which virtue inspires. It is not enough that we are absolutely loved; we must be loved exclusively, or more than others: nor do we care for being the objects of a regard, which, unless our deserts give us a right to it, is equally bestowed on every other being.

The distinction between the virtuous principle and the benevolent affections, is of no mean consequence to be observed; and many perplexities have been introduced into the theory of morals, from the circumstance of its being overlooked. It is not perhaps going too far to say, that there is not a greater difference - in the case of a man's doing good to himself - between his eating from appetite, and his doing so in order to gain strength and preserve life, when indisposition may have removed the relish for food, than- in the case of his doing good to others - between acting from a benevolent affection, and from virtue. Hunger is a bodily, parental or filial love, a mental affection: in other respects they act with entire similarity.

It was before observed, that it is impossible, in the nature of things, to possess a benevolent affection towards any being, and not be pleased with such actions as promote his happiness, displeased with the contrary. These feelings however must never be identified with moral approbation and disapprobation, taken in their proper meaning ; to which they bear only the same relation that instinctive gratitude and resentment do, (i. e. gra

titude for an enjoyment bestowed, or a pain inflicted, on self;) the susceptibility of which does not even suppose the capacity of reason. A brute resents an attack upon its young, but cannot be said to disapprove of it.

SECT. III.

Of the precise Sense in which Approbation and Disapprobation are Acts of Reason.

We shall now be able to estimate, with some degree of precision, how far, and in what sense, approbation and disapprobation can properly be termed acts of reason; or reason the power that distinguishes right from wrong.

The meaning of the terms approbation and disapprobation has been occasionally so far extended, as to comprehend every species of judgment, emotion, or affection, which a view of the acts, character, or disposition of living agents, may excite in us. In like manner, the terms good and bad often include, besides the moral notions of obligatory, virtuous, and meritorious, every character or quality of a living being, that can in any way move our affection or dislike. Of course we have found it necessary to distinguish the various species of mental acts or states, to which the names of approbation and disapprobation are, or might be applied; and to make a similar distinction of the corresponding objects of these sentiNow it has appeared, that the feelings of gratitude and resentment, respectively, for favours or injuries done to us, or those to whom we bear affection, do not imply any exercise of reason : these emotions being exhibited, on such occasions, by living creatures whom it is not usual to consider as being endowed with reason.

We have endeavoured to make it appear, however, that beings endowed with reason, and furnished with the occasions that give birth to moral conceptions, must perceive certain general truths, such as these :-that happiness ought to be promoted rather than misery: that what in itself ought to be done, an agent ought to do: that an agent who chooses to do what he ought, ought to be rewarded accordingly. So far as this is admitted, the agency of reason, in discriminating right and wrong, can of course admit of no controversy.

When an agent performs, or is desirous to perform, that which is obligatory upon him, we say he is a good agent, or a virtuous agent, or his action is morally good, or virtuous. Now these are not propositions, but definitions. To affirm such things, is certainly not an act of reasoning, any more than it is an act of reasoning to say, that a figure of three sides and three angles is a triangle. We do not then, in such a sense as this, distinguish what is morally good or bad by reason. Again, when we say that any particular moral

agent is a good moral agent, or the contrary, — as that the Deity is good; that Howard was good; that Nero was bad; we assert mere propositions of fact. Such propositions are not discovered by reason: they do not belong to morals as a science, any more than the proposition, — the earth is spherical, - is a truth discovered by reason, * or one belonging to the science of mathematics.

But whether we assert, in general, that certain species of characters and actions are good, or that particular characters or actions are of that species; in either case, we presuppose a judgment of reason: namely, that something is fit or obligatoryin the performance of which, goodness is defined to consist: and which goodness, so defined or understood, we ascribe to particular characters or actions.

It has been farther stated, however, that what reason perceives as fit to be done, must necessarily give some species of satisfaction to the mind of the reasoning being, when he beholds it done; and also that he must necessarily be moved with a certain attachment and admiration towards the agent. Now most certainly the emotions which are thus generated on beholding the performance of certain actions, are not acts of reason, in the proper or usual meaning of that expression; and so far as these emotions are constituent parts of

* That is, by reasoning a priori, from intuitive principles.

the sentiments * of approbation and disapprobation, and, as such, distinctive of right and wrong, so far it may be correct to say, that the moral faculty is something different from reason. But although it is not maintained that nothing else than a bare judgment of the understanding takes place, when we determine the moral character of an action which we behold performed; it is maintained that such a judgment does take place; that when we call an action right or wrong, we do not mean only to declare, as a fact, that we have a certain feeling, but are under a persuasion that to such an action, this feeling, and no other, is suitable; and that, not only in regard to our constitution, but in the nature of things. And finally, it is maintained, that even to represent reason as the sole judge of right and wrong, is what admits of entire justification, both in propriety of language, and in point of fact; since the emotions themselves that arise on the view of different moral actions, are not the result of any principle of our nature separate from reason, but are the necessary and unavoidable effect of the mere possession of life and intelligence.

The emotion is not reasoning, but a state of a reasoning mind; what a reasoning mind must be liable to exist in, if conversant with happiness and misery, and conceiving of actions productive

* This is a convenient term, as being applicable both to the judgment and the feeling.