perils and miseries, if they should fall upon them, for that nothing ever made their case so ill, as the doubt of the greatness of Spain; which adding reason of state, and matter of conscience and religion, doth whet the laws against them; and this cause also seemeth, in some cort, to return again at this time, except the clemency of his Majesty and the state do superabound. As for my part, I wish it should, and, that the proceedings towards them may rather tend to security, and providence, and point of state, than to persecution for religion.

But to conclude, these things, briefly touched, may serve as in a subject conjectural, and future, for to represent, how just cause of fear this kingdom may have towards Spain, omitting, as I said before, all present and more secret occurrention.

The third ground of a war with Spain I have set down to be a just fear of the subversion of our church and religion, which needeth little speech; for, if this war be a defensive, as I have proved it to be, no man will doubt, that a defensive war, against a foreigner, for religion is lawful; of an offensive war there is no dispute; and yet, in that instance of the war for the Holy Land and Sepulchre, I do wonder sometimes, that the schoolmen want words to defend that, which St. Bernard wanted words to commend; but I, that, in this little extract of a treatise, do omit things necessary, am not to handle things unnecessary; no man, I say, will doubt, but, if the Pope, or King of Spain, would demand of us to forsake our religion, upon pain of a war, it were as unjust a demand, as the Persians made to the Grecians, of land and water, or the Ammonites to the Israelites, of their right eyes; and we see all the Heathens did still their defensive war pro aris & focis, placing their altars before their hearths; so that it is in vain of this to speak further, only this is true, that the fear of the subversion of our religion from Spain is the more just, for that all other catholick princes and states content and contain themselves, to maintain their religion within their own dominions, and meddle not with the subjects of other states; whereas the practice of Spain hath been, both in Charles the Fifth's time, in Germany, and, in the time of the league, in France, by war, and now, with us, by conditions of treaties, to intermeddle with foreign states, and to declare themselves projectors-general of the party of catholicks through the world, as if the crown of Spain had a title of this, that they would plant the Pope's law by arms, as the Ottomans do the law of Mahomet. Thus much concerning the first main point of justifying the quarrel, if the King shall enter into a war; for this that I have said, and all that followeth to be said, is but to shew what he may do. The second main part of that I have propounded to speak of, is the balance or forces between Spain and us; and this also tendeth to no more but what the King may do, for what he may do is of two kinds, what he may do as just, and what he may do as possible; of the one I have already spoken, of the other I am now to speak. I said Spain was no such giant, and yet, if he were a giant, it will be but as it was between David and Goliah, for God is on our side. But to leave all arguments that are supernatural, and to speak in an human and politick sense, I am led to think that Spain is no over-match for Eng

land, by that which leadeth all men, that is, experience and reason; and with experience I will begin, for there all reason beginneth. Is it fortune, shall we think, that in all actions of war, or arms, great and small, which have happened these many years, ever since Spain and England have had any thing to debate one with the other, the English upon all encounters, have perpetually come off with honour, and with the better? It is not fortune sure, she is not so constant: There is somewhat in the nations and natural courage of the people, or some such thing. I will make a brief list of the particulars themselves, in an historical truth, no ways stretched nor made greater by language. This were a fit speech, you will say, for a general, in the head of an army, when they are going to battle; yes, and it is no less fit speech to be spoken in the head of a council upon a deliberation of an entrance into a war; neither speak I this to disparage the Spanish nation, whom I take to be of the best soldiers in Europe. But that sorteth to our honour, if we still have had the better hand. In the Year 1578, was that famous Lammas-Day which buried the reputation of Don John of Austria, himself not surviving long after: Don John, being superior in forces, assisted by the prince of Parma, Mondragon, Mansell, and other the best commanders of Spain, confident of victory, charged the army of the states near Rimenant, bravely and furiously at the first, but, after a fight maintained by the space of a whole day, was repulsed, and forced to a retreat, with great slaughter of his men, and the course of his farther enterprizes, wholy arrested; and this chiefly by the prowess and virtue of the English and Scottish troops, under the conduct of Sir John Norris and Sir Robert Steward, colonels, which troops came to the army but the day before, harrassed with a long and wearisome march. And, as it is left for a memorable circumstance in all stories, the soldiers, being more sensible of a little heat of the sun, than of any cold fear of treaty, cast away their armour and garments from them, and fought in their shirts; and, as it was generally conceived, had it not been that the count of Bosse was slack in charging the Spaniards upon their retreat, this fight had turned to an absolute defeat; but it was enough to chastise Don John for his insidious treaty of peace, wherewith he had abused the states at his first coming. And the fortune of the day, besides the testimony of all stories, may be ascribed to the service of the English and Scottish, by comparison of this charge near Rimenant, where the English and Scottish, in great numbers, came in action, with the like charge given by Don John, half a year before at Guyllours, where the success was contrary, there being at that time in the army but a handful of English and Scottish, and put in disaray by the horsemen of their own fellows.

