9.38

PREFACE.

WHEREIN consist Right and Wrong? - By what test or criterion may we, in doubtful or disputed cases, determine what is any one's duty or right? - are questions, which, even were the solution of them not often required for practical purposes, must always form a subject of deep philosophical interest.

Moral, or ethical science is, in a confined, but, I believe, more common sense, understood to have regard principally to the private duty of individuals; and, in this way, it is associated, in the minds of many people, with disquisitions on temperance, chastity, truth, honesty, diligence, and the like. But to have an idea of the full interest and importance of the science - (not meaning that the topics now alluded to are uninteresting or unimportant, otherwise than from their triteness and familiarity) - it is necessary to take a wider view of it-as embracing every question of right and wrong every question of what is just - fit

reasonable - fair-proper-that can arise out of any possible relation between one being, or collective number of beings, and another being, or number of beings - from the Deity down to the meanest insect: - every question relating to the just and fair rights, or powers, or privileges, which one being can claim over, or from another. In this way the science of ethics forms a basement, at once, to those of theology, jurisprudence, civil and criminal, and politics, - or all that regards the moral justice of laws and government - human and divine. - Never, perhaps, was there a time, when there was more frequent discussion of points relating to these momentous topics, or more need of all the enlightenment that philosophy can shed upon them; and I cannot help expressing my wonder, by the way, that while men (whether beneficially or not) seem intent on divesting themselves of all the trammels of prescription in political affairs - making truth and reason every thing, authority and custom nothing,

there seems an equal disposition, in religious matters, to make a sacrifice of the plainest dictates of common sense, and the clearest truths of revelation, to the most anile prejudices and superstitions.

The question as to the ultimate criterion of right and wrong, has always been more or less mixed up with the other, and more metaphysical, inquiry, which relates to the nature of the mental operation by which moral distinctions are perceived. Indeed the two questions have, even by some of the most acute inquirers, been treated as one. How this confusion (for such I think it) has arisen, will appear in the course of this work. At present, it is sufficient to notice the fact; and to observe that, even had the two questions been always kept apart, a theory of moral distinctions which did not embrace the consideration of both, could not be viewed but as materially defective. These two questions together may be taken to comprehend all that relates to what is called the Philosophy of Morals.

It is now a good many years, since, partly from

a desultory curiosity, partly from the relation of the subject to my professional pursuits, my attention was attracted to this branch of science. A very cursory examination of existing systems sufficed to create an impression on my mind, that the subject was capable of receiving much additional light. It appeared to me, that, in all the discussions I had seen, wherever what appeared to me the truth was stated, it was stated but indefinitely, and even inaccurately; - that it was scattered over a variety of contending arguments; - and that, to reconcile these, and distinguish, in each, the sound from the unsound, there was room and occasion for a more minute and exact analysis, than had yet been attempted, of the moral perceptions - both in regard to their nature, as mental acts, and their subjects as a species of truth. It seemed to me in short that, if the chief problems in the theory of morals had been solved at all, the true solutions were yet insufficiently distinguished from such as were erroneous: those insufficiently vindicated, these insufficiently exposed: - that, even if upon bases not entirely new, there was scope for a new classification of phenomena; that new junctures and connexions

were required - new harmonies and fittings; in short, a new combination - a new system. It need not then be reckoned a derogation from the value of such a work as this, that it does not offer what might be called a new theory - as meaning that the more considerable of the doctrines maintained are such as have never been stated before. A new theory, in this sense, might, indeed, at this time of day, be safely set down as a false theory. There are few of the more considerable problems in theoretical morality, of which the true solution may not somewhere be found. But truth not established, is truth not known; and he who can distinguish, among a variety of statements pretending to be true, and each having its share of acceptation as true, which is really true may not unfairly claim to rank as a discoverer. Whether I have done this or not, is another question. I now vindicate the purpose - not the execution.

It has always been a favourite mental exercise with me, to examine and compare various processes of reasoning employed on the same subject: - to discern, amid apparent contradiction, when they moved (so to speak) in parallel lines - each