notion, must adopt the word ought, or some other quite different from the verb to be. On this I would merely observe, that the use of the verb to be takes place as much in morals, when we say is right, is wrong, as when we say, in mathematics, is equal, is unequal; and that the expression, ought to be, expressing fitness or obligation, is not more remote from the mere indicative mood of the substantive verb, than is the expression, may be, expressing possibility; or must be, expressing necessity. Indeed the three several notions of what may be, what must be, what ought to be,-carry, on the face of them, so plain an appearance of belonging to one family, that stronger grounds would seem to be required for attributing them to different origins, than merely (the only plausible ground assigned) that we feel a satisfaction when what ought to be done is done-a satisfaction not experienced-from the difference of their specific nature-in regard to either of the other perceptions.

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CHAPTER V.

RECAPITULATION - ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLEX NOTION OF A MORAL ACTION.

WITH the preceding section terminated the discussion of the first of the two questions stated at the outset, as forming the principal divisions of the present inquiry, or that which relates to the nature of the moral faculty. The discussion of the second is now to be entered upon - to which the remaining chapters of this Part are but preliminary.

It has already appeared, however, that we must treat this question not as asking simply-wherein does the goodness of an action consist, but wherein does its fitness, its obligation, its virtue, its merit consist.

We have seen that, when we come to analyze the notion of an action in morals, we find it to be a complex one, separable into several different parts. There is, in the first place, an effect produced by such action a sentient being, the object of the action, receiving pain or pleasure from it; or, if there are more than one object, the pain or pleasure distributed in particular proportions to each. This effect viewed by itself, and without any regard whatsoever to the character, conduct, or intention of an agent, nay even though we suppose it produced by a blind undesigning cause, we judge to be fit or unfit to take place. That any being should be happy rather than miserable ; that, if there are more than one, a pleasure should be shared by all rather than enjoyed by one, is what we are pleased with in itself. So far the action, i. e. the effect of it, is fit. Obligation is a certain state, situation, or condition, in which an agent is placed in relation to this effect: he is under an obligation to produce the effect: there exists a certain reason or cause why he should produce it. No ideas can be more dissimilar than that of an effect or end, fit in itself to be produced, and that of the relative situation of an agent, who is bound or ought to produce it. We can conceive different agents to be each under a different degree of obligation to produce an effect of the same fitness. Among agents similarly situated, the fitness of the effect of an action is the measure of its obligation; but the obligation does not depend on this alone. The same effects, considered as proper to an action, will follow the performance of that action, whether the agent has promised to perform it or not; but it may be, in the highest degree, obligatory on him in the one case, not at all in the other. The estimate of obligation then is formed upon a conjunct view of the fitness of the effect, and the situation or circumstances of the agent in relation to the subject of the action. Again; different agents under equal degrees of obligation, may be conceived as differently disposed to the fulfilment of it. Virtue then is a character, nature, or quality of an agent's mind or disposition, by which he is more or less sensible to the influence of the motive which obligation furnishes. The idea of this character or quality of the agent's mind, which we call his virtue, is as different from that of the situation or relative position in which he stands with regard to the production of a certain effect, (which state we call his being under an obligation,) as the idea of this state of obligation is different from that of the useful or hurtful effects of the action. And in like manner as, where the fitness of the effect is equal, the obligation on each of two agents may be different; so, where obligation may be the same, the virtue, the sensibility to that obligation may be different in different agents. Farther, where two agents are both under the same obligation, and naturally formed with equal degrees of regard to its influence, we can conceive one, by a voluntary effort of free will, (which we must here consider as an ultimate cause,) making a strong exertion to fulfil the obligation - vehemently re

sisting any contrary inclination, or resolutely contending against some obstacle; - while the other, though alive to the sense of obligation, makes no effort to act according to that obligation, and yields without resistance to opposing inclinations. This exertion of free will in the one, we call merit; the want of it, in the other, guilt. The exertion so supposed to be employed, from no other cause but the will of the individual in that particular instance, is as different in the idea we form of it, from the general character of his mind, as that character is from the situation of obligation; or that again, from the beneficial or hurtful nature of the effect.

Fitness then is something in the nature of an effect: obligation is a relative situation in which an agent is placed : virtue is a character or quality of his disposition : merit is what accrues to him for the direction and energy of a particular volition. Different degrees of these several qualities of an action may co-exist together in different actions, in like manner as similar figures may exist in different extensions, and similar extensions in different figures.

Having thus, in a general way, separated and characterized the notions severally expressed by the terms fitness, obligation, virtue and merit, we are now to inquire into the particulars comprehended under each, and to attempt to discover the