'from all eternity.'

If nothing can be done, nothing happen, nothing take place which it was 'not certain would be, at a fixed time, what can 'fortune be?'1

'All things, which take place, take place from 'preceding causes: but, if this be so, whatsoever things are done are done by fate.'2 From this 'kind of causes, hanging together from eternity, 'fate is framed (nectitur) by the Stoics.' 3-What Cicero's own sentiments on the subject were, it is not very easy to determine; as he generally puts the sentiments, which he brings forward, into the mouths of the Stoics, or Epicureans, or others: but nothing can be plainer than that, according to all the parties, fate was not the decree of an infinitely wise, just, and good God; and that it was something, when philosophically considered, of a necessary concatenation of causes and effects from eternity, which the Deity could foresce and make known by auguries and divinations, if he chose, but which he did not form, and could not rule, or alter, or prevent: something, one would almost say, antecedent to God, at least to his counsels, plans, and purposes. Now, ought this sentiment, which, stripped of its false colourings, amounts to little better than direct atheism, to be confounded with the most wise and holy counsel, plan, and purpose of God; who could not possibly either decree or do any thing, which, viewed in all its bearings, was not the very best thing that could take place The one reduces the Deity to insignificancy, almost to non-entity: the other considers God as "doing according to his will in the armies

'Id. Ibid.

* Id. de Fato.

3 Idem.

"of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the "earth, and that none can stay his hand, or say to

him, What doest thou?"-It is worthy of notice, that the sacred writers, in speaking on a subject often confounded with the heathen doctrine of a fatal necessity, never once used any of the heathen terms, but adopted another phraseology: Προορίζω, Προγράφω, &c. And likewise that they did not use these words, or any words derived from them, in the manner in which heathen fate was spoken of, as if it were something existing of itself, and by itself, antecedently to the will of any being; but entirely as the purpose and determination of the everlasting, omniscient, infinitely wise, holy, and good Creator and Sovereign of the universe; Declaring the end from the beginning; and "from ancient times the things which are not yet "done; saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will "do all my pleasure.” 2

[Justin, however, does not argue conclusively, even against the doctrine which he opposes: for fatal necessity, however it might restrain, or limit, or disappoint a man, and render his best concerted plans abortive, would not deprive him of free agency; and, unless fate compelled him to be wicked, or the contrary, it would not destroy his responsibility. Whatever any may argue on such subjects, when contending for a system, or combating with an opponent, or seeking an excuse for their crimes; the common sense and consciousness of men in general (even fatalists, ancient and modern,) lead them, on other occasions, to speak and act as free agents, and, often against their

'Dan. iv. 35.

2

Isa. xlvi. 10.

will, to feel that they are responsible to God for their conduct. No fatal necessity, no decree of God, which does not imply invincible compulsion, or deprive men of their natural powers and faculties, or render them wicked by some positive effect; can prevent them from doing good or evil by their own free choice, or conscience from performing her office. And, in almost all the actions of life, the fate, or the decree, being wholly unknown, cannot be the motive of man's conduct, and therefore can be no excuse for it, if bad. I am indeed ready to concede, that Justin would have reasoned nearly in the same way against Christian predestination; but in that case he would have argued still more illogically. Yet at last the question is, not whether we can prove or disprove the doctrine, by our reasonings, or at least think we can; but whether it forms a part of "the "whole counsel of God," made known to us in the holy scriptures.]

'Do you see how God speaks, and what laws he 'lays down? Hear also how Fate speaks, and 'how it lays down contrary laws; and learn 'how the former are declared by a Divine Spirit, 'but the latter by a wicked demon, and a savage 'beast. God has said, " If ye be willing and obedi'ent," making us masters of virtue and wickedness, ' and placing them within our own power. But 'what does the other say? That it is impossible 'to avoid what is decreed by Fate, whether we 'will or not. God says, "If ye be willing ye shall 'eat the good of the land;" but Fate says, Al' though we be willing, unless it shall be permitted

God says, If ye will

'not obey my words, a sword shall devour you : 'Fate says, Although we be not willing, if it shall 'be granted us, we are certainly saved. Does 'not Fate say this? this? What then can be clearer 'than this opposition? What can be more evident than this war which the diabolical teachers of wickedness have thus shamelessly declared against the divine oracles? But, as I have said, 'that demons and men like demons (I mean the Greeks) should believe these things is no won'der; but that you, who were thus enjoying the divine and saving instruction, should despise 'these things and adopt those absurdities which destroy the soul, this is of all things the most grievous.'1

6

Is then heathen fate, and the predetermination of the infinitely wise, just, true, and merciful God, to be confounded by the ministers of Christianity? -The Latin word fatum signifies spoken; and some persons have attempted to shew that it means the mandate or decree of the true God: but here Chrysostom is right. Fate, in this view, was the thing spoken by a wicked demon; and, as such, contrary to the word of God. Predestination, predetermination, decree, counsel, purpose, prediction, appointment, are, expressly and frequently, in scripture, spoken of in respect of the one living and true God; whatever interpretation may be put on the words: and his purposes and decrees cannot be contrary to his commands and promises. -When the things predetermined shall all be accomplished, the consistency will be manifested, to Ref. 458, 459, from Chrysostom.

6

the full satisfaction of all holy intelligences, and to the utter confusion and silencing of all the enemies of God. Fate says, Although we be willing, ' &c.' Christian predestination says no such thing. The decree, especially, implies the purpose of producing by special grace a willing mind to repent, and believe the gospel: they through grace obey 'the calling.' Now all who are willing to obey 'the calling' are made welcome. "Him that "cometh unto me I will in no wise cast out."Chrysostom certainly confounded Christian predestination with heathen fate; and, like many others in every age, in this instance "spake evil of those things which he understood not:" but I am far from imputing bad motives to him. He was a better orator than a theologian, and a mere novice in this controversy. Basnage blames Chrysos'tom for this one thing; for allowing too much 'to human power, and human liberty, in the per'formance of religious actions. The charge is so far just enough, that John Chrysostom, to be sure, did not talk on these subjects like John Calvin, and the rest of the Christian fatalists.' Dr. Jortin.-This minister of our established church either knew, or ought to have known, that Chrysostom's language was equally contrary to that of those articles which he had repeatedly subscribed, as in the sight of God; and that liturgy which he read continually in the solemn worship of God. So learned a man might have known, (if he had searched the scriptures, as accurately as he did the classics,) that Christian predestination, the purpose and decree of infinite wisdom, justice, and