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own wisdom, He judges to be done concerning the acts of his rational creatures.

V. There is [extra] out of God no inwardly-moving cause of his will; nor out of Him is there any end. But the creature, and its action or passion, may be the outwardly-moving cause, without which God would supersede or omit that volition, or act of willing.

VI. But the cause of all other things is God, by his understanding and will, by means of his power or capability; yet so, that when He acts either through his creatures, with them or in them, He does not take away the peculiar mode of acting or of suffering which He has divinely placed within them; and that He suffers them according to their peculiar mode to produce their own effects, and to receive in themselves the acts of God, either necessarily, contingently, or freely. As this contingency and liberty do not make the prescience of God to be uncertain, so they are not destroyed by the volition of God, and by the certain futurition of events with regard to the understanding of God.

DISPUTATION XIX.

ON THE VARIOUS DISTINCTIONS OF THE WILL OF GOD.

I. THOUGH the will of God be one and simple, yet it may be variously distinguished, from its objects, in reference to the mode and order according to which it is borne towards its objects: Of these distinctions the use is important in the whole of the Scriptures, and in explaining many passages in them.

II. 1. The will of God is borne towards its object either according to the mode of nature, or that of liberty: In reference to the former, God tends towards his own primary, proper, and adequate object, that is, towards himself. But according to the mode of Liberty, He tends towards other things,-and towards all other things by the liberty of exercise, and towards many by the liberty of specification; because He cannot hate things, so far as they have some likeness of God, that is, so far as they are good; though He is not necessarily bound to love them, since he might reduce them to nothing whenever it seemed good to Himself.

III. 2. The will of God is distinguished into that by which He absolutely wills to do any thing or to prevent it; and into that by which He wills something to be done or omitted by his rational creatures: The former of these is called "the will of his good pleasure," or rather "of his pleasure;" and the latter," that

[signi] of his open intimation." The latter is revealed, for this is required by the use to which it is applied: The former is partly revealed, partly secret or hidden. The former employs a power that is either irresistible, or that is so accommodated to the object and subject as to obtain or insure its success, though it was possible for it to happen otherwise. To these two kinds of the Divine Will is opposed the remission of the will, that is, a two-fold permission, the one opposed to the will of open intimation, the other to that of good pleasure. The former is that by which God permits something to the power of a rational creature, by not circumscribing some act by a law. The latter is that by which God permits something to the will and [potentia] capability of the creature, by not placing an impediment in its way by which the act may in reality be hindered.

IV. Whatever things God wills to do, He wills them (1.) either from himself, not on account of any other cause placed beyond Him, (whether that be without the consideration of any act perpetrated by the creature, or solely from the occasion of the act of the creature,) (2.) or on account of a preceding cause afforded by the creature. In reference to this distinction, some work is said to be " proper to God," some other " extraneous, strange and foreign." But there is a two-fold difference in those things which He wills to be done: For they are pleasing and acceptable to God, either in themselves, as in the case of moral works; or they please accidentally and on account of some other thing, as in the case of things ceremonial.

V. 3. The will of God is either peremptory, or with a condition. (1.) His peremptory will is that which strictly and rigidly obtains: Such as the words of the Gospel which contain the last revelation of God, "The wrath of God abides on him who does not believe." "He that believes shall be saved." Also the words of Samuel to Saul, “The Lord hath rejected thee from being king over Israel." (2.) His will with a condition is that which has a condition annexed; whether it be a tacit one, such as, "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown." "Cursed is every one

that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them :" That is, unless he be delivered from this curse, as it is expressed in Gal. iii, 13. See also Jer. xviii, 7-10.

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VI. 4. One will of God is absolute, another respective. His absolute will is that by which He wills any thing simply, without regard to the volition or act of the creature; such as is that about the salvation of believers. His respective will is that by which He wills something with respect to the volition or the act of the

'creature. It is also either antecedent or consequent. (1.) The antecedent is that by which He wills something with respect to the subsequent will or act of the creature, as, "God wills all men to be saved if they believe." (2.) The consequent is that by which He wills something with respect to the antecedent volition or act of the creature, as, "Woe to that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed! Better would it have been for that man if he had never been born!" Both depend on the absolute will, and according to it each of them is regulated.

VII. 5. God wills some things so far as they are good, when absolutely considered according to their nature. Thus He wills almsgiving; and to do good to man so far as he is his creature. He also wills some other things so far as, all circumstances considered, they are understood to be good. According to this will, He says to the wicked man, "What hast thou to do, that thou shouldest take my covenant in thy mouth ?" And he speaks thus to Eli: "Be it far from me that thy house, and the house of thy father, should walk before me for ever: For, them that honour me I will honour, and they that despise me shall be lightly esteemed."-This distinction does not differ greatly from the antecedent will of God, which has been already mentioned.

