than one approving malevolent acts, gravely asks us to say "why it might not"*-surely it must be acknowledged that such a theory does not consist with our ordinary apprehensions of the necessary and unchangeable nature of the divine benevolence, or it ought fairly to be maintained that these apprehensions are absurd and groundless.

When, in order to evince the necessity of his supposition of the existence of a moral sense separate from reason, Dr. Hutcheson observes that "a being not possessed of a moral sense would see no propriety in one constitution's being given rather than another;" this is, or may be, just a truism and nothing more; because a moral sense may denote generally the ability to perceive moral distinctions, in whatever that may consist; in which use of the term, the proposition would simply amount to this, - a being who was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, could not discover any thing right in one constitution rather than another. To the same purpose it is to tell us that a being having no desire or wish to promote happiness, would not seek to promote it. The question is, could a rational being be without a moral sense, in this general meaning of a moral

* " Why may not the Deity have something of a superior kind, analogous to our moral sense, essential to him?" The consequences of such a supposition as this, I shall afterwards have occasion to advert to. See page 85.

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sense? Could a being be possessed of reason, and yet not see something right in the promotion of happiness, and wrong in the gratuitous infliction of misery? It is plain that Dr. H., deceiving himself by the ambiguity of the expression moral sense,” has here been led to beg the question. He assumes that a being possessed of reason would, without a superadded sense, be incapable of discerning right from wrong; and the affirmation which he has truly made of a being conceived to be destitute of moral notions altogether, should, in order to serve his argument, have been proved to hold good in the case of a being possessed of reason, but without a superadded moral

sense.

On one occasion, however, Dr. H. discovers at once the necessity he has felt himself to lie under, of admitting the absolute nature of moral distinctions, and the utter contradiction which this notion receives from his theory. And indeed it is to be remarked, that, while the supporters of this system have sometimes seriously endeavoured to repel the charge of its making moral distinctions to be merely relative, as if the establishment of this charge would be fatal to their system, they have, at other times, admitted the relative nature of such distinctions, in almost express terms. Nor does this remark apply only to different writers, but to the same writers in different parts of their works; and its truth, I think, may be amply substantiated by a comparison of various passages quoted or referred to in this work.*

* It is somewhat surprising that Dr. Adam Smith should, in his examination of Dr. Hutcheson's theory, complain that that theory renders moral distinctions merely relative, without perceiving that the objections press with exactly the same force against his own theory.

"Yet surely," Dr. S. observes, " if we saw any man shouting with admiration and applause, at a barbarous and unmerited execution, which some insolent tyrant had ordered, we should not think we were guilty of any great absurdity in denominating this behaviour vicious, and morally evil in the highest degree, though it expressed nothing but depraved moral faculties, or an absurd approbation of this horrid action, as of what was noble, magnanimous, and great. So far from regarding such a construction of mind as being merely something strange, or inconvenient, and not in any respect vicious, or morally evil, we should rather consider it as the very last and most dreadful stage of moral depravity."

Now, what, according to Dr. S.'s theory, is wanting to make this man's conduct quite natural and approvable? Why, merely that he should be surrounded by an assembly of spectators, whose minds should be constituted in the same way with his own; for then there would be that sympathetic agreement in their sentiments, which, according to Dr. S., gives birth to the sentiment of approbation - constitutes all that is meant by being right.

It is not less singular that Sir James Mackintosh (himself a supporter of the hypothesis of a moral sense) should make the same objection to Dr. Smith's theory, which Dr. Smith makes to Dr. Hutcheson's, while he apparently has not considered the objection as valid, or has not stated it to be such, against Dr. Hutcheson. So far as I can discover, the supporters of the sentimental theory have never been able to agree collectively,

In refuting the notion that our ideas of good and evil are derived from positive law, whether human or divine, Dr. H. observes, that "it must first be supposed that there is something in actions which is apprehended absolutely good, and this is benevolence, or a tendency to the public natural happiness of rational agents, and that our moral sense perceives the excellence." A few pages thereafter, we find the following : "If it be here inquired, Could not the Deity have given us a different or contrary determination of mind, viz. to approve actions upon another foundation than benevolence? It is certain there is nothing in this surpassing the natural power of the Deity."

Now can any one avoid perceiving, that, if there is an absolute standard of right and wrong, and if a moral sense can be constituted in two ways, an erroneous moral sense must be as conceivable, in regard to such absolute standard, as an unrighteous divine law; and, if there is absurdity in supposing that the divine law may be the standard of the rectitude of the divine law, is it not equally absurd to suppose that the determinations of a moral sense can be a standard of the truth of those determinations?

The way in which it evidently appears that Dr. Hutcheson and his followers have tried to reconcile, in their own minds, the absolute nature of the or to resolve individually, whether they would admit or deny the absolute nature of moral distinctions.

divine goodness, (which they cannot get over,) with the doctrines of their peculiar theory, is by confounding together as one, the notion of the divine benevolence, and that of the moral goodness of that benevolence. Benevolence is an absolute quality; and, this basis being established, an absolute standard is doubtless provided. But the question necessarily occurs, how comes benevolence to be morally excellent? Benevolence is morally excellent, we are told, because agreeable to our moral sense. But our moral sense may be so formed, that benevolence, instead of appearing excellent, may appear vile and detestable. In this case will our moral sense be wrong, or will benevolence cease to be excellent, or shall we make the one the standard for trying the other, that is, say that benevolence is morally excellent, because our moral sense determines it to be so, and our moral sense determines justly, because it determines benevolence to be morally excellent! Is not this very satisfactory? Let any argument employed * by the supporters of a moral sense, to

* Dr. T. Brown, in touching upon the point now considered, gives up, or at least does not contend for, the absolute nature of right and wrong; and thus, by going a step farther in maintaining absurdity, or a step less in admitting truth, avoids the inconsistency into which Dr. H. has fallen. He shows that unless we had been previously constituted to approve of one kind of actions rather than another, obedience to the Deity would have appeared equally right when his commands