Christ is not the Son of God by derivation. Creation and derivation are words of different import; and they require different acts of power. Creation is the production of something out of nothing. Derivation is the production of something from something already existing. Matter was created. The human body

was derived from this substance. The human race have derived their nature ultimately from the parents of all living. All the properties of their natures are similar to those of their progenitors. If their parents had a beginning of existence, if they were dependent and were limited in all their faculties, their descendants are exactly like them in all these particulars. The nature they derived is exactly similar to that, from which they derived it. A stream is of the same nature as its fountain. Every production is of the same nature, i. e. possesses the same essential properties, as those from which they are produced. In this manner derivation applies to almost every thing, which falls under our notice.

If Christ derived his nature from the Father, he possesses the same kind of nature, the same essential properties, which the Father possesses. If the Father be eternal, self-existent, independent, infinite in power, knowledge and wisdom, the derived Son must also be eternal, self-existent, independent, infinite in power, knowledge and wisdom. This derived Being is a distinct and separate existence from the Father. As he possesses all divine attributes, he is a divine Being. As he possesses a nature separate from, and independent of, the Father, he and the Father are two distinct gods. As this natural conclusion is false, it is presumed that the doctrine of divine derivation is

not true.

It is in vain to say, all divine attributes may be derived except eternity and self-existence. If the Son, by derivation be divine, he possesses divine attributes. If he possess not divine attributes, he is not divine. Take from him any one divine property, and

his divinity ceases. Take from him his eternity and self-existence, and it is harder to conceive of his divinity, than it is to conceive of a plurality in the divine nature. It is hard to conceive divine attributes blended in the same nature with finite properties. It is hard to conceive almighty power in a dependent existence; to conceive infinite knowledge, or any other quality infinite in its nature, subsisting in a nature, which has had a temporary existence.

When creatures receive existence by derivation, they, from whom they are derived, communicate a portion of their own substance. They suffer a diminution of themselves; and the diminution would continue, if they did not receive supplies, from external substance. If Christ derived his nature from the Father, the Father communicated a part of his own nature, a part of his own substance. He would suffer a privation of a part of his attributes, a part of his nature. There would be a chasm in the divine Spirit, which could not be filled. There would be an essential defect in the Father. The derived extract would be dependent; and the original Source of being would be diminished. Of course, the Son would be a dependent, and the Father a finite being.

Divine nature, or divine attributes are not communicable. God cannot impart one quality of his mind; nor can one divine quality be derived from him. If a human or an angelic spirit be produced, it is the effect of divine energy; it is not a communication of divine qualities. A created mind is similar, in some respects, to the divine Mind; but, in degree, it bears no comparison. Holiness in the human heart is not a derivation of divine holiness; but it is the effect of divine operation upon the mind. There is an essential difference between originating existence, and communicating that which already exists.

The divine nature is eternal; and it is necessary in its existence. As it had no cause of its existence, there is no cause, which can destroy its existence. As

it is impossible that it should not exist, it is impossible that it should exist otherwise than it does. If its attributes are infinite, it is impossible it should exist with a diminution or relinquishment of any of its attri butes. It is not derogatory to the Deity, to be incapable of change; to be incapable of imperfection. Admitting these principles, it is impossible that God should communicate his nature or his attributes; and it is equally impossible that they should be derived from him. Should he communicate almighty power, infinite wisdom, infinite knowledge and independence, he would become entirely destitute of these attributes. Or rather, a transference of divine attributes, (suppos ing it possible) would not destroy them; and being again united, they would constitute the same divine Being; and of course there would be no communication, nor derivation. If it be supposed that Jesus Christ derived divine attributes from the Father in only a limited degree, the supposition is inconsistent. In the first place, divine nature is incapable of division, or separation, or of communication of any part of itself. In the second place, if a partial communication were made, the consequence would be different from that, which is contemplated by the supposition. If it were possible that Christ derived a finite nature and finite attributes from the Father, he would not be divine. There is no perceptible difference between finite properties and the properties of creatures. Divine attributes are infinite; or they are in the highest possible degree. Attributes less than these are not divine. Should we speak of divine, dependent power; of a divine, finite knowledge; of a divine, limited presence; of a divine, temporary existence; we should pervert, we should torture language. If we had ideas on this subject, it is certain that such a combination, such a contrariety of words would not convey them.

If Christ has his nature by derivation from the Father, there was a period in eternity, in which he had not existence. It was owing to the will of the

Father that he was brought into being. It is, of course, owing to his will that he is continued in existence. For the same power, which produced him, can return him to his original state. He is, consequently, entirely dependent on the Father. If he be not eternal; if he be not independent, it is impossible he should possess other divine attributes. It is a contradiction to say that a dependent being possesses almighty power. It appears to be impossible that a being of only a temporary existence should possess infinite knowledge. It is impossible there should be infinite wisdom where knowledge is limited. A dependent being cannot be, in his own nature, unchangeable. Within these limitations it is impossible that a being should be omnipresent, and be capable of holding the reins of universal government. After the closest investigation of the nature of a Son, derived from the Father, (if such a thing were possible) it will clearly appear that he has not one divine attribute, nor the least degree of divine nature.

It is in vain to attempt to supply the innate deficiency of this derived Son, by constituting him God's agent, and by anointing him with the Spirit without measure; and by investing him with divine fulness. If Christ was only appointed or constituted Creator of the world; if the Father employed him as an instrument, through whom he exercised his own power, Christ was not the actual Creator of the world; and the glory of the work would not be due to him. If Christ was constituted a Prince; and he was a Prince on this ground only, he had no native regal dignity, nor regal authority. He acted only under a commission; and he, who granted the commission could, at any time, withdraw it. This constituted agent would not be entitled to those honors, to which the Father, who constituted him, would be entitled. There would be the same difference in their claims, as there would be in the claims of an actor and an instrument. If his claims to princely honors rise solely from God's

requiring that they should honor the Son even as they honor the Father, it is difficult to understand in what sense God is jealous for the honor of his name; and that he will not give his glory to another. If Christ is Judge, only because he is constituted to that office, then he does not possess inherent qualifications for that station, he is merely the organ, through which the Father acts; and the judgment rendered is not properly that of the Son, but that of the Father. If Christ is a Savior, merely on the ground of a constituted character, or merely because he was appointed to that office, he would be only an ostensible Savior; the Father would be the real Savior.

If the Son was divine, on the ground of his derivation from the Father, there would be no need of constituting him to fill divine offices; to sustain divine titles; to perform divine works. There would be no need of making divine communications to him for these purposes. He would be competent in his own nature to fill the highest offices; to claim the highest honors; and to do the greatest works. If extraordinary divine communications are necessary to qualify him for these things, it follows that he is not divine.

If Christ's superior excellence and dignity arises not from his nature, but from the communications, which the Father made to him, it is difficult to draw a line of distinction between him and the prophets. God endued Moses with an extraordinary degree of power, by which he exhibited signs and wonders before Pharaoh. But who actually wrought these miracles? When God called Moses to send him to the king of Egypt; and he hesitated to go, God said unto him, "I will stretch out my hand and smite Egypt with all my wonders, which I will do in the midst thereof." The power, which God communicated to Moses for this purpose, did not become a property of Moses' nature, any more than it became the property of the rod, which he carried, wherewith, God said, he should do signs. Moses never pretended to act by his own