the oblation of victims; and that it was omitted to be denounced for this very reason, because the law made provision for its being averted by sacrifice.

X. In vain, therefore, shall we seek in express threatnings directed against the offenders themselves, for that punishment which was averted from them by piacular sacrifices. But to discover what it was, we must inquire what punishment might have been inflicted upon them, if it had been the will of God to exercise his authority in that way. And that this punishment was no other than death, is evident from the language of God by Moses: "And whatsoever "man there be of the house of Israel, or of the

strangers that sojourn among you, that eateth any "manner of blood; I will even set my face' against "that soul that eateth blood, and will cut him off "from among his people. For the life of the flesh is "in the blood: and I have given it to you upon the "altar to make an atonement for your souls: for it is "the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul." Here, the blood which is said to make an atonement for the soul denotes the blood of the victims; and to make an atonement for the soul is the same as to be a ransom for the soul.* And to be a ransom for the soul is to avert death. This is evident from the following command: "They shall give every man a "ransomt for his soul unto the Lord, that there be

no plague among them." The word plague signifies a pestilence attended with sudden death. We remark further, that to make an atonment for the soul is the same as to make an atonement for the life for the word soul beyond all doubt here signifies the life.

*Exod. xxx. 12. 15, 16.

† rendered by the Septuagint λurga rns Juxus autou.

And what is it to make an atonement for the life, but to preserve the life by averting death? Who does not perceive, that the expression itself clearly conveys this meaning, and rejects every other interpretation? This is the sense invariably attributed to it by Jewish writers, whose language I shall introduce in another place. Nor is it any more to be doubted, why a piacular victim is said to have averted death from a man. It is certainly so described, because it did that which properly belonged to it, that is, because it averted from the offerer the punishment of the sin on account of which it was sacrificed. Hence it follows, that that punishment was death: and consequently piacular victims might be said to suffer vicarious death as well as vicarious punish

ment.

XI. The design of those piacular victims which were offered for the purification of women after childbirth, or in other cases, if there were any, in which there was no sin committed, nor any impurity incurred which could have been avoided, we have already endeavoured to explain. It is only necessary to remark here, that no conclusion can be drawn from those sacrifices, to invalidate the arguments which have just been advanced. For our present inquiry is, not for what reason corporeal impurity, abstracted perhaps from all guilt, was commanded to be purged by sacrifice, but what was the punishment that was averted by those victims which the law directed to be offered for sins properly so called : sins which Crellius himself confesses to have deserved some punishment, which was remitted by God on the oblation of the prescribed sacrifices. This punishment, I say, is the subject of our present investiga

tion, and what it was, has now, I trust, been sufficiently explained.

XII. Our attention is next called to the points of agreement and difference between vicarious punishment, and the punishment of the sinner in his own person. Whoever well understands these, will be at no loss for an answer to all the other objections which may be alleged by the Socinians against what has now been advanced. And to dispatch this subject in a few words, I observe first, that vicarious punishment, and that which is inflicted upon the sinner himself, both arise, though not both in the same way, out of some violated law; so that where there is no violation of any law, there can be no room for either. But both these kinds of punishment tend to maintain reverence for the laws, and both are calculated to show what regard the legislator has for his own laws, and how strictly he would have them observed by others. Of these things no one entertains any doubt in the punishment inflicted on the sinner himself; and no doubt ought to be entertained in vicarious punishment, if it be that without which the supreme judge will not let the offender go unpunished, nor pardon the sin he has committed, lest the facility of obtaining forgiveness should operate as an encouragement to sin.

XIII. But though there are these, and perhaps other, points of agreement between the two kinds of punishment, yet there are many and important points in which they evidently differ. In the first place, it is the punishment of the sinner himself, and not the vicarious punishment of another, which naturally be longs to the sanction of the law, and is included in its obligation. The law binds over to punishment and

pronounces worthy of it, those who have deserved it.* But no one deserves punishment for the crime of another, unless he is a partaker of that crime. The demerit of sin does not naturally extend beyond the sinner himself. Desert belongs to the will; but

nothing is more strictly a man's own, than his will. On 4 tiku lask And the punishment denounced upon the guilty ist. inflicted by virtue of a right arising out of sin committed; for every sin, as we have just remarked, deserves to be punished. But the right by which vicarious punishment is inflicted, rests, either on the sovereignty of the party who punishes, or on the consent of the party who is punished, united with that sovereignty. The latter of these cases is exhibited in Christ, who voluntarily suffered a death appointed for him by God: the former was exemplified in the Jewish piacular victims, which God, exercising his right of sovereignty, commanded to be sacrificed; though the sins of the offerers were the causes of his exercise of that right in this instance.

XIV. The arguments commonly alleged to show that all evils inflicted in virtue of either of these rights, always want the nature of punishment to the party on whom they are inflicted, fail of proving that they want the nature of vicarious punishment; and only prove that they are of a different nature from that punishment which any person suffers for his own sins: which cannot be denied. But to proceed to what remains; the punishment of the offender himself, if it is equal to the crime, cancels the guilt without the interposition of any person's favour, and with its own efficacy annuls the legal obligation to punishment, by suffering that which the obligation required. But

* Deut. xxv. 2. I Sam. xxvi. 16. Luke xii. 48. Rom. i. 32. Rev. xvi. 6.

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vicarious punishment, which exhibits something different from what the obligation requires, has respect, primarily and properly, not to the punitive obligation of the law, but to the will of him who has the right of punishment and of pardon. Hence it is, thạt the punishment inflicted upon the offender himself, which, whenever it is equal to the crime, cancels the guilt without the addition of any person's favour,— this punishment cannot possibly consist with remission of sin. Whereas the contrary is the case in vicarious punishment, which avails nothing without the interposition of his favour, who has the power to punish and pardon; and which is not considered by him in the same light as the punishment of the sinner himself, but only as a condition adapted to maintain a reverence for his law in general, and especially to profit restore the authority of that precept which had been violated, and in some measure weakened, by the crime. Such a condition, as it leaves the sinner's exemption from punishment manifestly dependent on the favour of him who has the right of punishing, is perfectly consistent with remission of sin; unless it be supposed that there is no proper remission, where any condition is required in order to its attainment. But this is so far from the truth, that no remission of sin is promised in the scriptures, except on condition of faith, repentance, and a holy life: a condition which, however, contains nothing inconsistent with that clemency which is displayed in remission of sin. Wherefore, as vicarious punishment prevents not the pardon of the sinner from being entirely dependent on the favour of him who has the right of punishing; it follows, that he may prescribe certain conditions, such as repentance and holiness, without