The first dart of war, which was thrown from Spain or Rome upon the realm of Ireland, was in the year 1580; for the design of Stuckley blew over into Africk, and the attempt of Sanders and Fitz Morris had a spice of madness. In that yearIreland was invaded by Spanish and Italian forces, under the Pope's banner and the conduct of St. Josepho, to the number of seven-hundred, or better, which landed at Smerwicke in Kerry. A poor number it was to conquer Ireland to

the Pope's use, for their design was no less, but, withal, they brought arms for five-thousand men above their own company, intending to arm so many of the rebels of Ireland; and their purpose was to fortify in some strong place of the wild and desolate country, and that to nestle till greater succours came, they being hastened upon this enterprise upon a special reason of state not proper to the enterprise itself, which was by the invasion of Ireland, and the noise thereof, to trouble the council of England, and to make a certain diversion of certain aids that were then preparing from hence for the Low-Countries. They chose a place where they erected a fort, which they called the Fort del Or, and froin thence they bolted like beasts of the forest, sometimes into the woods and fastnesses, and sometimes back again to their den. Soon after, siege was laid to the fort by the Lord Gray, then deputy, with a smaller number than those were within the fort, venturously indeed, but haste was made to attack them before the rebels came in to them. After the siege of four days only, with two or three sallies, with loss on that part, they, that should have made good the fort for some months, till new succours came from Spain, or at leat from the rebels of Ireland, yielded up themselves without conditions, at the end of those four days; and for that there were not in the English army enough to keep every man a prisoner; and for that also the deputy expected instantly to be assailed by the rebels, and again there was no barque to throw them into, and send them away by sea, they were all put to the sword, with which Queen Elisabeth was afterwards much displeased.

In the year 1582, was that memorable retreat of Ghent, than the which there hath not been an exploit of war more celebrated; for, in the true judgment of men of war, honourable retreats are no ways inferior to brave charges, as having less of fortune, more of discipline, and as much of valour. There were to the number of three hundred horse, and many thousand foot, English, commanded by Sir John Norris, charged upon an advantage taken by the prince of Parma coming upon them with seven-thousand horses; besides that, the whole army of the Spaniards was ready to march on. Nevertheless, Sir John Norris maintained a retreat without disaray by the space of some miles, part of the way champaign, unto the city of Ghent, with less loss of men than the enemy: The Duke of Anjou, and the Prince of Orange, beholding this noble action from the walls of Ghent, as in a theatre, with great admiration.

In the year 1585, followed the prosperous expedition of Drake and Carlisle into the West-Indies. In which I set aside the taking of St. Jago and St. Domingo in Hispaniola, as surprises rather than encounters. But that of Carthagena, where the Spaniards had warning of our coming, and had put themselves in their full strength, was one of the hottest services and most dangerous assaults hath been known, for the access to the town was only by a neck of land between the sea on the one part, and the harbour-water or minor-şea on the other, fortified clean over a strong rampart barricado, so as upon the ascent of our men they had both great ordnance and small shot that thundered and showered upon them from the rampart in front, and from the

