proved by any witnesses, and there were no means of detecting it, yet of their own accord confessed their crimes, and repaired the damages they had caused. It is likewise a consideration not to be overlooked, that the general interest of the nation was promoted by the hope of forgiveness held out to these offenders; the tendency of which would naturally be to render every one, who had privately injured another, more disposed to make compensation, which, without some hope of forgiveness, no one would ever have rendered. Though it may also be doubted, whether those transgressors whose pardon was to be obtained by sacrifice, could be said to be "held guiltless" according to the meaning of the law: which declares respecting every such person, as the reason why he was obliged to offer a victim for the expiation of his guilt, that "he shall bear his iniquity."*

VI. The other passage adduced by Episcopius, in which excision is denounced against presumptuous transgressors, has no reference whatever to the subject of our present inquiry. For this, as we have already remarked, is the case of those who knowingly committed some wrong unobserved by any witnesses; and who were instigated not by contempt of the law, but by criminal desires after the property of others. Such persons were chargeable with sinning "pre

sumptuously" or, as it is literally in the Hebrew, "with a high hand." None were guilty of this crime, but those who, as the words immediately following express, reproached the Lord:"t nor was any one considered as reproaching the Lord, but such as openly cast contempt upon his commands. Abarbinel restricts the crime of sinning with a high hand

**

to those who deny the law to be of divine origin, and that publicly, perversely and deliberately." Abarbinel is followed by Grotius,† who contends that the phrase," he that doeth ought presumptuously" is to be understood of one who obstinately denies the being of a God, or the divine inspiration of the law.' But this subject has been most judiciously illustrated by Maimonides: He sins with a high hand, who casts off shame, and sins openly. Such a person transgresses the law, not merely because he is hurried into forbidden things by the impulse of 'his unbridled passion and corrupt desires, but because he denies the authority of the law, and deter'mines openly to resist it. Whence he is said to ' reproach God: a crime which ought certainly to be 'punished with death. For no person ever commits

this sin without entertaining some opinion which 'subverts the authority of the law.' But such contempt of the law could not be imputed to one who of his own accord confessed an injury which he had privately done to his neighbour, and made compensation for it; although, under the influence of criminal desire for the property of another, he had before violated his conscience and perjured himself by denying the crime.

VII. Nor ought it to be objected that an apostle calls those sins" errors," which were expiated by the victims sacrificed on the annual day of atonement. For those victims were sin offerings; but we are now treating of another kind, namely trespass offerings, or rather of one particular sort of that kind: so that no conclusion can fairly be drawn from one sort of one kind to the whole of the other kind. Sins ex* Ad Num. xv. t Ibid. Moreh Nevoch. P. iii. c. 41 § Heb. ix. 7.

piated by animal sacrifices, the apostle has properly called errors, because this term was descriptive of the far greater number of those transgressions which were so to be expiated. It has also been supposed by Grotius, that the apostle used this word in tenderness for the honour of the high priest. He says:* "Though on the day of atonements all sins were expiated, to which the law had not annexed the 'punishment of death, or excision, yet this writer preferred using the word errors, that he might spare 'the honour of the high priest, who both offered and prayed for himself, and who was not to be pre'sumed to have sinned otherwise than through igno'rance.'-Not to dwell any longer on these things, therefore, I am of opinion that all those, who had privately injured another, and when conscious of their guilt had even denied it with wilful perjury, were allowed the benefit of expiation by a piacular victim, if they should afterwards of their own accord confess their guilt, and make reparation for the injury they had done. This ought not to be thought strange, when it is beyond all doubt that others might avail themselves of sacrificial atonement, who were conscious of their crimes while they were committing them. Such, as I have already remarked, were those who, when solemnly adjured to give evidence concerning any fact of which they had been witnesses, withheld their testimony. And the same may be said of one who violated a Jewish "bondmaid betrothed to "an husband." For though this crime might happen to be committed by one who was uninformed of the espousals, yet the law which directs the expiation of the crime by an animal sacrifice, contains no such

Ad Heb. ix. 7.

provision. And any provision, exception, or limitation, not expressed in the law, cannot without manifest impropriety be introduced in those things, in which, whenever such provision, exception, or limitation is designed, it is explicitly stated in the law itself.

VIII. Thus we have discussed the piacular sacrifices both sin offerings and tresspass offerings. Both these names are sometimes given to the same victim.* If you inquire what was the difference between the crimes themselves, which were designated by these appellations, sins† and trespasses; I reply, that after frequent and diligent consideration, I have not discovered any one thing by which they can be distinguished. Abarbinel § maintains, that a sin is an act which the person who commits it knows to be wrong, and a trespass an act concerning which he is in doubt. But this definition is inaccurate, because it does not comprehend the certain trespass. Aben Ezra || supposes sins to be committed through ignorance of the law, and trespasses from forgetfulness of it. But he gives no proof of either part of this explanation; which also, as he himself observes, excludes the doubtful trespass. No assistance can be derived towards an explanation of the original terms from the corresponding terms employed in the Septuagint version:¶ for it is by no means certain what is the difference between the two Greek words, much less whether there is precisely the same difference between them, as between the two Hebrew words for which they are respectively used. Grotius** supposes a

sin to be a fault of omission, and a trespass a fault of commission; than which nothing can be further from the truth: for the word rendered sin is very often applied to a transgression of a prohibitory precept; as Grotius himself elsewhere observes.* Saubert explains a sin to be an unintentional error, and a trespass an act of wilful and violent wickedness.‡ But this cannot be supported; since a waste or alienation of the sacred things committed through ignorance or mistake, is designated in the law as a trespass. Others understand a sin to have been such an offence against God as was attended with no detriment to men; and trespass to denote an injury done to men. But the advocates of this opinion do not consider, that the same kind of crime, which, whenever it had been fully ascertained, is called sin in the scriptures, ought to have the appellation of trespass whenever there was any doubt of the fact; which, however, must certainly be the case, if those things are true, that we have said concerning the doubtful trespass offering. And indeed, if those things are true, though I find these two terms, sin and trespass, often used in the same sense, yet I should think that the word trespass particularly denoted an offence which either was doubtful to the person guilty of it, whence the doubtful trespass offering; or caused some injury to a neighbour, whence the certain trespass offering: which (if you except polluted Nazarites and lepers, who, as they were to be purged by sin

TR.-This mistaken notion was also entertained by Philo and Josephus; who both represent sin offerings as prescribed for offences of ignorance or incaution, and trespass offerings for deliberate and wilful transgressions. Phil. de Vict. Offerend. Joseph. Antiq. L. iii. c. 10. Vide Roberts. Clav. Pentateuch. p. 404. § Levit. v. 15.