VIII. ON THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD. 1. THE Providence of God is subordinate to creation: And it is, therefore, necessary, that it should not impinge against creation; which it would do, were it to inhibit or hinder the use of free will in man, or should deny to man its necessary concurrence, or should direct man to another end, or to destruction, than to that which is agreeable to the condition and state in which He was created; that is, if the providence of God should so rule and govern man that he should necessarily become [vitiosus] corrupt, in order that God might manifest his own glory, both of justice and mercy, through the sin of man, according to his eternal counsel. 2. It appertains to the providence of God to act and permit ; which two things are confounded when permission is changed into action under this pretext,-that it cannot be idle or unemployed. 3. Divine providence does not determine a free will to one part of a contradiction or contrariety, that is, by a determination preceding the actual volition itself; [alioquin] under other circumstances the concurrence of the very volition with the will is the concomitant cause, and thus determines the will with the volition itself, by an act which is not previous but simultaneous, as the School-men express themselves. 4. The permission of God by which He permits any one to fall into sin is not correctly defined as "the subtraction or withdrawing of Divine Grace; by which, while God executes the decrees of his will through his rational creatures, He either does not unfold to the creature his own will by which He wills that wicked work to be done, or He does not bend the will of the man to obey the Divine Will in that action."-(URSINUS On Providence, tom. 1, fol. 178.) IX.-ON PREDESTINATION, CONSIDERED IN THE PRIMEVAL STATE OF MAN. 1. IT is not a true assertion, that "out of men considered puris naturalibus,* (either without supernatural things or with them,) God has determined, by the decree of election, to elevate to supernatural felicity some particular men, but to leave others in nature." * In the state in which they were when they proceeded from the creating hand of God. 2. And it is rashly asserted, that "it belongs to [rationem] the relation or analogy of the universe, that some men be placed on the right and others on the left; even as the method of the Master-builder requires, that some stones be placed on the left side, and others on the right, of a house which is to be built." 3. The permission by which God permits that some men wander from and miss the supernatural end, is unwisely made subordinate to this predestination: For it appertains to Providence to lead and conduct a rational creature to supernatural felicity in a manner which is agreeable to the nature of that creature. 4. The permission, also, by which God permitted our first parents to fall into sin, is rashly said to be subordinate to this predestination. X.-ON THE CAUSE OF SIN UNIVERSALLY. 1. THOUGH sin can be committed by none except by a rational creature, and, therefore, ceases to be sin by this very circumstance, if the cause of it be ascribed to God; yet it seems possible by four arguments to fasten this charge on our divines,"It follows from their doctrine that God is the author of sin.” 2. FIRST REASON.-Because they teach, that "without foresight of sin, God absolutely determined to declare his own glory through punitive justice and mercy, in the salvation of some men and in the damnation of others." Or, as others of them assert, "God resolved to illustrate his own glory by the demonstration of saving grace, wisdom, wrath, [potentia et potestatis,] ability, and most free power, in the salvation of some particular men, and in the eternal damnation of others; which neither can be done, nor has been done, without the entrance of sin into the world." 3. SECOND REASON.-Because they teach, "that, in order to attain to that chief and supreme end, God ordained that man should sin and become corrupt, by which thing God might open a way to himself for the execution of this decree." 4. THIRD REASON.-Because they teach, "that God has either denied to man, or has withdrawn from man, before he sinned, grace necessary and sufficient to avoid sin:" Which is tantamount to this,—as if God had imposed a law on man which was simply impossible to be performed or observed by his very nature. 5. FOURTH REASON.-Because they attribute to God some acts, partly external, partly mediate, and partly immediate, which being once laid down, man was not able to do otherwise than commit sin by necessity of a consequent and antecedent to the thing itself, which entirely takes away all liberty; yet without this liberty a man cannot be considered, or reckoned, as being guilty of the commission of sin. 6. A FIFTH REASON.-Testimonies of the same description may be added in which our divines assert, in express words, that "the reprobate cannot escape the necessity of sinning, especially since this kind of necessity is injected through [ordinatione] the appointment of God."-(CALVIN'S Institutes, lib. 2, 23.) XI. ON THE FALL OF ADAM. 1. ADAM was able to continue in goodness and to refrain from sinning, and this in reality and in reference to the issue, and not only by [potentia] capability not to be brought into action on account of some preceding decree of God, or rather not possible to lead to an act by that preceding decree. 