mathematical axioms and definitions, has not, in every respect, I believe, been satisfactorily over

come.

I. It is fit that every sentient being should be happy, or enjoy pleasure, rather than be miserable or suffer pain.*

II. It is unfit that any sentient being should be miserable or suffer pain.

III. When an agent is under a moral obligation - (when there is something that he ought, something that he ought not to do†) - it is fit that his state should be better if he wills or chooses to fulfil the obligation, than if he does not will or choose to fulfil it; or that his state should be worses if he does not will or choose to fulfil the obligation, than if he does will or choose to fulfil it: better in so much greater, worse in so much less a degree, as he exerts the power of free will in a greater or less degree to fulfil the obligation.

I

* Into the distinction between happiness and pleasure, I am not concerned to enter; nor to say the truth am very well prepared to assign wherein that distinction consists.For my purpose, they may either be reckoned the same or different.

+ Ought to do - means, ought to do, or ought to avoid; ought not to do-means, ought not to do, or ought not to omit. The obligation is fulfilled by doing, in the one case, or avoiding in the other; not fulfilled or violated, by doing, in the one case, by omitting to do in the other.

† Or he has merit, is of good desert, or deserves well.

§ Or he has guilt, is of ill desert, or deserves ill.

DEFINITION. * The power of free will is exerted in a greater degree, when exerted to fulfil a small than a great obligation; when exerted with a small than with a great concurring motive; or when exerted against a great than against a small opposing motive.

IV. It is fit that agents equally innocent, meritorious, or guilty, should, respectively, be equally happy or miserable, rather than unequally so.

DEF. Happiness or misery is more equally divided, where each person of a number enjoys or suffers the same portion, than where each has only the same chance: more equally where each has the same chance, than where each has not the same chance.

A being who is less happy or more miserable than it is fit he should be, as his desert and situation are compared with the desert and situation of any other being, suffers injustice.

V. It is more fit that misery should be removed or relieved, than that happiness should be communicated or augmented.

VI. It is more unfit, or less fit, that misery should be inflicted or increased, than that happiness should not be communicated or increased.

VII. Whatever is, in itself, and in all circumstances, fit or unfit to be, is more fit or unfit to be in a great degree, or to a great extent, than in a small degree or to a small extent.

VIII. An effect which is more fit than unfit, is fit; and vice versa.*

IX. In proportion as any action is obligatory on an agent, it is fit, or not unfit, that he should be compelled to perform it: and in proportion as it is obligatory on him not to perform any action, it is fit, or not unfit, that he should be prevented from performing it.

X. Whatever effect is, in itself, fit to be produced, it is obligatory on every agent to act so as it may be produced, - and vice versa of unfit effects.

DEF. The effect of an action is only its effect in so far as it takes place in consequence of that action, and would not take place without it.

XI. An obligation which cannot be fulfilled

* It may be more fit that a being or several beings, should bear a small evil, than miss a great good: and this even where, in the case of a number, the good may fall to some, the evil to others, yet by equal chances.

without the violation of a greater, is, in respect of it, no obligation.

XII. It is obligatory on every moral agent to discover, to the best of his means, all that is obligatory upon him; and how that which is obligatory may be really, truly, and actually performed.

DEF. Virtue is the spontaneous inclination to fulfil moral obligation.

DEF. Depravity is indifference about the fulfilment of moral obligation, or the spontaneous aversion to fulfil it.

XIII. Whatever it is obligatory on an agent to do, or not obligatory upon him not to do, and in the same proportion, he has a right to do, and no one has a right that it should not be done.

XIV. That which it is obligatory on any agent to do to another, that other has a right to have done.

XV. Whatever it is obligatory on an agent not to do, and in the same proportion, he has no right to do, and no one has a right that it should be done.

XVI. Whatever it is obligatory on any agent not to do to another, that other has a right not to have done.

DEF. The doing to any being what he has a right should not be done, or the not doing what he has a right should be done, is an injury.

XVII. When an agent has committed an injury, it is obligatory upon him to make reparation or compensation to the person injured, as well for the injury, as for the evil in the infliction of which the injury consisted.

Though the following propositions on the nature of happiness and misery appear to me necessary truths, they are not properly first principles of morals. But in the demonstration of many practical duties, they must, at all events, be advanced as postulates. - That a being ought to be happy rather than miserable, is a universal truth. If it is the fact that he is made unhappy in being deceived, it follows that he ought not to be deceived ; and this, alike, whether his aversion to being deceived is necessary or implanted.

XVIII. Every being must be so far happier as he obtains what he desires or wishes, so far more miserable as he does not obtain what he desires or wishes.

XIX. Every being must desire to know the truth, and be averse to being deceived.

XX. Every being must desire to be loved, approved, and regarded by other beings; and be averse to be hated, disapproved, or despised by

them.

XXI. Every being must be so far happier as