States while he remained at Burgoss. The Spanish court, somewhat awed by this remonstrance, desired Mr. Lee not to proceed farther, and signified that it would be preferred he should return to Paris. It did not how ever suspend communications with him; but the Spanish minister at Paris was instructed to continue on the most friendly footing with the American commissioners. The following note was addressed to the Spanish minister at Madrid, in reply to the communications making known to Mr. Lee the remonstrance of the British court, and the desire of his catholic majesty that he should not proceed to Madrid. "BURGOSS, March 5th, 1777. Upon maturely weighing what his excellency the Duke de Grimaldi had the goodness to communicate from his majesty, Mr. Lee feels himself obliged (notwithstanding his earnest wish to coincide with his majesty's views, and conciliate his amity towards the United States) to beg his attention to the following consider ations. 1st. Were it the question now, whether Mr. Lee being at Paris should come to Madrid, he might do it or not without any material consequence; but it being known that he was deputed upon that business and on his way, his return without going to Madrid will beget an opinion that Spain has renounced the states of America, in refusing to receive their deputy. For the fact of his return being notorious, and the reasons for it necessarily secret, it will make the same impression as if no such reasons existed. This opinion would very materially injure the credit of the United States in France and Holland; and it might have a very unfavourable effect in America, for it must be considered that the fact will reach America by a thousand channels, while the reasons for it can pass through one only, and that too from the nature of things in obscure hints. Mr. Lee therefore, hopes his majesty will weigh these reasons before he finally determines upon a measure which may be deemed ungracious to the congress and be highly detrimental to their interests. 2d. Mr. Lee cannot conceive upon what pretence of reason, right, or law, the English ambassador, or his court can take exception to his majesty's receiving a deputy from the United States, since the right of a neutral court to do so is clearly established by the unquestioned practice of all times, and recognized by the best writers. on the laws of nations. Neither the English ambassador at Paris nor his court, have taken any exception to it there. 3d. That it will be so far from preventing the execution of any gracious intentions his majesty may have of assisting the states, that the best and safest channel of conveying that aid is one from which Mr. Lee's being at Madrid will rather divert, than direct the attention of England. Next to an immediate declaration, a supply of money, to support the credit of the states and pay for what is necessary, is the most effectual aid. The support of this contest calls upon congress for very considerable funds. The means of supporting them by the export of their produce are slow and uncertain. This obliges them to have recourse for assistance to the powers that are friendly to their cause, among whom they have the greatest reliance upon his majesty of Spain. This purpose will be answered by his majesty's ordering his ambassador at the Hague to authorize Sir George Grand of Amsterdam to pay the sum destined to this use, to the order of Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee. Sir G. Grand is fixed upon as one who has been already trusted by the court of France in this business, and on whose attachment we can depend. Mr. Lee must beg leave to await his majesty's pleasure at Burgoss or Victoria, not at Bayonne, because he is persuaded upon reflection that he should incur the highest displeasure of his constituents, if he were to leave Spain without a definite answer to the objects of his mission. ARTHUR LEE, Commissioner Plenipotentiary from the To his excellency the Duke de Grimaldi." Mr. Lee was finally permitted to proceed to Madrid. The author has the original passports from the king of France and from the Spanish minister, Count d'Aranda, with the autographic signatures of Louis the 16th, and his minister Vergennes, and of the Count d'Aranda. They will be found among the MSS. of Mr. Lee, which are deposited, as the reader has been informed, in the library of the university of Cambridge. While Mr. Lee remained at Burgoss corresponding with the Spanish minister on the subject of his proceeding to Madrid, he addressed to his court a memoir, representing "the present state of the dispute between America and Great Britain." It was written to give force to his arguments for the propriety and policy on the part of Spain, of receiving a commissioner from the United States, and entering into a diplomatic intercourse with them. It is a striking specimen of the diplomatic skill and ability of Mr. Lee. It was composed by him in the Spanish language. The author has the original MS. in that language, with the translation by Mr. Lee which is here used. "To his Excellency the Duke de Grimaldi. The present state of the dispute between America and Great Britain does not seem to be so fully understood as to render a clear representation of it unnecessary. America has declared herself independent: and has defeated all the efforts of Great Britain to reduce her during two campaigns. In this resistance she has stood hitherto alone and unassisted. Her infant and unprepared situation has been compensated by her ardour, her indignation, and her enthusiasm. Great Britain however is determined to redouble her efforts to make this campaign decisive of the fate of America. In this situation America offers that commerce and friendship, which she has withdrawn from Great Britain, to France and Spain. This offer ought to be deemed of double value, because it will take from their hated rival and insolent foe, what it gives to them. It is therefore taken for granted that this is an object of the first magnitude, and worthy of the highest attention of both these courts. It is also taken for granted, that Spain and France do not wish Great Britain should prevail in this contest; or regain America by conquest or conciliation. There remains therefore but this single question, whether it be more politic for the two powers to accept the proffered alliance and declare immediately; or await the event of the next campaign. To judge of this it will be necessary to consider what may be the probable event of the next campaign. As Great Britain has resolved to put forth her utmost strength, it is probable that the event will be either the total destruction of America, or an accommodation founded upon a mutual conviction of each other's strength. And this accommodation must be hastened by America being left destitute of any material assistance from Europe. It is manifest that the neutrality of France and Spain leaves the field open to the operation of the British force, and to the production of one of those events, either of which must be highly prejudicial to both nations, and advantageous to their enemy. If Great Britain should be victorious, America will become a powerful instrument in her hands to be wielded at her will against these countries; and that it will not remain long unemployed no one will doubt who knows that the court of Great Britain is well informed of the countenance at least given to what they call a most dangerous rebellion, and that the head of that court is of a temper that never forgives nor forgets. If an accommodation should produce a reunion the same advantages will be lost; and almost the same consequences are to be feared. The end of the campaign cannot, therefore, promise so favourable a moment for the interposition of France and Spain as the present; and in all human conjecture it will then be fruitless. In truth what moment can be wished more favourable than the present, when Great Britain is so equally matched by what were her colonies, that the scales hang doubt ful; nor can it be questioned that the interposition of France or Spain, and much more of both, would make that of America decidedly preponderate and separate her from Great Britain forever. And what object can be of more importance than to deprive her of this great and growing source of her commerce, her wealth, her marine, and her dominion. There is nothing the court of Great Britain is more persuaded of, than that the loss of America would be the inevitable consequence of the war in Europe; nor is there a man in the nation, who is ignorant of it. Hence it is that the king finds himself obliged in all his speeches to assure his parliament of the tranquillity of Europe, that they may be emboldened to support his war against America. Hence too it is that they have laboured so much to prevent a rupture between Spain and Portugal, and have at length renounced the latter. It is therefore most certain that Great Britain would endure any insult short of an open and outrageous act of hostility, rather than engage in an European war during her contest with America. During the last war America contributed 12,000 seamen and 20,000 troops to the assistance of Great Britain. These are now tripled against her. The commerce of America, according to the declaration of Mr. Pitt who conducted the last war, carried Great Britain triumphantly through it. The full tide of that commerce is now turned against her. From America all the expeditions against the islands of Spain and France were then supplied. Now those supplies are all ready to assist in seizing her islands. Deprived of all those aids which ministered to her success and her triumphs during the last war, what could prevent her now from experiencing the bitter reverse of her former fortune. What policy can withhold two sovereigns whose prosperity is incompatible with her power, to forego such an opportunity of humbling her as may never return. If Great Britain should be again united to America by conquest or conciliation, it would be in vain to menace her with war. America has been felt like Hercules in |