2. Adam sinned freely and voluntarily, without any necessity, either internal or external. 3. Adam did not fall through the decree of God, neither through being ordained to fall nor through desertion, but through the mere permission of God, which is placed in subordination to no predestination either to salvation or to death, but which belongs to providence so far as it is distinguished in opposition to predestination. 4. Adam did not fall necessarily, either with respect to a decree, appointment, desertion, or permission: From which it is evident what kind of judgment ought to be formed concerning expressions of the following description: 5. "I confess, indeed, that by the will of God all the sons of Adam have fallen into this miserable condition in which they are bound and fastened."-(CALVIN's Institutes, lib. 3, cap. 23.) 6. "They deny, in express words, the existence of this fact,— that it was decreed by God that Adam should perish by his own defection." 7. "God foreknew what result man would have, because He thus ordained it by his decree." 8. "God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, but by his own will He [dispensavit] ordained it." XII. ON ORIGINAL SIN. 1. ORIGINAL sin is not that actual sin by which Adam transgressed the law concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and on account of which we have all been constituted sinners, and rendered [rei] obnoxious or liable to death and condemnation. 2. QUERIES.-Is original sin only [carentia] the absence or want of original righteousness and of primeval holiness, with an inclination to commit sin, which likewise formerly existed in man, though it was not so vehement nor so inordinate as now it is, on account of the lost favour of God, his malediction, and the loss of that good by which that inclination was reduced to order? Or is it a certain infused habit (or acquired ingress) contrary to righteousness and holiness, after that sin had been committed? 3. Does original sin render men obnoxious to ths wrath of God, when they have been previously constituted sinners on account of the actual sin of Adam, and rendered liable to damnation ? 4. Adam, when considered in this state, after sin and prior to restoration, was not bound at once to punishment and obedience, but only to punishment. XIII. ON THE PREDESTINATION OF MAN, CONSIDERED PARTLY IN HIS PRIMEVAL STATE, AND PARTLY IN THE FALL. 1 IT is rashly asserted, that "the matter of predestination, as it is opposed to reprobation, is man in common or absolutely, if regard be had to the fore-ordaining of the end; but if regard be had to the means for the end, it is man about to perish by and in himself and guilty in Adam.”—(TRELCATII Institut., lib. 2. On Predestination.) 2. With equal infelicity is it asserted, that "one reprobation is negative or passive, another affirmative or active; that the former is before all things and causes in things foreknown and considered, or that will arise from things; and that this act is respective of sin, and is called predamnation.” 3. It may become a subject of discussion in what manner the following things can be said agreeably to this doctrine: "The impulsive cause of this predestination is the benevolent [affectus] inclination of the will of God in Christ; and predestination is an eternal act of God, by which He resolves to make in Christ some creatures partakers of his grace and glory." 4. This is a stupid assertion: "The just desertion of God, by which He does not confer grace on a reprobate man, and which appertains to predestination and to its execution, is that of exploration or trial." This also cannot be reconciled with the expressions in the preceding paragraph. XIV.-ON PREDESTINATION CONSIDERED AFTER THE FALL. 1. QUERIES. Out of the fallen human race, or out of the mass of corruption and perdition, has God absolutely chosen some particular men to life, and absolutely reprobated others to death, without any consideration of the good of the one or of the evil of the other? And from a just decree, which is both gracious and severe, is there such a requisite condition as this in the object which God is about to elect and to save, or to reprobate and condemn ? 2. Is any man damned with death eternal, solely on account of the sin of Adam? 3. Are those who are thus the elect necessarily saved on account of the efficacy of grace, which has been destined to them only that they may not be able to do otherwise than assent to it, as it is irresistible? 4. Are those who are thus the reprobate necessarily damned, because either no grace at all, or not sufficient, has been destined to them, that they may assent to it and believe? 5. Or rather, according to St. Augustine, Are those who are thus the elect assuredly saved, because God decreed to employ grace on them as he knew was suitable and congruous that they might be persuaded and saved; though, if regard be had to the internal efficacy of grace, they may not be advanced or benefited by it? 6. Are those who have thus been reprobated certainly damned, because God does not apply to them grace as He knows to be suitable and congruous; though in the mean time they [afficiantur] are supplied with sufficient grace, that they may be able to yield their assent and be saved? XV. -ON THE DECREES OF GOD WHICH CONCERN THE SALVA- 1. THE FIRST DECREE concerning the salvation of sinful men, is that by which God resolves to appoint his Son Jesus Christ as a Saviour, Mediator, Redeemer, High Priest, and One who may |