and the aid of preservation, which God is not bound to bestow on the soul.

IX. But the immortality of the body is entirely supernatural and accidental: For it can be taken away from the body, and the body can return to the dust from which it was taken. Its excellence above other living creatures, and its peculiar fitness to produce various effects, are natural to it and essential. Its dominion over the creatures which belongs to the whole man as consisting of body and soul, may be partly considered as belonging to it according to the excellence of nature, and partly as conferred upon it by gracious gift: Of which dominion this seems to be [signum] an evidence, that it is never taken wholly away from the soul, although it be varied, and be augmented and diminished according to degrees and parts.

X. Thus was man created, that he might know, love and worship his Creator, and might live with Him for ever in a state of blessedness. By this act of creation God most manifestly displayed the glory of his wisdom, goodness, and power.

XI. From this description of man it appears, that he is both fitted to perform the act of religion to God, since such an act is required from him; that he is capable of the reward which may [decenter obtingere] be properly adjudged to those who perform [acts of ] religion to God, and of the punishment which may be justly inflicted on those who neglect religion; and therefore that religion may by a deserved right be required from man according to this relation: And this is the principal [respectus] relation, according to which we must in sacred Theology treat about the creation of man after the image of God.

XII. In addition to this image of God, and this reference to supernatural and spiritual things, comes under our consideration the state [vita animalis] of the natural life, in which the first man was created and constituted, according to the apostle Paul, "That which is natural was first, and afterwards that which is spiritual." (1 Cor. xv, 46.) This state is founded in the natural union of body and soul, and in the life which the soul naturally lives in the body; from which union and life it is that the soul procures for its body things which are good for it; and, on the other hand, the body is ready for offices which are congruous to its nature and desires. According to this state or condition, there is a mutual relation between man and the good things of this world; the effect of which is, that man can desire them, and, in procuring them for himself, can bestow that labour which he deems to be necessary and convenient.

DISPUTATION XXVII.

ON THE LORDSHIP OR DOMINION OF GOD.

I. THROUGH creation, dominion over all things which have been created by himself belongs to God. It is therefore primary, being dependent on no other dominion or on that of no other person: And it is on this account chief, because there is none greater; and it is absolute, because it is over the entire creature according to the whole, and according to all and each of its parts, and to all the relations which subsist between the Creator and the creature. It is consequently perpetual, that is, so long as the creature itself exists.

II. But the dominion of God is the right of the Creator, and his power over the creatures; according to which He has them [proprias sibi] as his own property, and can command and use them, and do about them whatever the relation of creation, and the equity which rests upon it, permit.

III. For the right cannot extend further than is allowed by that cause from which the whole of it arises, and on which it is dependent: For this reason it is not agreeable to this right of God, -either that He [addicat] delivers up his creature to another who may domineer over such creature at his arbitrary pleasure, so that he be not compelled to render to God an account of the exercise of his sovereignty, and be able, without any demerit on the part of the creature, to inflict every evil on a creature capable of injury, or, at least, not for any good of this creature ;—or that He [God] command an act to be done by the creature, for the performance of which he neither has nor can have sufficient and necessary powers;-or that He employ the creature to introduce sin into the world, that He may, by punishing or by forgiving it, [evadat gloriosus] promote his own glory;-or, lastly, to do concerning the creature whatever He is able according to his absolute power to do concerning him, that is, eternally to punish or to afflict him, without [his having committed] sin.

IV. As this is a power over rational creatures, (in reference to whom chiefly we treat on the dominion and power of God,) it may be considered in two views, either as despotic and lordly, or as kingly and patriarchal: The former is that which He employs without any intention of good which may be useful or saving to the creature: The latter is that which He employs when he also intends the good of the creature itself. And this last is used by God through the abundance of his own goodness and sufficiency,

until He considers the creature to be unworthy, on account of his perverseness, to have God presiding over him in His kingly and paternal authority.

V. Hence it is that when God is about to command something to his rational creature, He does not exact every thing which He [jure] justly might do, and he employs persuasions through arguments which have regard to the utility and necessity of those persuasions.

VI. In addition to this, God enters into a contract or covenant with his creature ;-and He does this for the purpose that the creature may serve Him, not so much "of debt," as from a spontaneous, free and liberal obedience;-according to the nature of confederations, which consist of stipulations and promises: On this account God frequently distinguishes his law by the title of a COVENANT.

VII. Yet this condition is always annexed to the confederation, -that if man be unmindful of the covenant and a contemner of its pleasant rule, he may always [urgeatur] be impelled or governed by that domination which is really lordly, strict, and rigid; and into which he who refuses to obey the other [species of rule] justly falls.