VIII. 6. God wills some things per se, or per accidens. Of themselves, He wills those things which are simply and relatively good: Thus he wills salvation to that man who is obedient. Accidentally, those things which in some respect are evil, but have a good joined with them, which God wills more than the respective good things that are opposed to those evil: Thus He wills the evils of punishment; because he chooses that the order of justice be preserved in punishment, rather than that a sinning creature should escape punishment, though this impunity might be for the good of the creature.

IX. 7. God wills some things in their antecedent causes, that is, He wills their causes [secundum quod] relatively, and [sic ordinat] places them in such order that effects may follow from them; and if they do follow, He wills that they of themselves be pleasing to Him. God wills other things in themselves. This distinction does not substantially recede from that by which the divine will is distinguished into absolute and respective.

COROLLARIES.

I. Is it possible for two affirmatively contrary volitions of God to tend towards one object which is the same and uniform? We answer in the negative.

II. Can one volition of God, that is, one formally, tend towards contrary objects? We reply, It can tend towards objects physically contrary, but not towards objects [ethicè] morally contrary.

III. Does God will, as an end, something which is [extra] beyond himself, and which does not proceed from his free will? We reply in the negative.

DISPUTATION XX.

ON THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD WHICH COME TO BE CONSIDERED UNDER HIS WILL. AND, FIRST, ON THOSE WHICH HAVE AN ANALOGY ΤΟ THE AFFECTIONS OR PASSIONS IN RATIONAL CREATURES.

I. THOSE attributes of God ought to be considered, which are either properly or figuratively attributed to Him in the Scriptures, according to a certain analogy of the affections and virtues in rational creatures.

II. Those divine attributes which have the analogy of affections, may be referred to two principal kinds: So that the first class may contain those affections which are simply conversant about good or evil, and which may be denominated primitive affections; and the second may comprehend those which are exercised about good and evil in reference to their absence or presence, and which may be called affections derived from the primitive.

III. The primitive affections are Love, (the opposite to which is Hatred,) and Goodness; and with these are connected Grace, Benignity and Mercy. Love is prior to Goodness towards the object, which is God himself: Goodness is prior to Love towards that object which is some other than God.

IV. Love is an affection of union in God; whose objects are not only God himself and the good of justice, but also the creature, [referens Deum,] imitating or related to God either according to [imaginem] likeness, or only according to [vestigium] impress, and the felicity of the creature. But this affection is borne onwards either to enjoy and to have, or to do good; the former is called "the love of complacency;" the latter, "the love of friendship,” which falls into goodness. God [complacet sibi] loves himself with complacency in the perfection of his own nature, wherefore He likewise enjoys himself. He also loves himself with the love of complacency in his effects produced [ad extra] externally; both in acts and works, which are specimens and evident, infallible indications of that perfection. Wherefore He

may be said in some degree likewise to enjoy these acts and works. Even the justice or righteousness performed by the creature, is pleasing to Him; wherefore His affection is extended to have it.

V. Hatred is an affection of separation in God; whose primary object is injustice or unrighteousness; and the secondary, the misery of the creature: The former is from "the love of complacency;" the latter, from "the love of friendship." But since God properly loves himself and the good of justice, and by the same impulse holds iniquity in detestation; and since he secondarily loves the creature and his blessedness, and in that impulse hates the misery of the creature, that is, He wills it to be taken away from the creature; hence it comes to pass, that He hates the creature who perseveres in unrighteousness, and He loves his misery.

VI. Hatred, however, is not collateral to Love, but necessarily flowing from it; since Love neither does nor can tend towards all those things which [objiciuntur] become objects to the understanding of God. It belongs to Him therefore in the first act, and must be placed in Him prior to any existence of a thing worthy of hatred; which existence being laid down, the act of hatred arises from it by a natural necessity, not by liberty of the will.

VII. But since Love does not perfectly fill the whole will of God, it has Goodness united with it; which also is an affection in God of communicating his good.-Its First object [ad extra] externally is nothing; and this is so necessarily first, that, when it is removed, no communication can be made externally: Its act is creation. Its Second object is the creature as a creature; and its act is called Conservation, or Sustentation, as if it was a continuance of creation.-Its Third object is the creature performing his duty according to the command of God; and its act is the elevation to a more worthy and felicitous condition, that is, the communication of a greater good than that which the creature obtained by creation. Both these [progressus] advances of Goodness may also be appropriately denominated "Benignity," in Hebrew Dл, or "Kindness."-Its Fourth object is the creature not performing his duty, or sinful, and on this account liable to misery according to the just judgment of God; and its act is a deliverance from sin through the remission and the mortification of sin: And this progress of Goodness is denominated Mercy, which is an affection for giving succour to a man in misery, sin [nihil obstante] presenting no obstacle.

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VIII. Grace is a certain adjunct of Goodness and Love, by which is signified that God is affected to communicate his own good and to love the creatures, not through merit or of debt, not

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