something is, in itself, fit to be done. The judgment of the understanding in each case precedes the affection or emotion; or that affection or emotion is not moral approbation. I morally approve that the end or effect should be produced, only when I have judged that it is fit and proper to be produced; and my moral approbation of the agent on account of his virtue, presupposes that there was something, in my judgment and his, perceived to

be obligatory, in a regard to which his virtue consisted.

SECT II.

Of the Natural Affections.

Along with that regard to moral fitness and obligation which constitutes virtue, and which must, in some degree, however small, belong to every intelligent being, man possesses several benevolent desires or affections, by which he is directly impelled to promote the happiness of other beings, and to relieve their misery. These affections correspond so entirely, in some instances, with the principle of virtue, that some of the best writers have taken them for the same. Nothing however can be more different.

Some benevolent affections are general, as sympathy or compassion; some particular, as filial, and parental love: but all of them are mere desires, not having any necessary relation to their particular objects, but of a kind which we could easily suppose, at least, to be connected with other objects. We desire to render such a one happy, to relieve another from being miserable, and we act accordingly; not having in view any fitness in the effect that is to be produced; we merely desire it: we might have desired the contrary in each case; and should as readily and naturally have sought to gratify the one desire, as the other. It is with these desires as with our desire of food,

which is quite independent of any view to the support of life, and would of itself equally impel us to swallow poison as wholesome victuals, did they chance to be equally agreeable to the taste. But when we act as virtuous agents, the case is quite different; and we promote happiness, and relieve misery, because it is fit or right that such should be done, and not merely because we desire it. It is true such desire exists; but it does not exist primarily, or by positive constitution; but in necessary connection with the object, as conceived by a rational mind. If we desire such effect to take place, it is only because it appears to be, in its own nature, a fit effect: one which is naturally proper to be desired, and would not cease to be fit, even should we possess contrary desires. Did we not desire it, indeed, we should not promote it; but did it not, in our judgment, possess an intrinsic fitness, we should not even desire it.

Happiness and misery, as exciting the mere natural affections, are in the mind, not as objects of reason, but of sense or imagination. In vain you tell me that thousands lie dead or wounded in the field, or are perishing by shipwreck, by the earthquake, or the pestilence. I may hear all this, and comprehend what it means, and yet my feelings of compassion remain unmoved. But let me behold the agonies, let me hear the groans of a single sufferer; nay, fill my imagination with the vivid conception of them, and my heart is melted with sympathy and compassion. Reason and virtue, on the other hand, need not to be presented with either the reality, or the representation of misery. The bare conception of it formed in the intellect, is that of something which ought not to be, - which ought to be removed; and the desire and purpose of removing it instantly and necessarily follows. Hence, feeling is moved by the case of distress that is present, more than by thousands of cases that are future or absent; virtue is moved by the intrinsic importance of this or that amount of suffering, without relation to time or place. Feeling looks merely to the fact that there is suffering: it regards not the desert of the sufferer: it regards not whether he endures more than his due share, or whether his burden can be at all removed, without pressing harder upon another. It interests us alike in what befals the murderer and his victim: we forget the fate of the latter, when we behold the suffering endured by the former, in expiation of his crime. To the eye of reason and virtue, the view of suffering is always painful; but they can look, comparatively unmoved, on suffering deservedly inflicted, if it is the means of preventing other suffering, that would be undeserved: they are not satisfied that a present suffering is removed, if a greater is thereby created elsewhere, or in future; or if it is removed from one to another, who is already bearing what in justice belongs to him.

The difference between acting from a principle of virtue, and acting from the impulse of a benevolent affection, may be shewn in a variety of instances. A judge on the bench feels the strongest compassion (which is a benevolent affection) for a criminal: yet he condemns him from a sense of duty. It may be said, this sense of duty is itself a benevolent affection towards those who would suffer by the escape of the criminal. That this name may be given to it without any great impropriety, I shall allow: but are the two things the same? Does the judge feel an impulse of emotion, a feeling, a desire, towards those whom he benefits by passing sentence on the criminal? No; he acts in their behalf from a rational sense of moral obligation. The circumstance of his doing violence to his feelings in condemning the criminal, shews that it is something different from feeling or affection, that determines his conduct. Is a revenue officer prompted by benevolent affection in exacting government dues? Who are the objects of this affection? his superiors in his peculiar department? the public in general? Surely to say so would be an abuse of words.

A man gives his assistance to a scheme for the saving of human lives, such as the maintaining of a life-boat, the procuring of an apparatus for the recovery of persons apparently drowned, and the like, from a sense of duty: he acts with a view to prevent certain misfortunes to some of his fellow