gallies that lay at sea in flank; and yet they forced the passage, and won the town, being likewise very well manned. As for the expedition of Sir Francis Drake in the year 1587, for the destroying of the Spanish shipping and provision upon their own coast, as I cannot say that there intervened in that enterprise any sharp fight or encounter, so nevertheless it did straightly discover, either that Spain is very weak at home, or very slow to move, when they suffered a small fleet of English to make an hostile invasion or incursion upon their havens and roads from Cadiz to Cape Sacre, and thence to Cascous, and to fire, sink, and carry away at the least ten-thousand ton of their greater shipping, besides fifty or sixty of their smaller vessels, and that in the sight and under the favour of their forts, and almost under the eye of their great admiral, the best commander of Spain by Sea, the Marquis de Santa Cruce, without ever being disputed with by any fight of importance. I remember Drake, in the vaunting stile of a soldier, would call this enterprise the singeing of the King of Spain's beard. The enterprise of 88, deserveth to be stood upon a little more fully being a miracle of time. There arrived from Spain, in the year 1588, the greatest navy that ever swam upon the seas; for, tho' there have been far greater fleets for number, yet the bulk and building of the ships, with the furniture of great ordnance and provisions, never the like. The design was not to make an invasion only, but an utter conquest of this kingdom. The number of vessels were one-hundredthirty, whereof galleasses and galleons seventy-two goodly ships, like floating towers or castles, manned with thirty-thousand soldiers and mariners. This navy was the preparation of five whole years at the least; it bare itself also upon divine assistance, for it received special blessing from Pope Sixtus, and was assigned as an apostolical mission for the reducement of this kingdom to the obedience of the see of Rome. And, in further token of this holy warfare, there were, amongst the rest of these ships, twelve called by the names of the twelve apostles. But it was truly conceived that this kingdom of England could never be overwhelmed, except the land-waters came in to the sea-tides: Therefore, was there also in readiness in Flanders a mighty army of land forces, to the number of fifty-thousand veteran soldiers, under the conduct of the Duke of Parma, the best commander, next the French King, the fourth of his time. These were designed to join with forces at sea, there being prepared a number of flat-bottom boats, to transport the land forces, under the wing and protection of the great navy, for they made no other account, but that the navy should be absolutely master of the seas. Against these forces, there were prepared on our part, to the number of near one-hundred ships, not of so great bulk in deed, but of a more nimble motion, and more serviceable, besides a less fleet of thirty ships, for the custody of the narrow seas. There were also in readiness at land two armies, besides other forces, to the number of ten-thousand, dispersed amongst the coast towns, in the southern parts; the two armies were appointed, one of them consisting of twenty-five-thousand horse and foot, for the repulsing of the enemy, at their landing, and the other of thirty-five thousand, for safeguard and attendance about the court, and the Queen's person. There

were also other dormant musters of soldiers, throughout all parts of the realm, that were put in readiness, but not drawn together. The two armies were assigned to the leading of two generals, noble persons; but both of them rather courtiers, and assured to the state, than martial men, yet loved and assisted, with subordinate commanders, of great experience and valour.

The fortune of the war made this enterprise, at first, a play at base : The Spanish navy set forth out of the Groyne in May, and was dispersed and driven back by weather: Our navy set forth somewhat later out of Plymouth, and bare up towards the coast of Spain, to have fought with the Spanish navy; and partly upon advertisement, that the Spaniards were gone back, and upon some doubt also, that they might pass by towards the coast of England, while we were seeking them afar off, returned likewise into Plymouth, about the middle of July. At that time, came more constant advertisement, though false, not only to the lord admiral, but to the court, that the Spaniards could not possibly come forwards that year; whereupon our navy was upon the point of disbanding, and many of our men gone a-shore. At that very time, the invincible Armada (for so it was called, in a Spanish ostentation, throughout Europe) was discovered upon the western coast: It was a kind of surprise, for that, as we said, many of our men were gone on land, and our ships ready to depart. Nevertheles, the admiral, with such ships only, as could suddenly be put in readiness, made forth towards them; insomueh as, of onehundred ships, there came scarce thirty to work. Howbeit, with them, and such as came duly in, we set upon them, and gave them the chace. But the Spaniards, for want of courage, which they called Commission, declined the fight, casting themselves continually into roundels, the strongest ships walling in the rest, and in that manner, they made a flying march, towards Calais. Our men, by the space of five or six days, followed them close, fought with them continually, made great slaughter of their men, took two of their great ships, and gave divers others of their ships their deaths wounds, whereof soon after they sank, and perished, and, in a word, distressed them, almost in the nature of a defeat, we ourselves, in the mean time, receiving little or no hurt. Near Calais the Spaniards anchored, excepting their land forces, which came not. It was afterwards alledged, that the Duke of Parma did artificially delay his coming; but this was but an invention, and pretension, given out by the Spaniards, partly upon a Spanish envy, against the Duke, being an Italian, and his son a competitor to Portugal, but chiefly to save the monstrous scorn and disreputation, which they and their nation received by the success of that enterprise; therefore, their colours and excuses forsooth were, that their general by sea had a limited commission, not to fight, until the land forces were come in to them, and that the Duke of Parma had particular reaches, and ends of his own, under hand, to cross the design. But it was both a strange commission, and a strange obedience to a commission, for men, in the midst of their own blood, and being so furiously assailed, to hold their hands, contrary to the laws of nature and necessity. And as for the Duke of Parma, he was