VIII. Hence arises a two-fold right of God over his rational creature: The FIRST, which belongs to Him through creation: The SECOND, through contract. The former rests on the good which the creature has received from his Creator: The latter rests on the still greater benefit which the creature will receive from God his Preserver, Promoter, and Glorifier.

IX. If the creature happen to sin against this two-fold right, by that very act he gives to God, his Lord, King and Father, the right of treating him as a sinning creature, and of inflicting on him due punishment: And this is a THIRD right, which rests on the wicked act of the creature against God.

DISPUTATION XXVIII.

ON THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD.

I. Not only does the very nature of God and of things themselves, but likewise the Scriptures and experience do, evidently shew that Providence belongs to God.

II. But Providence denotes some property of God, not a quality, or [potentia] a capability, or a habit; but it is an act, which is not ad intra nor internal, but which is ad extra and

external; and which is about an object [aliud] different from God, and that is not united to Him from all eternity in his understanding, but as separate and really existing.

III. And it is an act of the practical understanding, or of the will employing the understanding, not [peractus] completed in a single moment, but continued through the moments of the duration of things.

IV. And it may be defined, The solicitous, everywhere powerful, and continued [intuitus] inspection and oversight of God, according to which He exercises a general care over the whole world, and over each of the creatures and their actions and passions, in a manner that is befitting Himself and suitable for his creatures, for their benefit, especially for that of pious men, and for a declaration of the divine perfection.

V. We have represented the object of it to be,-both the whole world as it is [unum quid] a single thing consisting of many parts which have a certain relation among themselves, and possessing order between each other, and each of the creatures with its actions and passions: We preserve the distinction of the goodness which is in them, (1.) According to their nature, through creation: (2.) According to grace, through the communication of supernatural gifts, and elevation to dignities: (3.) According to the right use both of nature and grace. Yet we ascribe the last two also to the act of providence.

VI. The rule of providence, according to which it produces its acts, is the Wisdom of God, demonstrating what [deceat] is worthy of God, according to his goodness, his severity, or his love for justice or for the creature, but always according to equity.

VII. The acts of providence which belong to its execution, are,-Preservation, which appears to be occupied about essences, qualites and quantities;-and Government, which presides over actions and passions; and of which the principal acts are motion, assistance, concurrence, and permission: The three former of these acts extend themselves to good, whether natural or moral; and the last of them appertains to evil alone.

VIII. The power of God serves universally and at all times to execute these acts, with the exception of permission; specially and sometimes these acts are executed by the creatures themselves: Hence an act of providence is called either immediate or mediate. When it employs [the agency of] the creatures, then it permits them [agere] to conduct their motions agreeably to their own nature, unless it be his pleasure to do any thing [præter ordinem] out of the ordinary way.

IX. Then, those acts which are performed according to some certain [tenorem] course of nature or of grace, are called ordinary: Those which are employed either beyond, above, or also contrary to this order, are styled extraordinary. Yet they are always concluded by the terms, [decentia et convenientia] due fitness and suitableness, of which we have treated in the definition. [Thesis IV.]

X. Degrees are laid down in providence, not according to intuition or oversight itself, neither according to presence or continuity; but according to solicitude and care, which yet are [secura] free from anxiety, but which are greater concerning a man than concerning bullocks, also greater concerning believers and pious persons, than concerning those who are impious.

XI. The end of providence and of all its acts, is,—the declaration of the divine perfections, of Wisdom, Goodness, Justice, Severity and Power;-and the good of the whole, especially of those men who are chosen or elected.

XII. But since God does nothing, or permits it to be done in time, which He has not decreed from all eternity either to do or to permit; that decree therefore is placed before providence and its acts, as an internal act is before one that is external.

XIII. The effect, or, rather, the consequence, which belongs to God himself, is his prescience: And it is partly called natural and necessary, and partly free: FREE, because it follows the act of the divine free will, without which it would not be the object of it:-NATURAL and NECESSARY, so far as, when this object is laid down by the act of the divine will, it cannot be unknown by the divine understanding.

XIV. Prediction sometimes follows this Prescience, when it pleases God to give intimations to his creatures of the issues of things before they come to pass. But neither Prediction nor any Prescience induces a necessity of any thing [future] that is afterwards to be; since they are [in the divine mind] posterior in nature and order to the thing that is future. For a thing does not come to pass because it has been foreknown or foretold; but it is foreknown and foretold because it is yet [futura] to come to pass. XV. Neither does the decree itself, by which the Lord administers providence and its acts, induce any necessity on things future: For since it [the decree § XII] is an internal act of God, it lays down nothing in the thing itself. But things come to pass and happen either necessarily or contingently, according to the mode of power, which it has pleased God to employ in the administration of affairs.